•  179
    The grounding objection to middle knowledge revisited
    Religious Studies 39 (1): 93-102. 2003.
    The Molinist doctrine that God has middle knowledge requires that God knows the truth-values of counterfactuals of freedom, propositions about what free agents would do in hypothetical circumstances. A well-known objection to middle knowledge, the grounding objection, contends that counterfactuals of freedom have no truth-value because there is no fact to the matter as to what an agent with libertarian freedom would do in counterfactual circumstances. Molinists, however, have offered responses t…Read more
  •  96
    Compatibilism and the Sinlessness of the Redeemed in Heaven
    Faith and Philosophy 28 (4): 416-431. 2011.
    In a recent issue of Faith and Philosophy, Timothy Pawl and Kevin Timpe seek to respond to the so-called “Problem of Heavenly Freedom,” the problem ofexplaining how the redeemed in heaven can be free yet incapable of sinning. In the course of offering their solution, they argue that compatibilism is inadequateas a solution because it (1) undermines the free will defense against the logical problem of evil, and (2) exacerbates the problem of evil by making God the “author of sin.” In this paper, …Read more
  •  53
    A Reductio Ad Absurdum of Divine Temporality: STEVEN B. COWAN
    Religious Studies 32 (3): 371-378. 1996.
    Theists believe that God is eternal, but they differ as to just what God's eternality means . The traditional, historic view of most Christian philosophers is that eternality means that God is timeless. He is ‘outside’ of time and not subject to any kind of temporal change. Indeed, God is the creator of time. Lets call this view divine timelessness.
  •  27
    Complementarianism Unfazed
    Philosophia Christi 13 (1): 181-187. 2011.
    Adam Omelianchuk argues that my defense of the distinction between woman’s equality in being and subordinate role fails. I respond that his case misses the point of certain aspects of my argument, that it begs the main question, and that it depends upon an unclear notion of metaphysical equality/inferiority.
  •  23
    A Reductio Ad Absurdum of Divine Temporality
    Religious Studies 32 (3). 1996.
    In this paper, I present an argument to show that the doctrine of divine temporality (the view that God is in time, but everlastingly eternal) is incoherent. The doctrine of divine temporality entails that God has traversed an actually infinite series of moments in order to reach the present. But I show that an actually infinite series of moments cannot be traversed. Hence, God could not have traversed his infinite past to reach the present. Therefore, the doctrine of divine temporality is neces…Read more
  •  21
    Critics of the doctrine of eternal punishment may charge that this doctrine constitutes a horrendous evil unworthy of a perfectly good and loving God in that those experiencing eternal torment have lives not worth living. I respond to the problem of hell as a horrendous evil by arguing, first, that it is not clear that eternal torment constitutes a horrendous evil; and, second, that by adding to the traditional doctrine of hell the Christian belief in human sinfulness and our just desert of eter…Read more
  •  13
    Molinism, Meticulous Providence, and Luck
    Philosophia Christi 11 (1): 156-169. 2009.
    Molinism entails that God cannot actualize just any possible world because God has no control over what counterfactuals of freedom (CFs) are true. This fact confronts the Molinist with a dilemma. If God has a plan for the course of history logically antecedent to his cognizance of the true CFs, then God would have been implausibly lucky if any actualizable world corresponded to his plan. If, on the other hand, God did not have a plan for the course of history antecedent to his cognizance of the …Read more
  • Book Review (review)
    Philosophia Christi 9 (1): 242-246. 2007.
  • The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus (review)
    Philosophia Christi 9 (2): 483-487. 2007.
  • Book Review (review)
    Philosophia Christi 5 (1): 332-336. 2003.
  • This dissertation attempts to reconcile the apparent inconsistency between a strong view of divine sovereignty and human moral responsibility. God's absolute sovereignty over his creatures entails that human beings cannot do otherwise than they do. If so, then it would seem to follow that human beings cannot be held morally responsible for their actions. The notion that God has Middle Knowledge is often defended as a way out of this apparent inconsistency. It is argued, however, that counterfact…Read more
  • Book Review (review)
    Philosophia Christi 3 (2): 571-574. 2001.