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2554Extended Minds in VatsIn Sanford Goldberg (ed.), The Brain in a Vat, Cambridge University Press. pp. 54-72. 2015.Hilary Putnam has famously argued that “we are brains in a vat” is necessarily false. The argument assumes content externalism (also known as semantic externalism and anti-individualism), that is, the view that the individuation conditions of mental content depend, in part, on external or relational properties of the subject’s environment. Recently content externalism has given rise to the hypothesis of the extended mind, whereby mental states are not only externally individuated but also extern…Read more
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771On the Blameworthiness of ForgettingIn Kourken Michaelian, Dorothea Debus & Denis Perrin (eds.), New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory, Routledge. pp. 241-258. 2018.It is a mistake to think that we cannot be morally responsible for forgetting because, as a matter of principle, forgetting is outside of our control. Sometimes we do have control over our forgetting. When forgetting is under our control there is no question that it is the proper object of praise and blame. But we can also be morally responsible for forgetting something when it is beyond our control that we forget that thing. The literature contains three accounts of the blameworthiness of forge…Read more
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754Evidence, reasons, and knowledge in the reasons-first programPhilosophical Studies 181 (2): 617-625. 2023.Mark Schroeder’s Reasons First is admirable in its scope and execution, deftly demonstrating the theoretical promise of extending the reasons-first approach from ethics to epistemology. In what follows we explore how (not) to account for the evidence-that relation within the reasons-first program, we explain how factive content views of evidence can be resilient in the face of Schroeder’s criticisms, and we explain how knowledge from falsehood threatens Schroeder’s view of knowledge. Along the w…Read more
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751Warum das Gettier-Problem kein Scheinproblem istIn Gerhard Ernst & Lisa Marani (eds.), Das Gettierproblem. Eine Bilanz nach 50 Jahren, Mentis. pp. 29-48. 2013.Wie der Titel des Aufsatzes bereits signalisiert, werde ich dafür argumentieren, dass das Gettier-Problem ein genuines Problem ist, keines, das sich lediglich einer falschen Fragestellung verdankt. Versuche, das Gettier-Problem aufzulösen statt zu lösen, sind zum Scheitern verurteilt. In den ersten beiden Abschnitten wird eine Typologisierung von Gettier-Fällen vorgenommen und zwischen zwei Lesarten des Gettier-Problems unterschieden. Im dritten Abschnitt werden einige Auflösungsversuche des Get…Read more
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698Reinholds Erkenntnistheorie des DissensIn Violetta Stolz, Martin Bendeli & Marion Heinz (eds.), Wille, Willkür, Freiheit: Reinholds Freiheitskonzeption im Kontext der Philosophie des 18. Jahrhunders, De Gruyter. pp. 453-469. 2012.This paper explains and defends Reinhold’s epistemology of disagreement. The concept of agreement is of central importance for Reinhold’s philosophy. He attempts to settle the most basic disputes among post-Kantian philosophers by offering intermediate positions that reconcile the seemingly incompatible views. Moreover, Reinhold argues for epistemic objectivism, that is, the thesis that a group of philosophers sharing the same information and respecting each other’s opinion may not reasonably di…Read more
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655Autoconhecimento e os limites da autenticidadeSkepsis: A Journal for Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Research 9 (13): 105-125. 2016.
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649Reinholds linguistischer SchematismusIn Violetta Waibel & Margit Ruffing (eds.), Proceedings of the 12th International Kant Congress: Nature and Freedom, De Gruyter. pp. 3369-3377. 2018.In diesem Aufsatz stelle ich eine neue Interpretation der Reinhold’schen Sprachphilosophie vor. Mein Ziel ist es zu erklären, wie Reinhold der Meinung sein konnte, seine Sprachphilosophie stelle, ebenso wie seine Elementarphilosophie, den Versuch dar, Kants Kritische Philosophie zu fundieren. Außerdem möchte ich zeigen, worin die philosophische Bedeutung von Reinholds Ansatz gegenüber den Sprachphilosophien seiner Zeitgenossen besteht.
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550Memory in Analytic PhilosophyIn Dmitriĭ Vladimirovich Nikulin (ed.), Memory: A History, Oxford University Press Usa. pp. 298-315. 2015.
