•  670
    Surviving Death – Mark Johnston
    Philosophical Quarterly 61 (245): 884-887. 2011.
    This is a review of Johnston's book Surviving Death.
  •  313
    The epistemic predicament: Knowledge, Nozickian tracking, and scepticism
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (1). 1984.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  222
    Mortal harm
    Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227). 2007.
    The harm thesis says that death may harm the individual who dies. The posthumous harm thesis says that posthumous events may harm those who die. Epicurus rejects both theses, claiming that there is no subject who is harmed, no clear harm which is received, and no clear time when any harm is received. Feldman rescues the harm thesis with solutions to Epicurus' three puzzles based on his own version of the deprivation account of harm. But many critics, among them Lamont, Grey, Feit and Bradley, ha…Read more
  •  222
    Dretske on knowledge closure
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3). 2006.
    In early essays and in more recent work, Fred Dretske argues against the closure of perception, perceptual knowledge, and knowledge itself. In this essay I review his case and suggest that, in a useful sense, perception is closed, and that, while perceptual knowledge is not closed under entailment, perceptually based knowledge is closed, and so is knowledge itself. On my approach, which emphasizes the safe indication account of knowledge, we can both perceive, and know, that sceptical scenarios …Read more
  •  221
    The causal indicator analysis of knowledge
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (4): 563-587. 1987.
  •  214
    Posthumous Harm
    American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (1). 2004.
    According to Epicurus (1966a,b), neither death, nor anything that occurs later, can harm those who die, because people who die are not made to suffer as a result of either. In response, many philosophers (e.g., Nagel 1970, Feinberg 1984, and Pitcher 1984) have argued that Epicurus is wrong on both counts. They have defended the mortem thesis: death may harm those who die. They have also defended the post-mortem thesis: posthumous events may harm people who die. Their arguments for this joint vie…Read more
  •  201
    Annihilation
    Philosophical Quarterly 37 (148): 233-252. 1987.
  •  196
    The epistemic closure principle
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2008.
    Most of us think we can always enlarge our knowledge base by accepting things that are entailed by (or logically implied by) things we know. The set of things we know is closed under entailment (or under deduction or logical implication), which means that we know that a given claim is true upon recognizing, and accepting thereby, that it follows from what we know. However, some theorists deny that knowledge is closed under entailment, and the issue remains controversial. The arguments against cl…Read more
  •  183
    The Absurdity of Life
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 1-17. 1992.
  •  170
    Exhausting Life
    The Journal of Ethics 17 (1-2): 99-119. 2013.
    Can we render death harmless to us by perfecting life, as the ancient Epicureans and Stoics seemed to think? It might seem so, for after we perfect life—assuming we can—persisting would not make life any better. Dying earlier rather than later would shorten life, but a longer perfect life is no better than a shorter perfect life, so dying would take nothing of value from us. However, after sketching what perfecting life might entail, I will argue that it is not a desirable approach to invulnerab…Read more
  •  150
    Epistemic relativism
    Philosophical Issues 14 (1). 2004.
    Epistemic relativism rejects the idea that claims can be assessed from a universally applicable, objective standpoint. It is greatly disdained because it suggests that the real ‘basis’ for our views is something fleeting, such as ‘‘the techniques of mass persuasion’’ (Thomas Kuhn 1970) or the determination of intellectuals to achieve ‘‘solidarity’’ (Rorty 1984) or ‘‘keep the conversation going’’ (Rorty 1979). But epistemic relativism, like skepticism, is far easier to despise than to convincingl…Read more
  •  148
    The absurdity of life
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1): 85-101. 1992.
  •  133
    Contrastivism and Skepticism
    International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2 (1): 51-58. 2012.
    Recently, Jonathan Schaffer has defended a contrastivist analysis of knowledge. By appealing to his account, he has attempted to steer a path between skepticism and Moore-style antiskepticism: much like sensitivity theorists and contextualists, he offers significant concessions to, but ultimately rejects, both. In this essay I suggest that in fact Schaffer ends up succumbing to skepticism
  •  104
    The Philosophy of Death
    Cambridge University Press. 2009.
