•  29
    [full article, abstract in English; only abstract in Lithuanian] In this paper, I present an interpretation on how Hume can escape from his intellectual ordeal concerning personal identity in the Appendix of the Treatise. First of all, I present the source of Hume’s despair to offer an interpretation on what would have truly bothered Hume in the Appendix, and I identify several lines of interpretation. Recently Jonathan Ellis has distinguished various ways of understanding Hume’s predicament. Of…Read more
  •  41
    Emotion, Experiential Memory and Selfhood
    Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20 (1): 18-36. 2013.
  •  40
    Goldie's Puzzling Two Feelings:'Bodily Feeling 'and'Feeling Toward '
    Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 16 (3): 317-327. 2009.
    Emotion theorists in contemporary discussion have divided into two camps. The one claims that emotions are reducible to bodily feelings; the other holds that emotions are reducible to belief, desire or evaluative judgement. In an effort to avoid such reductionist view, Goldie suggests that emotions involve two kinds of feelings: bodily feel­ings and feeling towards. In spite of Goldie’s efforts, I argue that ex­plaining our emotional disposition in terms of ‘feeling toward’ re­mains distinctly u…Read more
  •  74
    Hume on the Authority of Desire in Explaining Action
    Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 16 263-273. 2008.
    The association of passion with desire has a long history, from Aristotle to contemporary philosophers. The Aristotelian conception of passion as involving desire has exerted a considerable influence on modern philosophers. I shall take this idea to be the thesis that emotion implies desire. In order to elaborate this thesis, in this paper, I shall focus on Hume’s theory of passion in Book 2 of Treatise. To this end, I first of all present an interpretation of Hume that relies on an account of d…Read more
  •  45
    Emotion, Intentionality and Appropriateness of Emotion: In Defense of a Response Dependence Theory
    Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 16 (1): 82-104. 2009.
    In explaining emotion, there are strong cognitive views, which reduce emotion to belief/thought or judgment. Misgivings about assimilating emotion to belief/thought/judgment have been a main reason for moving towards perceptual accounts for many authors. My aim in this paper is to defend a perceptual theory. To this end, I first argue against a crude version of cognitivism that views emotion essentially in terms of thought or belief. I then argue that doubts about the assimilation of emotion to …Read more
  •  3
    My aim, in this paper, is to demonstrate that Nussbaum’s cognitivism ignores a ‘feeling’ component. Although Nussbaum tries to address the feeling component by distinguishing two kinds of feelings, one with a rich intentional or cognitive content, and the other lacking such content, she downplays the feeling component. She claims that the latter kind of feeling is neither necessary nor sufficient for emotions, while feelings of the former kind, which she claims are ‘terminological variations’ of…Read more
  •  60
    Moral Emotions and Thick Ethical Concepts
    Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 10 469-479. 2008.
    My aim in this paper is to illuminate the limitations of adopting thick ethical concepts to support the rationality of moral emotion. To this end, I shall first of all concentrate on whether emotions, especially moral emotions are thick concepts and can be analysed into both evaluative and descriptive components. Secondly,I shall examine Gibbard’s thesis that to judge an act wrong is to think guilt and anger warranted. I then raise the following question. If we identify moral considerations with…Read more