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266The logic of tests of significancePhilosophy of Science 41 (3): 211-226. 1974.In spite of the fact that the Neyman-Pearson theory of testing is the official theory of statistical testing, most research publications in the social sciences use a pattern of inductive reasoning that is characteristic of Fisherian tests of significance. The exact structure and rationale of this pattern of reasoning is widely misunderstood. The goal of the paper is to describe precisely the pattern and its rationale, and to show that while it is far more cogent than Fisher's critics have realiz…Read more
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158This paper outlines a formal recursive wager resolution calculus (WRC) that provides a novel conceptual framework for sentential logic via bridge rules that link wager resolution with truth values. When paired with a traditional truth-centric criterion of logical soundness WRC generates a sentential logic that is broadly truth-conditional but not truth-functional, supports the rules of proof employed in standard mathematics, and is immune to the most vexing features of their traditional implemen…Read more
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77A refutation of the Neyman-Pearson theory of testingBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24 (3): 201-222. 1973.
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42On the infirmities of Gillies's ruleBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 25 (3): 261-265. 1974.
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41Statistical dogma and the logic of significance testingPhilosophy of Science 45 (1): 120-135. 1978.In a recent note Roger Carlson presented a rather negative appraisal of my treatment of the logic of Fisherian significance testing in [10]. The main issue between us involves Carlson's thesis that, within the limits set by Fisher, standard significance tests are valuable tools of data analysis as they stand, i.e., without modification of the structure of the reasoning they employ. Call this the adequacy thesis. In my paper I argued that the pattern of reasoning employed by tests of significance…Read more
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36Lewis on immodest inductive modelsPhilosophy of Science 39 (3): 375-377. 1972.In a recent paper [2] David Lewis offered an extremely interesting and, if correct, important solution to the main unsolved problem of Carnap's program for inductive logic—the choice of an appropriate C-function. The gist of Lewis' solution is to first obtain a pilot sample from the target population and then select, on the basis of this sample, from among the immodestλ-methods. An immodest inductive method is one which estimates that the mean squared error of its estimates of population relativ…Read more
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34Epistemology and Inference. Henry E. Kyburg, Jr (review)Philosophy of Science 53 (1): 149-150. 1986.
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29Inference, Method and Decision: Towards a Bayesian Philosophy of Science by Roger D. Rosenkrantz (review)Journal of Philosophy 78 (6): 356-367. 1981.
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27Exchangeability and the certainty of objective randomnessJournal of Philosophical Logic 5 (3). 1976.
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24Seidenfeld's critique of Kyburgian statisticsJournal of Philosophy 77 (12): 791-797. 1980.Seidenfeld's Critique of HenryKyburg's statistical treatment of probability is shown to be unjustified.
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11Bayesian Inference with Indeterminate ProbabilitiesPSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1976. 1976.The theory of personal probability needs to be developed as a logic of credibility in order to provide an adequate basis for the theories of scientific inference and rational decision making. But standard systems of personal probability impose formal structures on probability relationships which are too restrictive to qualify them as logics of credibility. Moreover, some rules for conditional probability have no justification as principles of credibility. A formal system of qualitative probabili…Read more
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11Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability: Volume IIPhilosophy of Science 49 (2): 293-295. 1982.
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7Book Review:Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability: Volume II Richard C. Jeffrey (review)Philosophy of Science 49 (2): 293-. 1982.
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1Isaac Levi: "The Enterprise of Knowledge: An Essay on Knowledge, Credal Probability and Chance" (review)Theory and Decision 15 (2): 199. 1983.
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Assuming, ascertaining, and inductive probabilityStudies in the Philosophy of Science. American Philosophical Quarterly Monograph 7. 1969.
Areas of Specialization
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
Philosophy of Mathematics |
Philosophy of Probability |