•  244
    Beyond possible worlds
    Philosophical Studies 53 (2). 1988.
  •  239
    Salmon trapping
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (2): 351-370. 1997.
    Let us call a sentential context semantically transparent if and only if all synonymous expressions are substitutable for one another in it salva veritate. A sentential context is semantically opaque if and only if it is not semantically transparent. Nathan Salmon has boldly advanced a refreshingly crisp theory according to which belief contexts are semantically transparent.1 If he is right, belief contexts are much better behaved than widely suspected.2 Impressive as it is, I do not believe tha…Read more
  •  227
    Logic purified
    Noûs 27 (4): 470-486. 1993.
  •  217
    The pseudo-Mates argument
    Philosophical Review 93 (3): 407-418. 1984.
  •  190
    Against Creationism in Fiction
    Noûs 35 (s15): 153-172. 2001.
    Sherlock Holmes is a fictional individual. So is his favorite pipe. Our pre-theoretical intuition says that neither of them is real. It says that neither of them really, or actually, exists. It also says that there is a sense in which they do exist, namely, a sense in which they exist “in the world of” the Sherlock Holmes stories. Our pre-theoretical intuition says in general of any fictional individual that it does not actually exist but exists “in the world of” the relevant fiction. I wish to …Read more
  •  182
    It may appear that in order to be any way at all, a thing must exist. A possible – worlds version of this claim goes as follows: (E) For every x, for every possible world w, Fx at w only if x exists at w. Here and later in (R), the letter ‘F’ is used as a schematic letter to be replaced with a one – place predicate. There are two arguments against (E). The first is by analogy. Socrates is widely admired now but he does not exist now. So, it is not the case that for every x, for every time t, Fx …Read more
  •  157
    Modal Realism with Modal Tense
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2): 309-327. 2008.
    Modal realists should fashion their theory by postulating\nand taking seriously the modal equivalent of tense, or\n_modal tense_. This will give them a uniform way to\nrespond to five different objections, one each by Skyrms,\nQuine, and Peacocke, and two by van Inwagen, and suggest a\nnon-Lewisian path to modal realism
  •  156
    Worlds and Individuals, Possible and Otherwise
    Oxford University Press. 2009.
    Modal realism -- Time, space, world -- Existence -- Actuality -- Modal realism and modal tense -- Transworld individuals and their identity -- Existensionalism -- Impossibility -- Proposition and relief -- Fictional worlds -- Epistemology.
  •  111
    Primitive worlds
    Acta Analytica 17 (1): 19-37. 2002.
    Modal Dimensionalism is a metaphysical theory about possible worlds that is naturally suggested by the often-noted parallelism between modal logic and tense logic. It says that the universe spreads out not only in spatiotemporal dimensions but also in a modal dimension. It regards worlds as nothing more or less than indices in the modal dimension in the way analogous to the way in which Temporal Dimensionalism regards temporal points and intervals as indices in the temporal dimension. Despite it…Read more
  •  101
    Deep theorizing about possibility requires theorizing about possible objects. One popular approach regards the notion of a possible object as intertwined with the notion of a possible world. There are two widely discussed types of theory concerning the nature of possible worlds: actualist representationism and possibilist realism. They support two opposing views about possible objects. Examination of the ways in which they do so reveals difficulties on both sides. There is another popular approa…Read more
  •  78
    Possible worlds as shifting domains
    Erkenntnis 36 (1). 1992.
    Those who object to David Lewis' modal realism express qualms about philosophical respectability of the Lewisian notion of a possible world and its correlate notion of an inhabitant of a possible world. The resulting impression is that these two notions either stand together or fall together. I argue that the Lewisian notion of a possible world is otiose even for a good Lewisian modal realist, and that one can carry out a good Lewisian semantics for modal discourse without Lewisian possible worl…Read more
  •  77
    Proper names as variables
    Erkenntnis 21 (2). 1984.
