My philosophical views

Question Answer Comments
A priori knowledge: yes and no Accept: yes
Abstract objects: Platonism and nominalism Lean toward: nominalism
Aesthetic value: objective and subjective Lean toward: subjective
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes and no Accept: yes
Epistemic justification: internalism and externalism Accept: internalism
External world: idealism, skepticism or non-skeptical realism Accept: non-skeptical realism
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism or no free will Accept: compatibilism
God: theism and atheism Accept: atheism
Knowledge: empiricism and rationalism Accept another alternative
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism or invariantism Accept: contextualism
Laws of nature: Humean and non-Humean Lean toward: non-Humean
Logic: classical and non-classical Lean toward: non-classical One needs to do something about the sorites paradox, and it is hard to see how to address it without deviating from classical logic (except by embracing epistemicism, a view I find too incredible to believe).
Mental content: internalism and externalism Accept: internalism I hold that the most fundamental kind of mental content is internalist (and phenomenally constituted), but that some thought-constituents also have a form of intentionality that constitutively depends in part on internal/external linkages.
Meta-ethics: moral realism and moral anti-realism Accept: moral anti-realism
Metaphilosophy: naturalism and non-naturalism Agnostic/undecided
Mind: physicalism and non-physicalism Lean toward: physicalism No extant treatments of the explanatory gap, aka the hard problem, seem even close to satisfactory to me. But I'm a wannabe physicalist anyway.
Moral judgment: cognitivism and non-cognitivism Accept another alternative I accept and advocate cognitivist expressivism, a position not on the standard menu of options.
Moral motivation: internalism and externalism Accept: internalism My kind of internalism allows for the possibility of the occasional immoralist.
Newcomb's problem: one box and two boxes Accept: one box
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism or virtue ethics Agnostic/undecided
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism or sense-datum theory Accept: representationalism My kind of representationalism is internalist. The envatted brain has sense experience with the same representational content as my sense experience, by virtue of having the same phenomenology.
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view or further-fact view Lean toward: psychological view
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism or libertarianism Lean toward: egalitarianism
Proper names: Fregean and Millian Accept: Fregean
Science: scientific realism and scientific anti-realism Accept: scientific realism
Teletransporter (new matter): survival and death Accept: death
Time: A-theory and B-theory Agnostic/undecided
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch and don't switch Other It seems to me that I'm morally permitted to go either way, and and not obligated one way or the other.
Truth: correspondence, deflationary or epistemic Accept: correspondence I hold that correspondence comes in many flavors, most of which do not require that the right ontology contains entities answering to singular terms and existential quantifiers of true statements.
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible or metaphysically possible Lean toward: conceivable but not metaphysically possible