Thomas Hainscho

Fritz Mauthner’s essay Die Philosophie und der Krieg, published in October 1914, is among the nationalist writings of Mauthner written during the First World War. The essay explores the question of returning to philosophy after the war. Asking this question, Mauthner examines the relationship between war and philosophy and argues that the two concepts do not share any substantial points of contact. During his discussion, an unspoken premise of the question about the return to philosophy is revealed: as the science of reason, philosophy cannot understand war. The profession of philosophy can neither contribute to a military victory nor end the people’s suffering. Hence, philosophers should remain silent in times of war. Mauthner himself did not adhere to his demand. In 1914, he believed that Germany would be victorious, and emphasised in his essay that war reveals a new meaning of life by giving a meaning to death.

‘Post-truth’ has become a buzzword for numerous current crises: the fragmentation of the media landscape, the ongoing debate about ‘fake news’, the loss of trust in science, etc. Although these crises take place in society, it is claimed that the roots of post-truth can be traced back to the history of philosophy. Occasionally, it is asserted that Karl Popper’s critical rationalism gave rise to post-truth: His rejection of verificationism has limited truth claims in the realm of science. Given the absence of infallible evidence and certainty, critical rationalism calls for challenging scientific authority. I argue that post-truth is compatible with critical rationalism from an epistemological point of view, considering that both positions are critical of certainty. However, in critical rationalism, fallibilism, responsibility, and the idea of criticism are combined, and in this respect, it offers a possible way to overcome the problems that are associated with post-truth. This treatment of the problems of post-truth results from the recognition of moral responsibility to take action on the basis of a hypothesis that remains open to revision.

This paper investigates the political dimension of Fritz Mauthner’s writings in respect to his language critique and his ambivalent relationship to Judaism. Its aim is to oppose the common understanding of Mauthner as a German-nationalist. For doing so, Mauthner’s relation to Judaism is contextualised within his philosophical views on patriotism, mother-tongue, and the formation of social communities. By suggesting an anti-nationalist interpretation of his philosophy, it is argued that participation in a certain linguistic practice can explain what it means to belong to a certain community according to Mauthner. The paper discusses to what extent Mauthner’s writings can be interpreted as anti-nationalist and concludes that he is too contradictory to be understood distinctively as a nationalist or an anti-nationalist.

This article deals with the question about the conditions for someone to call something ‘fake news’. It examines cases in which something is called fake news and analyses these cases from an ordinary language point of view as speech acts. Doing so, the analysis explains fake news as the expression of a dissent. The analysis avoids problems of recent attempts to provide a definition of fake news and argues against the view that fake news belong to a so-called post-truth era. The conclusion of the article is that it is not possible to call something fake news without having unyielding convictions about the truth.

This paper investigates the concept of Heimat in the work of philosopher, writer, and journalist Fritz Mauthner (1849–1923). It points out a conflict between Mauthner’s language philosophy and his political views. In his philosophical work, he argues that language is an insufficient tool for the acquisition of knowledge. When he writes about his heritage and uses notions such as Heimat, Volk, or Vaterland, Mauthner makes claims about the formation of social communities based on a shared language and neglects a critical analysis. It appears as if he ignores the philosophical critique of language when it comes to political concepts. Thus, his political position is usually described without regard to his language philosophy, and Mauthner is conceived as a devoted German nationalist and a typical example of Jewish self-hatred. That reading can be contrasted with parts of his work – especially the late book Muttersprache und Vaterland (1920) – in which he criticizes political concepts from a language-philosophical point of view. I argue that Mauthner, read as a philosopher, cannot be typecast as a naïve nationalist as he is too contradictory. I show that his writings offer both a historical example of German nationalism and a deconstruction of nationalism.

Ich möchte im Folgenden den Begriff des Resonanzphänomens bei Arnold Gehlen untersuchen. Dafür gehe ich im ersten Abschnitt auf die Rolle von Kultur und Technik in Gehlens philosophischer Anthropologie ein und zeige, wie er Faszination durch Technik als Resonanzphänomen beschreibt. Danach wird im zweiten Abschnitt auf Fragen hingewiesen, die durch den Begriff des Resonanzphänomens aufgeworfen werden, und im dritten Abschnitt vorgeschlagen, diese Fragen mithilfe der Technikphilosophie von Ernst Kapp zu beantworten.