  •  71
    Partee verbs
    Philosophical Studies 103 (3). 2001.
    Approximately thirty years ago, Barbara H. Partee tried to think of counterexamples to David Lewis’s observation that no intransitive verbs appeared to have intensional subject positions. She came up with such verbs as ‘rise,’ ‘change,’ and ‘increase.’ Lewis agreed that they were indeed counterexamples to his observation. He mentioned it to Richard Montague, who incorporated these verbs into his now famous grammatical theory for English.
  •  70
    Impossibilia and Modally Tensed Predication
    Acta Analytica 30 (4): 317-323. 2015.
    Mark Jago’s four arguments against Takashi Yagisawa’s extended modal realism are examined and shown to be ineffective. Yagisawa’s device of modal tense renders three of Jago’s arguments harmless, and the correct understanding of predications of modal properties of world stages blocks the fourth one
  •  69
    Unrestricted Quantification and Reality: Reply to Kim (review)
    Acta Analytica 27 (1): 77-79. 2012.
    In my book, Worlds and Individuals, Possible and Otherwise , I use the novel idea of modal tense to respond to a number of arguments against modal realism. Peter van Inwagen’s million-carat-diamond objection is one of them. It targets the version of modal realism by David Lewis and exploits the fact that Lewis accepts absolutely unrestricted quantification. The crux of my response is to use modal tense to neutralize absolutely unrestricted quantification. Seahwa Kim says that even when equipped …Read more
  •  50
    A somewhat Russellian theory of intensional contexts
    Philosophical Perspectives 11 43-82. 1997.
    Consider the following sentence schemata: (1) The proposition that P is F; (2) The property of being Q is F; (3) The relation of being R is F, where `P' is a schematic letter for a sentence, `Q' and `F' are schematic letters for a nonrelational predicate, and `R' is a schematic letter for a relational predicate. For example, if we substitute `Snow is white' for `P', `famous' for `F' in (1), `round' for `Q', `instantiated' for `F' in (2), `a father of' for `R', and `asymmetric' for `F' in (3), th…Read more
  •  40
    “Yes, you!”
    Philosophia 17 (2): 169-186. 1987.
  •  35
    The cost of meaning solipsism
    In Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest LaPore (eds.), Grazer Philosophische Studien, Rodopi. pp. 213-230. 1993.
    Meaning Solipsism says that it is possible for there to be a meaningful state without any other meaningful state. The meaning of such a solo meaningful state should be non-natural. The best strategy for establishing Meaning Solipsism is to argue for the determination of the meaning of a possible solo meaningful state via the set of entities the meaning of the state fits. Embracing merely possible and impossible entities is the most straightforward way to do so. Also, a good way to honor analayti…Read more
  •  35
    On the first day of the class for Introduction to Philosophy, your professor tells you that if you keep perfect attendance, complete every homework satisfactorily, participate in class discussion actively, and score 100% in every examination, you will certainly get an A+ for the course. You work hard and by the end of the semester, you think you have accomplished all these things. You are pleased. Why? Because you think as follows: “I have kept perfect attendance, completed every homework satisf…Read more
  •  35
    Deflationary Existence
    Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 22 1-16. 2014.
    I propose and defend a surprisingly simple yet useful analysis of existence according to which existence is a relation between a thing and a set: a thing x bears the relation of existence to a set S if and only if x is a member of S . This simple set-theoretic analysis of existence demystifies existence and is powerful and flexible enough to serve important theoretical purposes
  •  34
    When I assertively utter the sentence `Spot is a cat', the sentence I utter expresses a proposition. The truth condition of the proposition so expressed is determined by the semantic values of the singular term, `Spot', and the predicate, `is a cat'. If `Spot' refers to a certain particular entity E and `is a cat' expresses a certain particular property P, then the proposition in question is true if and only if E has P. Such is the theoretical cash value of reference. The referent of a given sin…Read more