    The Philosophy of Death is a discussion of the basic philosophical issues concerning death, and a critical introduction to the relevant contemporary philosophical literature. Luper begins by addressing questions about those who die: What is it to be alive? What does it mean for you and me to exist? Under what conditions do we persist over time, and when do we perish? Next, he considers several questions concerning death, including: What does dying consist in; in particular, how does it differ fr…Read more
  •  101
    Death
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2008.
    First, what constitutes a person's death? It is clear enough that people die when their lives end, but less clear what constitutes the ending of a person's life.
  •  77
    The Anatomy of Aggression
    American Philosophical Quarterly 27 (3). 1990.
  •  72
    Annihilation: The sense and significance of death – Christopher Belshaw
    Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238): 218-220. 2010.
    No Abstract
  •  63
    Competing for the Good Life
    American Philosophical Quarterly 23 (2). 1986.
  •  61
    The knower, inside and out
    Synthese 74 (3): 349-67. 1988.
    Adherents of the epistemological position called internalism typically believe that the view they oppose, called externalism, is such a new and radical departure from the established way of seeing knowledge that its implications are uninteresting. Perhaps itis relatively novel, but the approach to knowledge with the greatest antiquity is the one that equates it withcertainty, and while this conception is amenable to the demands of the internalist, it is also a non-starter in the opinion of almos…Read more
  •  58
    Despite its plausibility, I mean to resist this argument. I will reject premise 1 on the grounds that dying may be atemporally bad for us. I will also reject premise 3. Some postmortem events are bad for some of us while we are alive. But I am not going to report some new exotic particle that makes backwards causation possible. As far as I know, 6 is true. If an event is responsible for a harm that we incur before the event itself occurs, it might be said to harm us retroactively ; if when or af…Read more
  •  54
    The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays (edited book)
    Ashgate Publishing. 2003.
    Presented throughout in an accessible style, this book will prove particularly useful for students, researchers and general readers of philosophy who are ...
  •  54
    The Easy Argument
    Acta Analytica 22 (4). 2007.
    Suppose Ted is in an ordinary house in good viewing conditions and believes red, his table is red, entirely because he sees his table and its color; he also believes not-white, it is false that his table is white and illuminated by a red light, because not-white is entailed by red. The following three claims about this table case clash, but each seems plausible: 1. Ted’s epistemic position is strong enough for him to know red. 2. Ted cannot know not-white on the basis of red. 3. The epistemic …Read more
  •  49
    The Reliabilist Theory of Rational Belief
    The Monist 68 (2): 203-225. 1985.
    Niceties aside, Reliabilism is the claim that a belief is justified or rational if and only if it has a reliable source. One way to arrive at a belief is by inferring it from others through the application of a rule of inference. Hence Reliabilism has the consequence that a belief arrived at by applying a given rule of inference is rational if and only if arriving at that belief by applying the rule is reliable. This consequence of Reliabilism I will call the Reliabilist’s Thesis.
  •  46
    Doxastic skepticism
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 25 (4): 529-538. 1987.
  •  43
    Justice and Natural Resources
    Environmental Values 1 (1): 47-64. 1992.
    Justice entitles everyone in the world, including future generations, to an equitable share of the benefits of the world's natural resources. I argue that even though both Rawls and his libertarian critics seem hostile to it, this resource equity principle, suitably clarified, is a major part of an adequate strict compliance theory of global justice whether or not we take a libertarian or a Rawlsian approach. I offer a defence of the resource equity principle from both points of view
  •  43
    ‘Skepticism’ refers primarily to two positions. Knowledge skepticism says there is no such thing as knowledge, and justification skepticism denies the existence of justified belief. How closely the two views are related depends on the relationship between knowledge and justification: if knowledge entails justified belief, as many theorists say, then justification skepticism entails knowledge skepticism (but not vice versa). Either form of skepticism can be limited in scope. Global (or radical) s…Read more
  •  42
    Moore's Missing Principle
    Philosophical Papers 36 (1): 151-161. 2007.
    Philosophical Papers 36.1 (2007): 151-161.
  •  41
    Review of Ben Bradley, Well-Being and Death (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (7). 2009.