T. R. Girill

This paper presents preliminary solutions to three conceptual problems posed by the use of triage to sort candidates for scarce medical resources: (1) By what criteria are the candidates grouped? (2) To what extent can triage be justified? (3) Under what conditions are different versions of triage equivalent? Four explicit methods of applying triage are described and compared, with the aid of examples. The extent to which they either maximize expected utility or show cost-benefit dominance is discussed. And cases in which one triage method reduces to another are contrasted with others where no such reduction occurs.

That the concepts of confirmation and requirement are very similar has recently been suggested by the discovery of four analogies between them. This conjecture is tested by comparing examples of each relation. I show that both of these relations can be "defeated" in two similar ways. But I also argue for two important dissimilarities between them: 1) when faced with certain inconsistencies, requirement suffers much more drastically than confirmation, and 2) confirmation is partiresultant in a sense in which requirement is not.

Puzzle-solving, like several other everyday activities, appears in a more sophisticated and ramified form in the realm of natural science. Improving on Thomas Kuhn's rudimentary account of puzzles in science, this paper formulates logical and functional criteria for the occurrence of scientific puzzles, and examines the two-fold nature of their solutions. Then, with the aid of erotetic logic, puzzle-posing questions are identified, their presuppositional relations to scientific theory and explanations are explored, and a new tool for history of science research is developed

SummaryThe traditional account of micro‐reductive explanations, in terms of bridge‐law derivations and attribute‐identities, is subjected to critical analysis. Formal expositions of this approach especially those of R. L. Causey, are shown to have oversimplified certain relations between micro‐parts and wholes, and between identities and explanations, and to have neglected a key difference between homogeneous and heterogeneous micro‐explanatory contexts. An alternative treatment of part‐explanation adequacy is outlined and illustrated

There seem to exist special conditions unique to those scientific explanations which exmploy micro-parts under which alone such explanations are considered intellectually adequate. Two attempts to specify these conditions have been endorsed since antiquity, but serious counter-examples exist for each one. This paper contends that only in certain circumstances may each of the traditional criteria of adequacy be regarded as acceptable, identifies these circumstances, and examines the consequences of adopting such a dualistic or contextual solution to the problem of micro-explanation

This paper develops an explicit, pragmatic solution to the problem of deciding when an explanans which only approximately "covers" a desired event-explanandum E is acceptable as an adequate explanation. It shows in detail how comparisons made by the explanation's audience with the numerical value in E are what determine how closely E must be approximated for success. With the aid of several physics examples, it spells out the principles that govern these explanandum-comparisons, the conditions under which those principles hold, and the audience traits that influence which comparisons they take seriously.

Although context and comparison are widely regarded as vital to explanatory pragmatics, no systematic treatment of them is available which is free from unnecessary vagueness. The goal of this paper, therefore, is to develop a network of clear, explicit principles describing the conditions under which an audience finds a sentential explanation pragmatically adequate. Previous suggestions are spelled out overtly, and revised or rejected when they cannot overcome counter-examples. The roles and interrelationships of type appropriateness, explanatory power and explanatory appeal as pragmatic concepts are examined and clarified. In the process of formulating improved pragmatic principles, misleading assumptions by earlier writers are disclosed, and the logical consequences of each proposal are compared.

That the concepts of confirmation and requirement are very similar has recently been suggested by the discovery of four analogies between them. This conjecture is tested by comparing examples of each relation. I show that both of these relations can be "defeated" in two similar ways. But I also argue for two important dissimilarities between them: 1) when faced with certain inconsistencies, requirement suffers much more drastically than confirmation, and 2) confirmation is partiresultant in a sense in which requirement is not.