Theodor Ebert

Die hier vorliegende Neuübersetzung von Platons Menon enthält eine ausführliche Einführung, in der die Umstände der Abfassung, die möglichen Adressaten, die Figuren des Dialogs sowie dessen Thema und Fragestellung erörtert werden. Die Übersetzung beruht auf dem griechischen Text von Bluck. Daher sind in dem reproduzierten griechischen Text die Änderungen eingearbeitet, die sich aus dem Text von Bluck ergeben. Darüber hinaus werden an einer Reihe von Stellen Änderungen für den griechischen Text vorgeschlagen, teils aufgrund eigener oder fremder Konjekturen, teils aufgrund anderer Lesarten in den Handschriften, von denen einige auch für das philosophische Verständnis des Dialogs von Bedeutung sind. Die Erläuterungen legen zum einen Wert auf eine genaue Analyse der Argumente des Gesprächs, zum anderen auf die literarischen Aspekte. Hierbei sprechen die Bezüge zu sizilischen Autoren zusammen mit den an die Komödie erinnernden Elementen dafür, dass Platon bei der Abfassung ein sizilisches Publikum vor Augen hatte. Aus diesen Voraussetzungen ergibt sich ein neues Verständnis verschiedener Positionen, die diesem Dialog zugeschrieben werden.

Kant’s Categorical Imperative (CI) is to be taken as a necessary and sufficient condition for any action that is permissible, i. e. not prohibited. The class of permissible actions contains actions which are allowed as well as those which are morally required. If to perform an action and to abstain from this action can be taken to be ‘practical opposites’, then an action that is morally required for, a duty, is an action whose practical opposite is prohibited, and vice versa. The class of actions which are merely allowed (neither prohibited nor morally required for) contains all and only those actions who together with their practical opposites belong to the class of permissible (not prohibited) actions. The paper then adduces passages from Kant’s ethical writings on the CI supporting these distinctions.

I argue, firstly, that the accounts of 'accident' in Aristotle's Met. V 30 and in Top. I 5 cannot be used to elucidate each other: the Metaphysics passage tries to disentangle the uses of a Greek word, the Topics passage introduces technical terms for Aristotle's semantics. I then argue that the positive definition in Top. I 5 is to be understood in the following way: X is an accident of Y iff X belongs to Y and if there is a Z such that X can belong to Z and also not belong to Z. Thus, being white is an accident of snow. I finally argue that certain shortcomings in the Topics account lead Aristotle to redefine accident in the Posterior Analytics.

Der Artikel enthält eine Metakritik an einer von Vertretern der 'Erlanger Schule' vorgebrachten Kritik der Wissenschaftstheorie des Kritischen Rationalismus Poppers und Alberts. Von Janich/Kambartel/Mittelstraß war behauptet worden, das bei der Frage der Begründung wissenschaftlicher Sätze auftretende Trilemma von unendlichem Regreß, Zirkelschluß und axiomatischer Grundlegung beruhe auf einem "höchst eingeschränkten Verständnis von Begründung" und könne durch den Begriff der Verteidigung bzw. Verteidigbarkeit von Behauptungssätzen aufgelöst werden. Es wird gezeigt, daß die Auflösung dieses Trilemmas nur vermeintlich ist, weil sie auf einer unzulässigen Änderung der Beweislastregelung beruht.

I discuss the "theory of recollection" in Plato's Meno (81a–86c). Socrates' comments on the "geometry lesson" (85b8–86c3) are used to support the claim that, in a Socratic dialogue, we ought to differentiate between between non-committal and committal questions (= those implying a commitment of the questioner). It is then argued that the "theory of recollection" is no Platonic doctrine: Socrates uses Pythagorean material against Meno who is acquainted with the Pythagorean tradition and whose eristical argument against the possibility of learning is meant to be refuted by the paradoxical consequences about the slave-boy's learning Meno is made to admit.

This is a collection of papers already published (spanning the years from 1976 to 2002) covering mostly the history of philosophy, with the exception of Aristotle (papers on Aristotle are contained in vol. I). The bulk of the papers (eight) are on Plato (on the Meno, Phaedo, Republic and Sophist), two concern the Presocratics, one paper discusses the theory of sign with the Stoics, five are on modern philosophy (Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz and Kant). Two papers are in English, the rest in German. The book contains an index of proper names as well as a list of Ebert’s publications up to 2002.

