Cornell University
Sage School of Philosophy
PhD, 2002
APA Central Division
CV
St. Louis, Missouri, United States of America
  •  1780
    Medieval Approaches to Consciousness: Ockham and Chatton
    Philosophers' Imprint 12 1-29. 2012.
    My aim in this paper is to advance our understanding of medieval approaches to consciousness by focusing on a particular but, as it seems to me, representative medieval debate. The debate in question is between William Ockham and Walter Chatton over the existence of what these two thinkers refer to as “reflexive intellective intuitive cognition”. Although framed in the technical terminology of late-medieval cognitive psychology, the basic question at issue between them is this: Does the mind (or…Read more
  •  948
    William Ockham on the Scope and Limits of Consciousness
    Vivarium 52 (3-4): 197-219. 2014.
    Ockham holds what nowadays would be characterized as a “higher-order perception” theory of consciousness. Among the most common objections to such a theory is the charge that it gives rise to an infinite regress in higher-order states. In this paper, I examine Ockham’s various responses to the regress problem, focusing in particular on his attempts to restrict the scope of consciousness so as to avoid it. In his earlier writings, Ockham holds that we are conscious only of those states to which w…Read more
  •  926
    Aquinas on Mental Representation: Concepts and Intentionality
    with Jeffrey E. Brower
    Philosophical Review 117 (2): 193-243. 2008.
    This essay explores some of the central aspects of Aquinas's account of mental representation, focusing in particular on his views about the intentionality of concepts (or intelligible species). It begins by demonstrating the need for a new interpretation of his account, showing in particular that the standard interpretations all face insurmountable textual difficulties. It then develops the needed alternative and explains how it avoids the sorts of problems plaguing the standard interpretations…Read more
  •  885
    The theory of mind that medieval philosophers inherit from Augustine is predicated on the thesis that the human mind is essentially self-reflexive. This paper examines Peter John Olivi's (1248-1298) distinctive development of this traditional Augustinian thesis. The aim of the paper is three-fold. The first is to establish that Olivi's theory of reflexive awareness amounts to a theory of phenomenal consciousness. The second is to show that, despite appearances, Olivi rejects a higher-order analy…Read more
  •  643
    It is well-known that Chatton is among the earliest and most vehement critics of Ockham’s theory of judgment, but scholars have overlooked the role Chatton’s criticisms play in shaping Ockham’s final account. In this paper, I demonstrate that Ockham’s most mature treatment of judgment not only contains revisions that resolve the problems Chatton identifies in his earlier theories, but also that these revisions ultimately bring his final account of the objects of judgment surprisingly close to Ch…Read more
  •  629
    Intuition, Externalism, and Direct Reference in Ockham
    History of Philosophy Quarterly 24 (4): 317-336. 2007.
    In this paper I challenge recent externalist interpretations of Ockham’s theory of intuitive cognition. I begin by distinguishing two distinct theses that defenders of the externalist interpretation typically attribute to Ockham: a ‘direct reference thesis’, according to which intuitive cognitions are states that lack all internal, descriptive content; and a ‘causal thesis’, according to which intuitive states are wholly determined by causal connections they bear to singular objects. I then argu…Read more
  •  591
    Perception in Augustine's De Trinitate 11: A Non-Trinitarian Analysis
    Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy 8 41-78. 2020.
    In this paper, I explore Augustine’s account of sense cognition in book 11 of De Trinitate. His discussion in this context focuses on two types of sensory state—what he calls “outer vision” and “inner vision,” respectively. His analysis of both types of state is designed to show that cognitive acts involving external and internal sense faculties are susceptible of a kind of trinitarian analysis. A common way to read De Trin. 11, is to interpret Augustine’s account of “outer” vision as an analysi…Read more
  •  522
    Facts vs. Things
    Review of Metaphysics 60 (3): 597-642. 2006.
    Commentators have long agreed that Wodeham’s account of objects of judgment is highly innovative, but they have continued to disagree about its proper interpretation. Some read him as introducing items that are merely supervenient on (and nothing in addition to) Aristotelian substances and accidents; others take him to be introducing a new type of entity in addition to substances and accidents—namely, abstract states of affairs. In this paper, I argue that both interpretations are mistaken: the …Read more
  •  469
    Buridan holds that the proper subject of psychology (i.e., the science undertaken in Aristotle’s De Anima) is the soul, its powers, and characteristic functions. But, on his view, the science of psychology should not be understood as including the body nor even the soul-body composite as its proper subject. Rather its subject is just “the soul in itself and its powers and functions insofar as they stand on the side of the soul". Buridan takes it as obvious that, even thus narrowly construed, su…Read more
  •  369
    On the dominant interpretation, Ockham is an externalist about mental content. This reading is founded principally on his theory of intuitive cognition. Intuitive cognition plays a foundational role in Ockham’s account of concept formation and judgment, and Ockham insists that the content of intuitive states is determined by the causal relations such states bear to their objects. The aim of this paper is to challenge the externalist interpretation by situating Ockham’s account of intuitive …Read more
  •  262
    This paper traces a rather peculiar debate between William Ockham, Walter Chatton, and Robert Holcot over whether it is possible for God to know more than he knows. Although the debate specifically addresses a theological question about divine knowledge, the central issue at stake in it is a purely philosophical question about the nature and ontological status of propositions. The theories of propositions that emerge from the discussion appear deeply puzzling, however. My aim in this paper is to…Read more
  •  240
    Aquinas on Human Self-Knowledge. By Therese Scarpelli Cory (review)
    American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 90 (1): 147-151. 2016.