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480On the Metaphysics of KnowledgeIn Andreas Speer, Wolfram Hogrebe & Markus Gabriel (eds.), Das Neue Bedürfnis Nach Metaphysik / the New Desire for Metaphysics, De Gruyter. pp. 161-180. 2015.This paper argues for an overlooked dimension in the metaphysical microstructure of knowledge. The connection between knowledge and truth is even deeper than generally acknowledged. Knowledge, I argue, supervenes not only on a specific (namely modal) relation between the proposition p’s truth and an agent’s belief that p, but also on specific relations between the proposition’s truthmaker and the belief’s justification-maker. S knows that p only if the states of affairs referred to by S’s reason…Read more
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437Memory and TruthIn Sven Bernecker & Kourken Michaelian (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory, Routledge. pp. 51-62. 2017.
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437Visual Memory and the Bounds of AuthenticityIn Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Volker Munz & Annalisa Coliva (eds.), Mind, Language and Action: Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium, De Gruyter. pp. 445-464. 2015.It has long been known that memory need not be a literal reproduction of the past but may be a constructive process. To say that memory is a constructive process is to say that the encoded content may differ from the retrieved content. At the same time, memory is bound by the authenticity constraint which states that the memory content must be true to the subject's original perception of reality. This paper addresses the question of how the constructive nature of visual memory can be reconciled …Read more
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409The Routledge Companion to Epistemology (edited book)Routledge. 2010.Epistemology, the philosophy of knowledge, is at the core of many of the central debates and issues in philosophy, interrogating the notions of truth, objectivity, trust, belief and perception. _The Routledge Companion to Epistemology_ provides a comprehensive and the up-to-date survey of epistemology, charting its history, providing a thorough account of its key thinkers and movements, and addressing enduring questions and contemporary research in the field. Organized thematically, the _Compani…Read more
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381Die identifikationistische Lösung des Gettier ProblemsIn Dirk Koppelberg & Stefan Tolksdorf (eds.), Erkenntnistheorie – wie und wozu?, Mentis. pp. 189-214. 2015.
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374The philosophy of memory today: Editors' introductionIn Sven Bernecker & Kourken Michaelian (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory, Routledge. pp. 1-3. 2017.
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362Knowledge: readings in contemporary epistemology (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2000.In this anthology, distinguished editors Sven Bernecker and Fred Dretske offer the most comprehensive review available of contemporary epistemology. They bring together the most important and influential writings in the field, including selections that cover frequently neglected topics such as dominant responses to skepticism, introspection, memory, and testimony. Knowledge is divided into fifteen subject areas and includes forty-one readings by eminent contributors. An accessible introduction t…Read more
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351Triangular ExternalismIn Ernest Lepore & Kirk Ludwig (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Donald Davidson, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 443-455. 2013.
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308Self-Knowledge and ClosureIn Peter Ludlow & Norah Martin (eds.), Externalism and Self-Knowledge, Center For the Study of Language and Inf. pp. 333-349. 1998.In this paper I argue in favor of the compatibility of semantic externalism with privileged self-knowledge by showing that an argument for incompatibilism from switching scenarios fails. Given the inclusion theory of self-knowledge, the hypothesis according to which I am having twater thoughts while thinking that I have water thoughts simply isn't a (entertainable) possibility. When I am on Earth thinking earthian concepts, I cannot believe that I am thinking that twater is wet for I don't have …Read more
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291Memory: A Philosophical StudyOxford University Press. 2009.Sven Bernecker presents an analysis of the concept of propositional (or factual) memory, and examines a number of metaphysical and epistemological issues crucial to the understanding of memory. Bernecker argues that memory, unlike knowledge, implies neither belief nor justification. There are instances where memory, though hitting the mark of truth, succeeds in an epistemically defective way. This book shows that, contrary to received wisdom in epistemology, memory not only preserves epistemic f…Read more
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288Representationalism, First-person Authority, and Second-order KnowledgeIn Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge, Oxford University Press. pp. 33-52. 2011.This paper argues that, given the representational theory of mind, one cannot know a priori that one knows that p as opposed to being incapable of having any knowledge states; but one can know a priori that one knows that p as opposed to some other proposition q.
