•  67
    Discussing Harm without Harming
    Environmental Ethics 42 (2): 169-187. 2020.
    While the disability community has long argued convincingly that disability is not a negative condition, academic and popular discourses on environmental justice routinely refer to disability as a prima facie harm to be avoided. This perpetuates the harms of ableism, and it is, furthermore, unnecessary in order to advance environmental justice. It is possible to demand an investigation into the state of an environment, to object to toxic environmental conditions and to hold polluting parties acc…Read more
  •  21
    At first glance, it might seem strange to consider Derrida as an environmental philosopher. There is still a sense with many that Derrida is primarily a thinker of poetry and texts rather than of “leaves or soil”. While this is still a common view, even a cursory glance at Derrida’s work and at this volume shows that it is based on a misunderstanding. What it ignores is the fact that ‘text’ for Derrida is “coextensive [at least, T.B.] with mortal life” and indeed can be said to include every asp…Read more
  •  16
    Animating the Inanimate—A Deconstructive-Phenomenological Account of Animism
    Environmental Philosophy 17 (2): 221-251. 2020.
    This paper investigates the plausibility of one aspect of animism, namely the experience of other-than-human beings as exhibiting a kind of inaccessible interiority. I do so by developing a parallel between Husserl’s account of our experience of other conscious beings and our experience of non-conscious as well as so-called inanimate beings. I establish this parallel based on Derrida’s insistence on the irreducibility of context. This allows me to show how the structure of presence qua absence c…Read more
  •  11
    John Basl: The Death of the Ethic of Life
    Environmental Ethics 42 (1): 93-96. 2020.
  •  7
    Animating the Inanimate—A Deconstructive-Phenomenological Account of Animism
    Environmental Philosophy 17 (2): 221-251. 2020.
    This paper investigates the plausibility of one aspect of animism, namely the experience of other-than-human (including so-called inanimate) beings as exhibiting a kind of inaccessible interiority. I do so by developing a parallel between Husserl’s account of our experience of other conscious beings and our experience of non-conscious as well as so-called inanimate beings. I establish this parallel based on Derrida’s insistence on the irreducibility of context. This allows me to show how the str…Read more