•  3404
    Oppressive Double Binds
    Ethics 131 (4): 643-669. 2021.
    I give an account of the structure of “oppressive double binds,” the double binds that exist in virtue of oppression. I explain how these double binds both are a product of and serve to reinforce o...
  •  2073
    Acting virtuously as an end in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics
    British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (6): 1006-1026. 2018.
    Sometimes, in the Nicomachean Ethics (NE), Aristotle describes virtuous actions as the sorts of actions that are ends; it is important for Aristotle to do so if he wants to maintain, as he seems to at least until NE 10.7-8, that virtuous actions are a constituent of eudaimonia. At other times, he claims that virtuous actions are the sorts of actions that are for the sake of ends beyond themselves; after all, no one would choose to go into battle or give away a significant portion of their wealth…Read more
  •  1915
    Outrage and the Bounds of Empathy
    Philosophers' Imprint 22 (16). 2022.
    Often, when we are angry, we are angry at someone who has hurt us, and our anger is a protest against our perceived mistreatment. In these cases, its function is to hold the abuser accountable for their offense. The anger involves a demand for some sort of change or response: that the hurt be acknowledged, that the relationship be repaired, that the offending party reform in some way. In this paper, I develop and defend an account of a different form of anger, called "outrage anger". Outrage ang…Read more
  •  1801
    What's Aristotelian about neo‐Aristotelian Virtue Ethics?
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (3): 671-696. 2019.
    It is commonly assumed that Aristotle's ethical theory shares deep structural similarities with neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics. I argue that this assumption is a mistake, and that Aristotle's ethical theory is both importantly distinct from the theories his work has inspired, and independently compelling. I take neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics to be characterized by two central commitments: (i) virtues of character are defined as traits that reliably promote an agent's own flourishing, and (ii) v…Read more
  •  1765
    External Goods and the Complete Exercise of Virtue in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics
    Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 103 (1): 29-53. 2021.
    In Nicomachean Ethics 1.8, Aristotle seems to argue that certain external goods are needed for happiness because, in the first place, they are needed for virtuous activity. This has puzzled scholars. After all, it seems possible for a virtuous agent to exercise her virtuous character even under conditions of extreme hardship or deprivation. Indeed, it is natural to think these are precisely the conditions under which one's virtue shines through most clearly. Why then does Aristotle think that a …Read more
  •  1002
    Not Always Worth the Effort: Difficulty and the Value of Achievement
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (2): 525-548. 2019.
    Recent literature has argued that what makes certain activities ranging from curing cancer to running a marathon count as achievements, and what makes achievements intrinsically valuable is, centrally, that they involve great effort. Although there is much the difficulty-based view gets right, I argue that it generates the wrong results about some central cases of achievement, and this is because it is too narrowly focused on only one perfectionist capacity, the will. I propose a revised perfect…Read more
  •  518
    Aristotle on the Uses of Contemplation (review)
    Philosophical Review 129 (3): 465-468. 2020.
  •  1
    Both Kant and Sidgwick recognize a deep tension between moral and prudential reasons. On the basis of what we can observe, both agree that fulfilling one’s moral obligation is not always prudentially optimal. And, both agree, if acting morally must sometimes come at the cost of one’s own happiness, then we should be skeptical about the possibility of having a completely rationalized — that is, a completely systematic and coherent — account of practical reason. Both suggest that, the empirical wo…Read more