•  148
    Relations as Plural-Predications in Plato
    Studia Neoaristotelica 10 (1): 28-49. 2013.
    Plato was the first philosopher to discover the metaphysical phenomenon of plural-subjects and plural-predication; e.g. you and I are two, but neither you, nor I are two. I argue that Plato devised an ontology for plural-predication through his Theory of Forms, namely, plural-partaking in a Form. Furthermore, I argue that Plato used plural-partaking to offer an ontology of related individuals without reifying relations. My contention is that Plato’s theory of plural-relatives has evaded detectio…Read more
  •  141
  •  125
    In Republic V, Plato distinguishes two different cognitive powers, knowledge and belief, which operate differently on different types of object. I argue that in Republic VI Plato modifies this account, and claims that there is a single cognitive power, which under different circumstances behaves either as knowledge or as belief. I show that the circumstances which turn true belief into knowledge are the provision of an individuation account of the object of belief, which reveals the ontological …Read more
  •  92
    This volume presents fourteen essays by leading figures in the fields of ancient philosophy and contemporary metaphysics, discussing Aristotle's theory of the unity and identity of substances, a topic that remains at the center of metaphysical enquiry. The contributors examine the nature of essences, how they differ from other components of substance, and how they are related to these other components. The central questions discussed are: What does Aristotle mean by "potentiality" and "actuality…Read more
  •  81
    In Republic V, Plato makes the astonishing claim that knowledge is a different and independent power from belief, in the way, for example, that sight differs from hearing. I will argue that this is a fundamentally different conception of knowledge than the, also Platonic, conception of knowledge as 'true belief with an account'. I examine the reasons why Plato holds this position, and the ontology and epistemology which sustain its claims.
  •  76
    Weakness of Will in Aristotle’s Ethics
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (3): 375-382. 1986.
    I argue that in "en", Aristotle allows not only for weak akrasia but also for "strong akrasia". In weak akrasia, The agent makes only a "nominal" choice according to the right principle, While in strong akrasia he/she makes a "real" choice, But still acts against it. I show that, Although aristotle does not give a detailed account of strong akrasia, Such an account can be reconstructed on the basis of the analyses and examples of choice and akratic behaviour provided by him in "en" and "de motu"
  •  73
    In this paper i offer a detailed analysis of the dilemma of participation (parmenides, 130e-131e), in which plato considers the consequences of participation in the whole, and in a part of, a form. This analysis explains, in contrast to existing interpretations of the argument, plato's claim that participation in parts of a form is incompatible with the uniqueness of the form, and his modal claim that becoming equal by possessing part of the equal is absurd. In the second part of the paper, i gi…Read more
  •  65
    Substratum, subject, and substance
    Ancient Philosophy 5 (2): 215-240. 1985.
  •  62
    Substantial Holism
    Philosophical Inquiry 39 (1): 146-163. 2015.
  •  61
    Reciprocal Justice in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics
    Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 77 (3): 248-262. 1995.
  •  60
    The Theme A substance is a composite particular. If it is composed of further particulars, will the substance itself be one or many? ...
  •  45
    In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle begins his investigation by exploring the nature of the end of all action. In the very first sentence of the work he says: "Every art and every enquiry and similarly every action and pursuit is thought to aim at some good and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim". It is easy, says Aristotle, to find verbal agreement between people regarding that good because they all consider it to be happiness. Aristotle says: …Read more
  •  45
  •  39
    Knowledge as ‘True Belief Plus Individuation’ in Plato
    Philosophical Inquiry 38 (3-4): 20-41. 2014.
    In Republic V, Plato distinguishes two different cognitive powers, knowledge and belief, which operate differently on different types of object. I argue that in Republic VI Plato modifies this account, and claims that there is a single cognitive power, which under different circumstances behaves either as knowledge or as belief. I show that the circumstances which turn true belief into knowledge are the provision of an individuation account of the object of belief, which reveals the ontological …Read more
  •  38
    Identity, Individuation, and Uniqueness in Stoics Metaphysics
    Philosophical Inquiry 34 (1-2): 1-14. 2011.
  •  37
    The Philosophy of Epictetus (edited book)
    with Andrew S. Mason
    Oxford University Press. 2007.
    Written by some of the leading experts in the field, the essays in this volume will be a fascinating resource for students and scholars of ancient philosophy, ...
  •  32
    Fairness in Socratic Justice: "Republic" I
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 93 (1): 247-262. 1992.
  •  28
    The uniqueness of particulars
    Philosophia 14 (3-4): 273-297. 1984.
  •  28
    Weakness of Will in Aristotle's Ethics
    Philosophical Inquiry 40 (1-2): 30-37. 2016.
  •  26
  •  24
    Aristotle on Substance — The Paradox of Unity
    Philosophical Books 32 (1): 26-28. 1991.
  •  21
    Sharing a Property
    Philosophical Inquiry 41 (2-3): 3-16. 2017.
    The Socratic discussion in the Hippias Major, 300-303, is not a passing comment on plural reference; it is a theory of plural subjecthood. It has escaped attention because it is a small part of a larger complex argument on the topic of which pleasures are fine. Socrates’s theory is further concealed by the fact that it is presented as an antithesis between Hippias and himself, whereas in fact, Hippias’s position becomes part of Socrates’s theory. I begin by examining Hippias’s position, and subs…Read more
  •  20
    Mixing the Elements
    In Georgios Anagnostopoulos (ed.), A Companion to Aristotle, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 242-259. 2009.
    Forthcoming in the Blackwell Companion to Aristotle, 2008.
  •  20
    Commentary on Gotthelf
    Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 4 (1): 140-147. 1988.