  •  148
    William of Ockham (d. 1347) is well known for his commitment to parsimony and for his so-called ‘razor’ principle. But little is known about attempts among his own contemporaries to deflect his use of the razor. In this paper, I explore one such attempt. In particular, I consider a clever challenge that Ockham’s younger contemporary, Walter Chatton (d. 1343) deploys against the razor. The challenge involves a kind of dilemma for Ockham. Depending on how Ockham responds to this dilemma, his razor…Read more
  •  91
    This paper explores William Ockham's account of memory with a view to understanding its implications for his account of the nature and persistence of human beings. I show that Ockham holds a view according to which memory (i) is a type of self-knowledge and (ii) entails the existence of an enduring psychological subject. This is significant when taken in conjunction with his account of the afterlife. For, Ockham holds that during the interim state—namely, after bodily death, but prior to bodily …Read more
  •  67
    In Quodlibet XV q.13, Henry of Ghent considers whether the Virgin Mary was immaculately conceived. He argues that she was not, but rather possessed sin only at the first instant of her existence. Because Henry’s defense of this position involves an elaborate discussion of motion and mutation, his discussion marks an important contribution to medieval discussions of Aristotelian natural philosophy. In fact, a number of scholars have identified Henry’s discussion as the source of an unusual fourte…Read more
  •  67
    Lectura super sententias: Liber I, distinctiones 1–2, 3–7, 8–17 (review) (review)
    Journal of the History of Philosophy 49 (1): 120-121. 2011.
    Walter Chatton (ca. 1290–1343) is not exactly a household name—even among historians of medieval philosophy. Indeed, to the extent that he is known to scholars, it is more for his role as a critic of William of Ockham (d. 1347) than for any particular philosophical contribution of his own. Part of the reason for this owes to Chatton's own philosophical style: he uses his objections to Ockham's (and, to a lesser extent, to Peter Aureol's) views as a foil for developing his own. Another, larger pa…Read more
  •  36
    Propositions are items that play certain theoretical roles: (among other things) they serve as objects of belief, fundamental bearers of truth-value, and the semantic contents of sentences. In this paper, I examine the key role Ockham played in the development of later medieval debates about propositions. Unlike contemporary philosophers, who typically assume that propositions are abstract entities of some sort, Ockham holds a nominalist view of propositions according to which token entities—nam…Read more
  •  17
    Gareth B. Matthews: Augustine (review)
    Faith and Philosophy 24 (2): 229-232. 2007.
  •  13
    Editor's Introduction
    Res Philosophica 99 (2): 95-96. 2022.
    This special issue of Res Philosophica brings together articles exploring the theme of “Theological Dogma and Philosophical Innovation in Medieval Philosophy”. Philosophy during the medieval period is deeply influenced and significantly shaped by the religious and theological commitments that define not only the outlook of its individual practitioners, but also the institutional and cultural context within which medieval philosophy develops. Philosophical theorizing during this period is often …Read more
  •  8
    Ockham on Judgment, Concepts, and The Problem of Intentionality
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (1): 67-109. 2007.
    IntroductionIn this paper I examine William Ockham's theory of judgment — in particular, his account of the nature and ontological Status of its objects. ‘Judgment’ (Latiniudicio)is the expression Ockham and other medieval thinkers use to refer to a certain subset of what philosophers nowadays call ‘propositional attitudes’. Judgments include all and only those mental states in which a subject not only entertains a given propositional content, but also takes some positive stance with respect to …Read more
  •  6
    Walter Chatton
    Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. 2011.
  • Since the classic writings of Frege, Russell, and Moore, philosophers have devoted considerable attention to questions concerning the nature and ontological status of propositions . Interest in propositions does not originate, however, with the 20th century. On the contrary, it begins in antiquity and runs through the Middle Ages, flourishing in the 14th century in particular, owing largely to the work of William Ockham on mental language and judgment. In his early writings, Ockham claims that w…Read more