My philosophical views

Question Answer Comments
A priori knowledge: yes and no Lean toward: no We might be wired with good true beliefs pre-experience, but it seems to me even such beliefs need to get some justification from the whole body of experience to be knowledge.
Abstract objects: Platonism and nominalism Lean toward: Platonism My hunch is that abstract objects are real patterns of concreta. I guess that makes me Platonist?
Aesthetic value: objective and subjective Lean toward: objective
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes and no Accept: no
Epistemic justification: internalism and externalism Accept: externalism Again I think something two-factory is right but since I think /some/ important notion of justification depends on the extra-mental, I count myself as externalist.
External world: idealism, skepticism or non-skeptical realism Lean toward: non-skeptical realism I'm inclined toward explanationism.
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism or no free will Accept: no free will But I construe responsibility like a typical compatiblist, of course - consequentially.
God: theism and atheism Accept: atheism
Knowledge: empiricism and rationalism Lean toward: empiricism But I'm a scientific realist, etc.
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism or invariantism Lean toward: contextualism
Laws of nature: Humean and non-Humean Lean toward: Humean
Logic: classical and non-classical Lean toward: classical
Mental content: internalism and externalism Lean toward: externalism I'm inclined to accept a two-factor theory; I guess that makes me externalist because I think /some/ notion of content requires the extra-mental?
Meta-ethics: moral realism and moral anti-realism Lean toward: moral realism
Metaphilosophy: naturalism and non-naturalism Accept: naturalism I construe naturalism basically as methodological commitment to IBE. Thus I'm on board in principle with notions like "naturalistic dualism" (though I'm not one).
Mind: physicalism and non-physicalism Lean toward: physicalism
Moral judgment: cognitivism and non-cognitivism Lean toward: cognitivism
Moral motivation: internalism and externalism Lean toward: externalism Because I have overall background preference for welfare utilitarianism, which I fear is motivation externalist. But I think this is something of a problem for utilitarianism.
Newcomb's problem: one box and two boxes Lean toward: one box
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism or virtue ethics Lean toward: consequentialism
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism or sense-datum theory Lean toward: representationalism
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view or further-fact view Accept: psychological view
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism or libertarianism Lean toward: egalitarianism
Proper names: Fregean and Millian Lean toward: Fregean
Science: scientific realism and scientific anti-realism Lean toward: scientific realism
Teletransporter (new matter): survival and death Accept: survival
Time: A-theory and B-theory Lean toward: B-theory A fairly strong leaning, though not at all my expertise.
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch and don't switch Accept: switch
Truth: correspondence, deflationary or epistemic Lean toward: correspondence
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible or metaphysically possible Lean toward: conceivable but not metaphysically possible