Steve Geisz

The Nèiyè 內業 talks of “a heart-mind within a heart-mind” that is somehow connected to or prior to language. In the context of the overall advice on looking “inward” or “internally” as part of the meditation and mysticism practice that the Nèiyè introduces, this talk of a heart-mind within a heart-mind arguably invites comparisons with a Cartesian “inner theater” conception of mentality. In this paper, I examine the “inner” talk of the Nèiyè in order to tease out its identifiable commitments in philosophical psychology. I consider the ways in which the “inner” talk of the text might be read as marking out one or more of three different inner/outer distinctions, and I argue that we can consistently read the Nèiyè without seeing it as marking any inner/outer distinction that is related to what is often referred to in English as “inner experience.”

: This essay introduces a way of reading the Mengzi (Mencius) that complicates how we understand what Mengzi is recorded as saying. A pragmatic-strategic reading of the Mengzi is developed here, according to which Mengzi attends to and operates under important pragmatic constraints on speech. Based on a close reading of key passages, it is argued that truth-telling and descriptive accuracy are less important to Mengzi than guiding people along the Confucian path. This reading has implications for our understanding of Mengzi’s philosophical positions and his methods of argumentation, as well as for our understanding of philosophical activity in general.

Numerous theories of intentionality have been proposed which seek to account for the aboutness of signs, symbols, and representations. Typically such theories attempt to provide a naturalistic account of intentionality, and such theories are often offered for supposed mental representations which are thought to have natural, underived intentionality. While theories of intentionality have problems, it is thought that some such theory must work, at least in principle. ;I offer an alternative adverbial view of signs, symbols, and representations which, if successful, allows us to avoid the problems which theories of intentionality aim to solve. According to an adverbial view of signs, talk or thought about signs, symbols, or representations does not refer to token physical objects which are signs or---in what amounts to the same thing---which have semantic or intentional properties. Rather, talk/thought about signs should be understood adverbially, such that some physical object or other is required to communicate signly, but no physical object is, itself, a sign-object. ;The argument proceeds in three stages. In Part 1, the ontology of signs and utterances is considered. It is argued that the common distinction between natural and conventional intentionality is flawed, since the very individuation of signs can be seen as dependent upon an utterance-act which produces it. It is further argued that the very distinction between sign-objects and utterance-acts is problematic; only in extreme cases is there a neat distinction to be made. ;In Part 2, an adverbial view of signs is explicitly introduced and developed. Potential objections are responded to in the course of specifying how an adverbial view understands syntax and the individuation of signs. ;In Part 3, it is argued that, if we adopt an adverbial view and understand it in light of the considerations of Part 1, the standard problems of intentionality can be seen as an artifact of a contingent, non-adverbial view of signs, symbols, and representations. By adopting an adverbial view and refusing to reify or objectify signs, we can avoid the purported problems of intentionality in an intellectually satisfying way.