The paper starts from a distinction between two terms in Aristotle: kategoroumenon and kategoria. It is argued that the job of the first is to pick out 'predicated predicates' (i.e. predicates attached to a specific subject), the job of the second is to designate 'predicable predicates' (terms which can be attached to specific subjects). It is then argued (1) that Aristotle's division of the (erroneously) so-called 'predicables' (i. e. genus, proprium, definiens, accident) is a classification of predicated predicates, (2) that the list of the "genera of kategoriai" in Top. I 9 which starts with ti estin (essence) as its first member contains a classification of predicable predicates, and (3) that the list in Cat. 4 (starting with ousia, 'substance') is a classification not of kategoriai, but of things there are.

In this paper I defend the existence of a Dialectical school proper against criticisms brought forward by Klaus Döring and by Jonathan Barnes. Whereas Döring claims that there was no Dialectical school separate from the Megarians, Barnes takes issue with my claim (argued for in “Dialektiker und frühe Stoiker bei Sextus Empiricus”) that most of the reports in Sextus on the dialecticians refer to members of the Dialectical school. Barnes contends that these dialecticians are in fact Stoic logicians. As against Döring, I argue that the passage in Diogenes Laertius II 113 (first drawn attention to by David Sedley) which talks of a the Megarian Stilpo winning over disciples from the Dialecticians is not refuted by Döring’s arguments. It clearly shows that the Dialecticians and the Megarians at the time were taken to be different philosophical sects. As against Barnes I insist on the differences between the report in Ps.-Galen’s Historia 9 and the Sextan report on the theory of sign in AM VIII. These reports offer incompatible definitions of the indicative sign. Moreover, the classification of simple propositions reported by Sextus at AM VIII 96f. cannot be a truncated version of the (Stoic) list to be found in Diogenes Laertius VII 69f. since in Sextus’ report one of the three classes of simple propositions is labelled middle (meson). This is a certain sign that we are dealing with a triad, and hence that this list is meant to be complete. Therefore the classification found in Sextus and attributed to the dialecticians and the one in Diogenes Laertius reporting Stoic material do come from different sources.

This paper discusses the question why the first edition of Descartes' Meditations carries a title announcing a proof of the immortality of the soul, whereas Descartes himself (in the Synopsis as well as in his Replies) explicitly denies any intention to deliver such a proof. In the first part of the paper, I refute existing attempts to explain this inconsistency. In the second part, I argue that it was Descartes' intention to announce a proof for the immaterialitas, not for the immortalitas of the soul, and that the first of these two words has been misread, probably by the Paris printer, and turned into immortalitas. I first adduce as evidence a remark by Baillet in his second (abbreviated) version of Descartes' biography, a remark that has hitherto gone unnoticed in the learned literature. (Baillet explicitly states, using French words indeed, that immortalitas/immortalité was put instead of immaterialitas/immaterialité.) I secondly point to three statements by Descartes concerning either the Meditations or the content of metaphysics generally; Descartes mentions the immateriality of the soul on all three occasions. -/- .

In this paper, I take my start from certain distinctions Aristotle made use of in his analysis of prudence (phronesis) in the Nicomachean Ethics, but I then move away from Aristotle’s claims, in particular because I find fault with Aristotle’s exclusion of technical achievements from the realm of prudence. It is not the type of action which serves as a criterion to differentiate prudent acts from merely skilful ones, since in building a house you may act skilfully as well as prudently; yet whereas in acting skilfully you look not farther than to the intended aim of the action, in acting prudently you take options and possible aims into account which are beyond the aim of the actual action.

Die hier vorliegende Neuübersetzung von Platons Menon enthält eine ausführliche Einführung, in der die Umstände der Abfassung, die möglichen Adressaten, die Figuren des Dialogs sowie dessen Thema und Fragestellung erörtert werden. Die Übersetzung beruht auf dem griechischen Text von Bluck. Daher sind in dem reproduzierten griechischen Text die Änderungen eingearbeitet, die sich aus dem Text von Bluck ergeben. Darüber hinaus werden an einer Reihe von Stellen Änderungen für den griechischen Text vorgeschlagen, teils aufgrund eigener oder fremder Konjekturen, teils aufgrund anderer Lesarten in den Handschriften, von denen einige auch für das philosophische Verständnis des Dialogs von Bedeutung sind. Die Erläuterungen legen zum einen Wert auf eine genaue Analyse der Argumente des Gesprächs, zum anderen auf die literarischen Aspekte. Hierbei sprechen die Bezüge zu sizilischen Autoren zusammen mit den an die Komödie erinnernden Elementen dafür, dass Platon bei der Abfassung ein sizilisches Publikum vor Augen hatte. Aus diesen Voraussetzungen ergibt sich ein neues Verständnis verschiedener Positionen, die diesem Dialog zugeschrieben werden.