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3363The real distinction between mind and bodyCanadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (sup1): 149--201. 1990.Descartes's "conceivability argument" for substance-dualism is defended against Arnauld's criticism that, for all he knows, Descartes can conceive himself without a body only because he underestimates his true essence; one could suggest with equal plausibility that it is only for ignorance of his essential hairiness that Descartes can conceive himself as bald. Conceivability intuitions are defeasible but special reasons are required; a model for such defeat is offered, and various potential defe…Read more
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2470Non-catastrophic presupposition failureIn Judith Thomson & Alex Byrne (eds.), Content and Modality: Themes From the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker, Oxford University Press. 2006.
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1628Is conceivability a guide to possibility?Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1): 1-42. 1993.
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1581Advertisement for a sketch of an outline of a proto-theory of causationIn Ned Hall, L. A. Paul & John Collins (eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals, Mit Press. pp. 119-137. 2004.
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1342A Priority and ExistenceIn Paul Artin Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori, Oxford University Press. pp. 197. 2000.
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1217Textbook kripkeanism and the open texture of conceptsPacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (1). 2000.Kripke, argued like this: it seems possible that E; the appearance can't be explained away as really pertaining to a "presentation" of E; so, pending a different explanation, it is possible that E. Textbook Kripkeans see in the contrast between E and its presentation intimations of a quite general distinction between two sorts of meaning. E's secondary or a posteriori meaning is the set of all worlds w which E, as employed here, truly describes. Its primary or a priori meaning is the set of all …Read more
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1150Knights, Knaves, Truth, Truthfulness, Grounding, Tethering, Aboutness, and ParadoxIn Melvin Fitting (ed.), Essays for Raymond Smullyan, . 2017.
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1038How in the world?In Christopher Hill (ed.), Philosophical Topics, University of Arkansas Press. pp. 255--86. 1996.
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1011Ifs, Ands, and Buts: An Incremental Truthmaker Semantics for Indicative ConditionalsAnalytic Philosophy 57 (1): 175-213. 2016.
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818Must existence-questions have answers?In David Chalmers, David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology, Oxford University Press. pp. 507-525. 2009.
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803The Real Distinction Between Mind and BodyCanadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 16 (n/a): 149-201. 1990.….it [is] wholly irrational to regard as doubtful matters that are perceived clearly and distinctly by the understanding in its purity, on account of mere prejudices of the senses and hypotheses in which there is an element of the unknown.Descartes, Geometrical Exposition of the MeditationsSubstance dualism, once a main preoccupation of Western metaphysics, has fallen strangely out of view; today’s mental/physical dualisms are dualisms of fact, property, or event. So if someone claims to find a …Read more
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664Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake?Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 72 (1). 1998.[Stephen Yablo] The usual charge against Carnap's internal/external distinction is one of 'guilt by association with analytic/synthetic'. But it can be freed of this association, to become the distinction between statements made within make-believe games and those made outside them-or, rather, a special case of it with some claim to be called the metaphorical/literal distinction. Not even Quine considers figurative speech committal, so this turns the tables somewhat. To determine our ontological…Read more
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628Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake?Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 72 229-283. 1998.[Stephen Yablo] The usual charge against Carnap's internal/external distinction is one of 'guilt by association with analytic/synthetic'. But it can be freed of this association, to become the distinction between statements made within make-believe games and those made outside them-or, rather, a special case of it with some claim to be called the metaphorical/literal distinction. Not even Quine considers figurative speech committal, so this turns the tables somewhat. To determine our ontological…Read more
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558Saul Kripke: Philosophical Troubles: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (review)Journal of Philosophy 110 (4): 221-229. 2013.
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517Relevance Without MinimalityIn Dirk Kindermann, Peter van Elswyk, Andy Egan & Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini (eds.), Unstructured Content, Oxford University Press. forthcoming.
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507The myth of the sevenIn Mark Eli Kalderon (ed.), Fictionalism in Metaphysics, Clarendon Press. pp. 88--115. 2005.
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470Concepts and ConsciousnessPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2): 455-463. 1999.I. The Conscious Mind is a hugely likable book. Perceptive, candid, and instructive page by page, the work as a whole sets out a large and uplifting vision with cheeringly un-Dover-Beach-ish implications for “our place in the universe.” A book that you can’t helping wanting to believe as much as you can’t help wanting to believe this one doesn’t come along every day. It is with real regret that I proceed to the story of why belief would not come.
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469Coulda, woulda, shouldaIn Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford University Press. pp. 441-492. 2002.
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357A problem about permission and possibilityIn Andy Egan & Brian Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality, Oxford University Press. 2009.
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348Superproportionality and mind-body relationsTheoria 16 (40): 65-75. 2001.Mental causes are threatened from two directions: from below, since they would appear to be screened off by lower-order, e.g., neural states; and from within, since they would also appear to be screened off by intrinsic, e.g., syntactical states. A principle needed to parry the first threat -causes should be proportional to their effects- appears to leave us open to the second; for why should unneeded extrinsic detail be any less offensive to proportionality than excess microstructure? I say tha…Read more
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