Tariq Modood

In this article, we articulate and defend a contextual approach to political theory. According to what we shall call ‘iterative contextualism’, context has two important roles to play in determining what is required by justice. First, it is through the exploration and evaluation of multiple contexts that general principles are devised, revised and refined. Second, significant weight should be given to the norms to be found in specific contexts because the people affected by those norms strongly identify with them. Having said this, the application of general principles to particular contexts may still result in recommendations which deviate to some degree from the prevailing norms. In this case, we shall argue that although justice requires something other than what local norms say, what is required is likely to be intimated by the relevant context. Thus, whilst considerations of identification act as significant constraints on iterative contextualists’ thinking, the idea of intimations provides them with an important resource.

Will Kymlicka has recently (in Analyse & Kritik 14, 33-56) argued that western liberals are mistaken in assuming that religious pluralism presupposes a commitment to individual rights. He instances the millet system of the Ottoman Empire as a successful form of toleration based on group rather than individual rights. In the course of his argument he makes some remarks about British Muslims and arranged marriages, sexual segregation in education and the Rushdie Affair which are false or highly misleading though typical of the prejudice-cum-ignorance with which British and other intellectuals discuss Muslims.

It was only a few years ago that the central topic of academic political philosophy, at least in the English-speaking world, was distributive justice. The focus was very much on economic or material goods; the question being whether people were entitled to have what they had, or did justice require that someone else should have some of it. That the arguments about justice led to investigating the conceptions of self, rationality and community that underpinned them meant that the debate was far from governed by economics and welfare, and was capable of moving in many directions and far from its starting-point. Yet that many of the leading participants in the ‘liberalism v . communitarianism’ debate should now have come to place diversity, pluralism and multiculturalism at the centre of their theorising, with the emphasis being on the justness of cultural rather than economic transactions, is surely not just a product of ‘following the argument to where it leads’. The change in philosophical focus is also determined by changes in the political world; by the challenges of feminism, the growing recognition that most Western societies are, partly because of movements of populations, increasingly multi-ethnic and multi-racial, and the growing questioning of whether the pursuit of a universal theory of justice may not itself be an example of a Western cultural imperialism. The politics I am pointing to is various and by no means harmonious, but a common feature perhaps is the insistence that there are forms of inequality and domination beyond those of economics and material distributions

We explore aspects of what it means to be a ‘moderate’ Muslim in Britain. Based on interviews with 21 Muslim intellectuals or those active in public or community debates, we examine what these Muslims think about multiculturalism. While there is a variety of views, the respondents are promulticulturalism as long as it includes faith as a dimension of ‘difference’, something they believe has only belatedly, tentatively and slowly happened in Britain. Most of the other aspects of the multicultural ideal and criticisms of contemporary British practice, such as the distinction between mutual respect and tolerance, the importance of non-separateness and dialogue, the need for transformative change on the part of the minorities as well as the majority, seem to be similar to the views held by non-Muslim British multiculturalists. Yet some believe that the Qur’an, Islam and Muslim history are powerful sources of multi-culturalism and represent a form superior to any that has been developed elsewhere or is on offer in the contemporary West. This view was held by those who are experts in using and engaging with contemporary Western discourses rather than those who are authorities in interpreting Islamic texts, and so they, like most others in the group could be said to be a relatively new kind of Muslim public figure.

In this article, we present a case for the recognition of multiple religions, arguing that states have a non-absolute duty to recognise religions which it is likely they should discharge along different dimensions and to different degrees. More concretely, we focus on several Western European states (or regions thereof), arguing that they would be more legitimate if they were to recognise an extensive range of faiths and ethno-religious groups. In order to make this argument, we deploy a method of iterative contextualism, consisting of two interlocking steps which can be thought of as obverse halves of a hermeneutic circle. First we identify and describe two cross-contextual principles, which we call identification and discretionary recognition. Then we suggest how it may be shown that these principles are already present to a significant degree in Denmark, Finland and Alsace-Moselle – the three contexts with which we are particularly concerned here. This, then, is a normatively robust and contextually sensitive argument for the multidimensional recognition of religion by a state, and at the same time it explains how we apply the method of iterative contextualism.