University of Notre Dame
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1995
San Francisco, California, United States of America
  •  10
    Act Evaluation, Willing and Double Effect
    Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 71 243-253. 1997.
  •  1
    Double-effect Reasoning Defended: A Response to Scanlon
    Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 86 267-279. 2012.
    Common morality endorses some form of an exceptionless prohibition against killing innocents. Natural lawyers employ double-effect reasoning to address hard cases involving deaths of the innocent. Current deontologists criticize DER-proponents as conflating act-with agent-evaluations. Scanlon develops this critique extensively. I respond to his criticism. He maintains that the DER-advocate tells a badly-motivated agent to refrain from an obligatory act. Thus, he asserts, the natural lawyer who e…Read more
  •  26
    Anscombe, Thomson, and Double Effect
    American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2): 263-280. 2016.
    In “Modern Moral Philosophy” Anscombe argues that the distinction between intention of an end or means and foresight of a consequentially comparable outcome proves crucial in act-evaluation. The deontologist J. J. Thomson disagrees. She asserts that Anscombe mistakes the distinction’s moral import; it bears on agent-evaluation, not act-evaluation. I map out the contours of this dispute. I show that it implicates other disagreements, some to be expected and others not to be expected. Amongst the …Read more
  •  33
    Anscombe, Thomson, and Double Effect in advance
    American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly. forthcoming.
  •  11
    Double-effect Reasoning Defended
    Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 86 267-279. 2012.
  •  13
    Cause for Thought: An Essay in Metaphysics by John Burbridge (review)
    Review of Metaphysics 69 (1): 122-123. 2015.
  •  12
    DER and Policy
    American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3): 539-556. 2015.
    If viable, DER justifies certain individual acts that—by definition—have two effects. Presumably, it would in some fashion justify policies concerning the very same acts. By contrast, acts that sometimes have a good effect and sometimes have a bad effect do not have the requisite two effects such that DER can justify them immediately. Yet, a policy concerning numerous such acts would have the requisite good and bad effects. For while any one such act would lack the relevant two effects, a series…Read more
  •  21
    How We Act: Causes, Reasons, and Intentions (review)
    International Philosophical Quarterly 45 (2): 266-268. 2005.
  • Double Effect Reasoning: A Critique and Defense
    Dissertation, University of Notre Dame. 1995.
    Double effect reasoning is a nonconsequentialist analysis of the ethical status of an agent's acting to realize an end which is ethically in the clear when the realization of such an end inextricably causes some effect the causing of which is, prima facie, not ethically in the clear. In this work, I remove certain misunderstandings which attend discussions of DER: the relation between contemporary accounts and Aquinas's originating account , the relation between the intended/foreseen distinction…Read more
  •  15
    Double-effect Reasoning Defended: A Response to Scanlon
    Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 86 267-279. 2012.
    Common morality endorses some form of an exceptionless prohibition against killing innocents. Natural lawyers employ double-effect reasoning to address hard cases involving deaths of the innocent. Current deontologists criticize DER-proponents as conflating act-with agent-evaluations. Scanlon develops this critique extensively. I respond to his criticism. He maintains that the DER-advocate tells a badly-motivated agent to refrain from an obligatory act. Thus, he asserts, the natural lawyer who e…Read more
  •  13
    Carlos Aldana-Valenzuela, MD, is Chief of the Department of Neonatology at the Hospital de Ginecopediatria of the Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social in Leon, Guanajuato, Mexico. He is also a member of the Center for Studies in Bioethics at the University of Guanajuato
    with M. L. S. Bette Anton, Claire Brett, Michele A. Carter, Pieter de Vries Robbe, Richard Gorlin, Michael L. Gross, and Matti Häyry
    Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 10 3-5. 2001.
  •  10
    We acknowledge with thanks receipt of the following titles. Inclusion in this list neither implies nor precludes subsequent
    with Don S. Browning, Celia Deane-Drummond, Peter Manley Scott, Malcolm Duncan, Julia A. Fleming, and Stephen J. Grabill
    Studies in Christian Ethics 20 318-319. 2007.