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286Sensitivity, Safety, and ClosureActa Analytica 27 (4): 367-381. 2012.It is widely thought that if knowledge requires sensitivity, knowledge is not closed because sensitivity is not closed. This paper argues that there is no valid argument from sensitivity failure to non-closure of knowledge. Sensitivity does not imply non-closure of knowledge. Closure considerations cannot be used to adjudicate between safety and sensitivity accounts of knowledge.
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273Keeping Track of the Gettier ProblemPacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2): 127-152. 2011.This paper argues that for someone to know proposition p inferentially it is not enough that his belief in p and his justification for believing p covary with the truth of p through a sphere of possibilities. A further condition on inferential knowledge is that p's truth-maker is identical with, or causally related to, the state of affairs the justification is grounded in. This position is dubbed ‘identificationism.’
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252Précis of Memory: A Philosophical StudyPhilosophical Studies 153 (1): 61-64. 2011.This is a response to three critical discussions of my book Memory: A Philosophical Study (Oxford University Press 2010): Marya Schechtman, “Memory and Identity”, Fred Adams, “Husker Du?”, and Sanford Goldberg “The Metasemantics of Memory”.
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234Memory and ExternalismPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3): 605-632. 2004.Content externalism about memory says that the individuation of memory contents depends on relations the subject bears to his past environment. I defend externalism about memory by arguing that neither philosophical nor psychological considerations stand in the way of accepting the context dependency of memory that follows from externalism.
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225Remembering without KnowingAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (1). 2007.This paper challenges the standard conception of memory as a form of knowledge. Unlike knowledge, memory implies neither belief nor justification.
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220Knowing the World by Knowing One's MindSynthese 123 (1): 1-34. 2000.This paper addresses the question whether introspection plus externalism about mental content warrant an a priori refutation of external-world skepticism and ontological solipsism. The suggestion is that if thought content is partly determined by affairs in the environment and if we can have non-empirical knowledge of our current thought contents, we can, just by reflection, know about the world around us -- we can know that our environment is populated with content-determining entities. After …Read more
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217Kant on Spatial OrientationEuropean Journal of Philosophy 20 (4): 519-533. 2010.This paper develops a novel interpretation of Kant's argument from incongruent counterparts to the effect that the representations of space and time are intuitions rather than concepts. When properly understood, the argument anticipates the contemporary position whereby the meaning of indexicals cannot be captured by descriptive contents.
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217Self-Knowledge and the Bounds of AuthenticityErkenntnis 71 (1): 107-121. 2009.This paper criticizes the widespread view whereby a second-order judgment of the form ‘I believe that p ’ qualifies as self-knowledge only if the embedded content, p , is of the same type as the content of the intentional state reflected upon and the self-ascribed attitude, belief, is of the same type as the attitude the subject takes towards p . Rather than requiring identity of contents across levels of cognition self-knowledge requires only that the embedded content of the second-order though…Read more
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213The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory (edited book)Routledge. 2017.Memory occupies a fundamental place in philosophy, playing a central role not only in the history of philosophy but also in philosophy of mind, epistemology, and ethics. Yet the philosophy of memory has only recently emerged as an area of study and research in its own right. The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory is an outstanding reference source on the key topics, problems and debates in this exciting area, and is the first philosophical collection of its kind. The forty-eight chapters…Read more
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208The Epistemology of Fake News (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2021.This book is the first sustained inquiry into the new epistemology of fake news. The chapters, authored by established and emerging names in the field, pursue three goals. First, to analyse the meaning and novelty of 'fake news' and related notions, such as 'conspiracy theory.' Second, to discuss the mechanics of fake news, exploring various practices that generate or promote fake news. Third, to investigate potential therapies for fake news.
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200Further Thoughts on Memory: Replies to Schechtman, Adams, and GoldbergPhilosophical Studies 153 (1): 109-121. 2011.This is a response to three critical discussions of my book Memory: A Philosophical Study (Oxford University Press 2010): Marya Schechtman, Memory and Identity , Fred Adams, Husker Du? , and Sanford Goldberg The Metasemantics of Memory
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17th/18th Century Philosophy |
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Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |