Terence Cuneo

The Projectability Challenge states that a metaethical view must explain how ordinary agents can, on the basis of moral experience and reflection, accurately and justifiably apply moral concepts to novel situations. In this paper, we argue for two primary claims. First, paradigm nonnaturalism can satisfactorily answer the projectability challenge. Second, it is unclear whether there is a version of moral naturalism that can satisfactorily answer the challenge. The conclusion we draw is that there is an important respect in which nonnaturalism holds an advantage over its most prominent naturalist rivals. The conclusion is interesting if only because it is widely assumed that naturalism has an easier time handling thorny problems in moral epistemology. We argue that there is at least one such problem of which this assumption is not true.

Thomas Reid's Essays on the Active Powers presents what is probably the most thoroughly developed version of agent-causal libertarianism in the modern canon. While commentators today often acknowledge Reid's contribution, they typically focus on what appears to be a serious problem for the view: Reid appears to commit himself to a position according to which acting freely would require an agent to engage in an infinite number of exertions of active power. In this essay, we maintain that, properly understood, Reid's version of agent-causal libertarianism generates no regress of exertion. Our discussion begins by presenting Reid's account of free action and why it appears vulnerable to a worrisome regress. We then consider three attempts to address the regress in the contemporary literature offered by William Rowe, Gideon Yaffe, and James Van Cleve, which we find unsatisfactory. We then develop a solution to the worry—one that takes very seriously both what Reid means by an ‘efficient’ cause and his appeal to normative features when explaining action. We call it the ‘networked capacity’ view.

Advocates of the so-called New Hume maintain that, contrary to the traditional interpretation, Hume is neither a non-cognitivist nor a moral skeptic. Rather, if these philosophers are correct, Hume is a sentimentalist who defends views very similar to Hutcheson’s. Reid’s attack on Hume’s moral philosophy, however, depends on an interpretation according to which Hume is a non-cognitivist and a moral skeptic. Does this mean that, if advocates of the New Hume are correct, Reid’s objections to Hume entirely fail to make contact with Hume’s views? This chapter argues that, even if proponents of the New Hume are correct, Reid raises objections that make contact with Hume’s views and are worth considering. These objections concern how to square Hume’s commitment to hedonism and rule-utilitarianism with very plausible principles of justice.

Quasi-realist expressivists set themselves the task of developing a metaethical theory that at once captures what they call the “realist-sounding” elements of ordinary moral thought and discourse but is also distinctively antirealist. Its critics have long suspected that the position cannot have what it wants. In this essay, I develop this suspicion. I do so by distinguishing two paradigmatic versions of the view—what I call Thin and Thick expressivism respectively. I contend that there is a metaethical datum regarding our epistemic achievements in the moral domain that presents challenges for each variety of expressivism. Thin expressivism opts not to accommodate and explain this datum but I contend that its rationale for not doing so rests on a suspect methodology. Thick expressivism looks as if it must accommodate and explain this datum but I argue that it is poorly situated to do so. I conclude that we have reason to believe that paradigmatic expressivism cannot have all that it wants.

Everyone is talking about food. Chefs are celebrities. "Locavore" and "freegan" have earned spots in the dictionary. Popular books and films about food production and consumption are exposing the unintended consequences of the standard American diet. Questions about the principles and values that ought to guide decisions about dinner have become urgent for moral, ecological, and health-related reasons. In _Philosophy Comes to Dinner_, twelve philosophers—some leading voices, some inspiring new ones—join the conversation, and consider issues ranging from the sustainability of modern agriculture, to consumer complicity in animal exploitation, to the pros and cons of alternative diets.

Hume bequeathed to rational intuitionists a problem concerning moral judgment and the will – a problem of sufficient severity that it is still cited as one of the major reasons why intuitionism is untenable. 1 Stated in general terms, the problem concerns how an intuitionist moral theory can account for the intimate connection between moral judgment and moral motivation. One reason that this is still considered to be a problem for intuitionists is that it is widely assumed that the early intuitionists made little progress towards solving it. In this essay, I wish to challenge this assumption by examining one of the more subtle intuitionist responses to Hume, viz., that offered by Thomas Reid. For reasons that remain unclear to me, Reid's response to Hume on this issue has been almost entirely neglected. I shall argue that it is nonetheless one that merits our attention, for at least two reasons. In the first place, Reid's response to Hume's challenge to rational intuitionism bears a close affinity to the type of response that he offers to Hume's broadly skeptical challenge to realist views regarding our perception of the external world. Since Reid's strategy in the latter case is widely regarded as exhibiting significant promise, it is natural to wonder whether, when applied to the moral domain, this type of strategy displays similar promise. 2 I will suggest that it does. That is, I will suggest that since Reid's broadly nativist position in perception is one well worth considering, then so also is his broadly nativist account of moral motivation. Second, Reid's position regarding moral motivation represents an intriguing attempt to blend a broadly intuitionist view with important insights from the sentimentalist tradition. In this respect, Reid's view is a genuine hybrid position unlike that offered by other intuitionists such as Richard Price. The synthetic character of Reid's position, I claim, gives it a unique type of theoretical richness, since it incorporates some very attractive features of both rational intuitionism and sentimentalism.

In his recent book, The Moral Problem, Michael Smith presents a number of arguments designed to expose the difficulties with so-called `externalist' theories of motivation. This essay endeavors to defend externalism from Smith's attacks. I attempt three tasks in the essay. First, I try to clarify and reformulate Smith's distinction between internalism and externalism. Second, I formulate two of Smith's arguments-what I call the `reliability argument' and `the rationalist argument'-and attempt to show that these arguments fail to damage externalism. Third, I undertake to expose and question some of the motivations that drive internalism.

In his recent book, The Moral Problem (Basil Blackwell, 1994), Michael Smith presents a number of arguments designed to expose the difficulties with so-called 'extcrnalist' theories of motivation. This essay endeavors to defend externalism from Smith's attacks. I attempt three tasks in the essay. First, I try to clarify and reformulate Smith's distinction between internalism and externalism. Second, I formulate two of Smith's arguments- what I call the 'reliability argument' and 'the rationalist argument' -and attempt to show that these arguments fail to damage externalism. Third, I undertake to expose and question some of the motivations that drive internalism.

Capacities for Goodness: A Defense of neo-Aristotelian Moral Realism is an essay in metaethics. Its overarching aim is to develop and defend a distinctively neo-Aristotelian version of moral realism. ;The essay breaks into three stages and seven chapters. The first stage of the dissertation defends a generic brand of moral realism. In the first chapter, I claim that moral realism is any view which defends the claims that some moral judgments are true in the realist sense, and that moral facts irreducibly exist. I contend, in the second and third chapters, that some version of moral realism is true. Therein, I argue that we should reject rival antirealist views, including moral noncognitivism, alethic antirealism, 'error theories' and moral reductionism. ;The second stage of the dissertation develops an account of what it is for humans to flourish. In the fourth chapter, I offer a neo-Aristotelian account of the nature and components of human flourishing. I then proceed, in the fifth chapter, to grapple with what I call the 'Grounding Question'. The Grounding Question asks: what makes it the case that the sorts of activities, functional states and experiential states which we have identified as components of human flourishing are components of human flourishing? The sixth chapter develops a neo-Aristotelian account of intrinsic goodness. Here I claim that participation in the various components of human flourishing gives rise to moral obligations of various sorts for persons to prize such participation in and for itself. ;The third stage of the dissertation sketches a neo-Aristotelian account of the moral virtues. A moral virtue, so I claim, is composed of four components. For any trait that is a virtue, that trait must be an enduring excellence of a sort; dispose its possessor to apprehend a certain range of morally salient features of the world; motivate its possessor to bring about a certain range of valuable ends E; and be such that its possessor cannot ordinarily fail to bring about those valuable ends E which she intends to bring about because of her own incompetence, inattention, etc

In his recent book, The Moral Problem , Michael Smith presents a number of arguments designed to expose the difficulties with so-called 'extcrnalist' theories of motivation. This essay endeavors to defend externalism from Smith's attacks. I attempt three tasks in the essay. First, I try to clarify and reformulate Smith's distinction between internalism and externalism. Second, I formulate two of Smith's arguments- what I call the 'reliability argument' and 'the rationalist argument' -and attempt to show that these arguments fail to damage externalism. Third, I undertake to expose and question some of the motivations that drive internalism

The religious inquirer is, however, in a tough spot, for she is subject to norms that it appears she cannot jointly satisfy. On the one hand, there are norms for the conduct of one's doxastic life, which do not emanate from any particular religious tradition, that enjoin us to be conscientious in our believings. In her view, conforming to these norms does not license having religious beliefs: there are simply too many evidential impediments to having such beliefs, ranging from deep theoretical challenges to the fundamental religious claims to questions about the reliability of the fundamental religious texts and traditions. Call these norms, which the religious inquirer holds that religious belief does not satisfy, external epistemic norms. On the other hand, there are norms that emanate from within the religious traditions themselves that speak against engaging in a religious way of life in order to enjoy its considerable goods by doing such things as playing the role of a believer or going through the ritualistic motions. Instead, these norms seem to call for genuine faith, which is understood to be something approximating what the true believer has. Call these norms, which place restrictions on how one could legitimately engage in a religious way of life, the internal religious norms.