  •  29
    Double-Effect Reasoning, Craniotomy, and Vital Conflicts
    The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 11 (3): 453-464. 2011.
    By analogy to justifications offered for craniotomy by Catholic moralists, a recent instance of casuistry attempts to apply double-effect reasoning and, separately, the concept of a vital conflict to justify dilation and curettage in order to preserve the life of a pregnant woman. This paper examines and rejects these bases for justifying craniotomy and D&C. It concludes with a consideration of Pope John Paul II’s discussion of moral martyrdom in Veritatis splendor. National Catholic Bioethics Q…Read more
  •  75
    Much of Roman Catholic discussion concerning bioethical controversies, such as the surgical removal of a life-threatening cancerous uterus when the fetus is not viable, has focused on the employment of double-effect reasoning. While double-effect reasoning has been the subject of much debate, this paper argues first, that there is a distinction between the intended and the foreseen; second, that this distinction applies to the contrasted cases in such a way as to categorize foreseen but not inte…Read more
  •  121
    "Playing God" and Bioethics
    Christian Bioethics 8 (2): 119-124. 2002.
  •  24
    Act Evaluation, Willing and Double Effect
    Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 71 243-253. 1997.
  •  18
    How We Act
    International Philosophical Quarterly 45 (2): 266-268. 2005.
  •  15
    Permissible Killing: The Self-defence Justification of Homicide
    Review of Metaphysics 49 (2): 444-445. 1995.
    Suzanne Uniacke has written an adventurous and philosophically elegant work in which she justifies the intentional use of necessary and proportionate lethal force in private homicidal self-defense. Her contribution will interest those engaged in discussions concerning the ethics of homicide.
  •  19
    Expanding Boundaries
    Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 10 (2): 121-122. 2001.
    Itself a topic of constant comment, the Internet's implications for healthcare remain unclear even while its boundaries incessantly expand. The WorldWide Web and allied technologies such as telephony are clearly permanent fixtures of our world. These technologies have changed our ways of life and demonstrate further dynamic capacities to do so. They speak of what we shall be, but know not
  •  55
    A number of common and generally noncontroversial practices in the care of patients at the end of life lead to their deaths. For example, physicians honor a patient's refusal of medical intervention even when doing so leads to the patient's death. Similarly, with a patient's or surrogate's consent, physicians administer sedatives in order to relieve pain and distress at the end of life, even when it is known that doing so will cause the patient's death. In contemporary U.S. public policy, these …Read more
  •  62
    The Instability of the Standard Justification for Physician-Assisted Suicide
    Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 10 (1): 103-109. 2001.
    Proponents commonly justify the legalization of physician-assisted suicide (PAS) in terms of a patient's wanting to die (autonomy) and the patient's having a medically established good reason for suicide. These are the common elements of the standard justification offered for the legalization of PAS. In what follows, I argue that these two conditions exist in significant tension with one another, operating according to distinct dynamics that render the justification for PAS an unstable basis for…Read more
  •  34
    Temporal indiscriminateness: The case of cluster bombs
    Science and Engineering Ethics 16 (1): 135-145. 2010.
    This paper argues that the current stock of anti-personnel cluster bombs are temporally indiscriminate, and, therefore, unjust weapons. The paper introduces and explains the idea of temporal indiscriminateness. It argues that to honor non-combatant immunity—in addition to not targeting civilians—one must adequately target combatants. Due to their high dud rate, cluster submunitions fail to target combatants with sufficient temporal accuracy, and, thereby, result in avoidable serious harm to non-…Read more
  •  234
    T. A. Cavanaugh defends double-effect reasoning (DER), also known as the principle of double effect. DER plays a role in anti-consequentialist ethics (such as deontology), in hard cases in which one cannot realize a good without also causing a foreseen, but not intended, bad effect (for example, killing non-combatants when bombing a military target). This study is the first book-length account of the history and issues surrounding this controversial approach to hard cases. It will be indispensab…Read more