•  7
    Volume 28, Issue 1, February 2020, Page 96-113.
  •  12
    McDowell, Hegel, and Habits
    Hegel Bulletin 36 (2): 184-201. 2015.
    In his debate with Dreyfus McDowell defends the ‘pervasiveness thesis’, the thesis that rational mindedness pervades the lives of rational animals, their perceptual experiences and exercises of agency. To counter this idea, Dreyfus introduces the notion of ‘social standing’: the culturally inculcated yet non-conceptual sense of the appropriate distance that one should stand from another person. McDowell claims that social standing is not a counter-example to the pervasiveness thesis because it s…Read more
  • Pragmatism, Objectivity, and Experience
    Cambridge University Press. 2019.
    In this book Steven Levine explores the relation between objectivity and experience from a pragmatic point of view. Like many new pragmatists he aims to rehabilitate objectivity in the wake of Richard Rorty's rejection of the concept. But he challenges the idea, put forward by pragmatists like Robert Brandom, that objectivity is best rehabilitated in communicative-theoretic terms - namely, in terms that can be cashed out by capacities that agents gain through linguistic communication. Levine pro…Read more
  •  72
    Habermas, Kantian pragmatism, and truth
    Philosophy and Social Criticism 36 (6): 677-695. 2010.
    In his book Truth and Justification Habermas replaces his long-held discourse-theoretic conception of truth with what he calls a pragmatic theory of truth. Instead of taking truth to originate in the communicative interactions between subjects, this new theory ties truth to the action contexts of the lifeworld, contexts where the existence of the world is ratified in practice. This, Habermas argues, overcomes the relativism and contextualism endemic to the linguistic turn. This article has two g…Read more
  •  9
    Foundations of Hegel’s Social Theory (review)
    Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 23 (1): 203-207. 2001.
  •  4
    Intentionality: Bifurcated or Intertwined?
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (4): 551-558. 2016.
  • On Heidegger's Being and Time (edited book)
    Routledge. 2008.
    _On Heidegger's Being and Time_ is an outstanding exploration of Heidegger's most important work by two major philosophers. Simon Critchley argues that we must see _Being and Time_ as a radicalization of Husserl's phenomenology, particularly his theories of intentionality, categorial intuition, and the phenomenological concept of the a priori. This leads to a reappraisal and defense of Heidegger's conception of phenomenology. In contrast, Reiner Schürmann urges us to read Heidegger 'backward', a…Read more
  •  26
    Intentionality and the Myths of the Given (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 66 (262): 89-193. 2016.
  •  37
    Rorty, Davidson, and the New Pragmatists
    Philosophical Topics 36 (1): 167-192. 2008.
  •  154
    Norms and Habits: Brandom on the Sociality of Action
    European Journal of Philosophy 23 (2): 248-272. 2015.
    In this paper I argue against Brandom's two-ply theory of action. For Brandom, action is the result of an agent acknowledging a practical commitment and then causally responding to that commitment by acting. Action is social because the content of the commitment upon which one acts is socially conferred in the game of giving and asking for reasons. On my proposal, instead of seeing action as the coupling of a rational capacity to acknowledge commitments and a non-rational capacity to reliably re…Read more
  •  27
    Heidegger, Language, and World-Disclosure (review)
    Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 23 (2): 245-251. 2002.
  •  8
    Reflections of Equality by Christoph Menke (review)
    Constellations 14 (3): 454-457. 2007.
  •  53
    Expressivism and I‐Beliefs in Brandom’s Making it Explicit
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (1). 2009.
    No abstract
  •  82
    Sellars' critical direct realism
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (1). 2007.
    In this paper, I attempt to demonstrate the structure of Sellars' critical direct realism in the philosophy of perception. This position is original because it attempts to balance two claims that many have thought to be incompatible: (1) that perceptual knowledge is direct, i.e., not inferential, and (2) that perceptual knowledge is irreducibly conceptual. Even though perceptual episodes are not the result of inferences, they must still stand within the space of reasons if they are to be counted…Read more
  •  279
    Rehabilitating objectivity: Rorty, Brandom, and the new pragmatism
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (4): 567-589. 2010.
    In recent years, a renascent form of pragmatism has developed which argues that a satisfactory pragmatic position must integrate into itself the concepts of truth and objectivity. This New Pragmatism, as Cheryl Misak calls it, is directed primarily against Rorty's neo-pragmatic dismissal of these concepts. For Rorty, the goal of our epistemic practices should not be to achieve an objective view, one that tries to represent things as they are 'in themselves,' but rather to attain a view of things…Read more
  •  46
    Sellars and Nonconceptual Content
    European Journal of Philosophy 24 (4): 855-878. 2016.
    In this paper I take up the question of whether Wilfrid Sellars has a notion of non-conceptual perceptual content. The question is controversial, being one of the fault lines along which so-called left and right Sellarsians diverge. In the paper I try to make clear what it is in Sellars' thought that leads interpreters to such disparate conclusions. My account depends on highlighting the importance of Sellars' little discussed thesis that perception involves a systematic form of mis-categorizati…Read more
  •  9
    Kantianism and Pragmatism: A Response to Margolis
    Contemporary Pragmatism 13 (1): 118-121. 2016.
    In this piece I respond to Joseph Margolis’ article “The Future of Pragmatism’s Second Life.” I make two arguments. First, I argue that Margolis misinterprets the true contest between Kantianism and Pragmatism, and that his vision of Pragmatism’s second life is overly Kantian. Second, I question his conclusion that truths about our agential norms can only ever be ‘second best’.
  •  7
    Does James have a Place for Objectivity?
    European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 5 (2). 2013.
  •  32
    Hegel, Dewey, and habits
    British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23 (4): 632-656. 2015.
    In this paper, I argue against Terry Pinkard's account of the relation between Deweyian pragmatism and Hegelian idealism. Instead of thinking that their affinity concerns the issue of normative authority, as Pinkard does, I argue that we should trace their affinity to Dewey's appropriation of Hegel's naturalism, especially his theory of habits. Pinkard is not in a position to appreciate this affinity because he misreads Dewey as an instrumentalist, and his social-constructivist account of Hegel …Read more