•  249
    How Can Beliefs Wrong?: A Strawsonian Epistemology
    Philosophical Topics 46 (1): 97-114. 2018.
    We take a tremendous interest in how other people think of us. We have certain expectations of others, concerning how we are to figure in their thought and judgment. And we often feel wronged if those are disappointed. But it is puzzling how others’ beliefs could wrong us. On the one hand, moral considerations don’t bear on the truth of a belief and so seem to be the wrong kind of reasons for belief. On the other hand, truth-directed considerations seem to render moral considerations redundant. …Read more
  •  92
    Responsibility and the Demands of Morality
    Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (3): 315-338. 2017.
    Is it a good objection to a moral theory that it demands a great deal of individual agents? I argue that if we interpret the question to be about the potential welfare costs associated with our moral obligations, the answer must be “no.” However, the demands a moral theory makes can also be measured in terms of what it requires us to take responsibility for. I argue that this is distinct from what we may be required to do or give up, and that it provides a conception of demandingness that makes …Read more
  •  77
    On the Moral Objection to Coercion
    Philosophy and Public Affairs 45 (3): 199-231. 2017.
  •  69
    The Problem of Self-Torture: What's Being Done?
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3): 584-605. 2017.
    We commonly face circumstances in which the cumulative negative effects of repeatedly acting in a certain way over time will be significant, although the negative effects of any one such act, taken on its own, are insubstantial. Warren Quinn's puzzle of the self-torturer presents an especially clear example of this type of predicament. This paper considers three different approaches to understanding the rational response to such situations. The first focuses on the conditions under which it is r…Read more
  •  56
    Are predictions about how one will freely and intentionally behave in the future ever relevant to how one ought to behave? There is good reason to think they are. As imperfect agents, we have responsibilities of self-management, which seem to require that we take account of the predictable ways we're liable to go wrong. I defend this conclusion against certain objections to the effect that incorporating predictions concerning one's voluntary conduct into one's practical reasoning amounts to evad…Read more
  •  51
    Transmission Failures
    Ethics 127 (3): 719-732. 2017.
    According to a natural view of instrumental normativity, if you ought to do φ, and doing ψ is a necessary means for you to do φ, then you ought to do ψ. In “Instrumental Normativity: In Defense of the Transmission Principle,” Benjamin Kiesewetter defends this principle against certain actualist-inspired counterexamples. In this article I argue that Kiesewetter’s defense of the transmission principle fails. His arguments rely on certain principles—Joint Satisfiability and Reason Transmission—whic…Read more
  •  47
    Action and Production
    Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 22 (2): 271-294. 2022.
    here.
  •  42
    Intention and Predicition in Means-End Reasoning
    American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (3): 251-266. 2018.
    How, if at all, does one's intention to realize an end bear on the justification for taking the means to that end? Theories that allow that intending an end directly provides a reason to take the means are subject to a well-known "bootstrapping" objection. On the other hand, "anti-psychologistic" accounts—which seek to derive instrumental reasons directly from the reasons that support adopting the end itself—have unacceptable implications where an agent faces multiple rationally permissible opti…Read more
  •  34
    Against Voluntarism about Doxastic Responsibility
    Journal of Philosophical Research 44 33-51. 2019.
    According to the view Rik Peels defends in Responsible Belief, one is responsible for believing something only if that belief was the result of choices one made voluntarily, and for which one may be held responsible. Here, I argue against this voluntarist account of doxastic responsibility and in favor of the rationalist position that a person is responsible for her beliefs insofar as they are under the influence of her reason. In particular, I argue that the latter yields a more plausible accou…Read more
  •  9
    Shared Agency, Michael Bratman (review)
    Ethics 126 (3): 816-821. 2016.
  •  4
    Aristo of Ceos: Text, Translation, and Discussion
    with William W. Fortenbaugh
    Routledge. 2006.
    Volume 13 in the RUSCH series continues work already begun on the School of Aristotle. Volume 9 featured Demetrius of Phalerum, Volume 10, Dicaearchus of Messana, Volume 11, Eudemus of Rhodes, and Volume 12, both Lyco of Troas and Hieronymus of Rhodes. Now Volume 13 turns our attention to Aristo of Iulis on Ceos, who was active in the last quarter of the third century BCE. Almost certainly he was Lyco's successor as head of the Peripatetic School. In antiquity, Aristo was confused with the like-…Read more