Thomas Donahue

Who is made unfree by systematic injustices, like poverty, patriarchy, or race? Many think the answer is, "The victims." Who has duties to challenge these injustices? Many say, "The privileged." To both, this book offers a different answer: "Everyone." Everyone is made unfree by such injustices: victims, bystanders, and perpetrators alike. For such injustices try to suppress everyone's resistance to their workings, and that suppression counts as arbitrary power. Moreover, everyone has a duty to themselves to be free. Examining three major global injustices--gender, race, and poverty--this book thus offers a new defence of the doctrine of the global left, "No one is free while others are oppressed!"

Anthropocentrism holds that the only things valuable in themselves are: human beings, their desires and needs, and the satisfaction of those. In turn, Gaia theory holds that the Earth and all creatures on it constitute something akin to a vast living being. Many layfolk maintain that Gaia theory implies the falsity of anthropocentrism, and thus puts the kibosh on that doctrine. But philosophical writers deny this implication. This paper therefore argues for what we may call “the Kibosh Thesis”—that Gaia theory, when correctly understood, does indeed put the kibosh on anthropocentrism. It defends this thesis by appealing to “the Part-Whole Thesis”—that no parts of a living being which do not constitute the whole being can have as much intrinsic value as the being itself has. Since the evidence supporting Gaia theory is mounting, this thesis appears to provide a fairly strong argument against anthropocentrism. In arguing for this position, I show why anthropocentrism is a plausible doctrine, specify Gaia theory’s main claims, meet the main philosophical objections to the Kibosh Thesis, and develop the argument from the Part-Whole Thesis.

Poverty exists in all societies, and is widely considered a bad thing. This suggests two questions. First, why, if at all, is it a bad thing that poverty persists in a given society? Second, why is it a bad thing to be poor? This paper aims to give us a better purchase on the first question by tackling the second. Accordingly, it asks: What is it that, above all else, makes it a bad thing to be poor? What is the chief bad-maker of individual poverty? In answer, the paper argues that what chiefly makes being poor bad is that it throws one into a condition of stigmatized vulnerability. To be in this condition is, on the one hand, to have society consider you socially disgraced and, on the other, to be particularly vulnerable to being harmed by the actions of other people or the workings of social institutions. The paper begins by considering four alternative explanations of poverty's badness: Hegel's theory that it forces the poor into moral degradation; J. Wolff and A. de-Shalit's theory that it constitutes a corrosive disadvantage; social policy researchers’ view that it is a form of social exclusion; and A. Margalit's theory that it is seen as humiliating failure. The paper tries to show that all four theories face grave objections. The paper then defines poverty as a lack of capabilities to achieve basic functionings, presents the stigmatized vulnerability theory, and gives a positive reason for thinking it the best explanation of poverty’s badness. The reason is that stigmatized vulnerability, in addition to its own intrinsic badness, institutionalizes the shaming involved in stigmatization and thus produces a moral bad which masquerades as morally acceptable.

The question: Why, if at all, is justice the first virtue of social institutions? is one of the chief questions of current political philosophy. But political philosophers have not asked: Why should societies strive to be just? In answer, this paper argues that societies should strive for social justice because unless they do so, morality will lack legitimate authority for most of its members. Call this "the undermining morality explanation." The paper first considers and tries to rebut three alternative views: the Rawlsian explanation from the finality condition; the Hegelian explanation from the value of reconciling people to their social world; and the Frankfurt-school solidarity explanation, which is from the value of achieving universal societal solidarity. The paper then argues for the undermining morality explanation, on the grounds that (1) if a society does not strive for social justice, it will not provide a majority of its members with the self-respect necessary for valuing themselves and all other people as human; (2) that if a majority of society's members cannot so value themselves and others, then for them morality lacks its requiring force; and (3) if morality lacks legitimate authority for most of its members, then the evils which morality is designed to reduce and eliminate will beset society. The paper then shows why avoiding causing those evils is obligatory for society, and offers reasons for thinking that this explanation is superior to its three rivals. If the thesis defended here is right, then one of morality's foundations is social justice.

This paper outlines and defends a processual theory of peoplehood. On our theory, a people is, roughly speaking, composed of two things. First, an unfolding series of events coordinated by the practices of constituting, governing, or changing a polity's authoritative institutions. Second, individual persons whose lives and interests are intensely affected by these events and institutions. We call this theory deep processualism. We outline the theory by showing how it would answer five questions: the questions of constituents, individuation, origination, termination, and membership: What are the chief constituents of peoples? What individuates peoples? Under what conditions do peoples originate? Under what conditions do peoples cease to be? Under what conditions is a person a member of the people? We also consider alternative theories of the nature of peoples, theories due to Juergen Habermas, Bruce Ackerman, Philip Pettit, and James Fishkin. We defend our theory on the ground that it is not embarrassed by the difficulties that we pin on these alternative theories.

It is widely agreed that oppression is wrong. But what, above all, makes it wrong? What is its chief wrong-maker? This paper argues that what chiefly makes oppression wrong is that it violates two principles of political morality. The first is the principle of wrongful benefit: no one should benefit from her own wrong. The second is the principle of institutionalized harm: no social group should be subjected to an unjustified institutionalized harm. Let us call this explanation of oppression's wrongness the two principles thesis. In arguing for this thesis, I give an account of the nature of oppression, explicate the two principles, prove that they both exist, and then show how oppression violates them and thus is wrong. I then defend the thesis on the grounds that it better explains oppression's wrongness than do two rival explanations. First, the view that oppression violates a principle of non-domination. Second, the view that it violates a principle of equal respect. I show that my explanation better satisfies the nine criteria for choice among explanatory theories: evidential adequacy, simplicity, unifying power, falsifiability, testability, neatness, conservativeness, fecundity, and mechanism-informativeness.

Philosophical pessimism consists of a set of theses offering a gloomy view of humanity and its destiny. These theses, and the philosophical position they comprise, have been held by Leopardi, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Camus, Cioran, and perhaps Unamuno and Freud. This paper asks: What are this position's theoretical foundations? What are the theories which underpin and justify the position and its constituent theses? In answer, this paper argues that pessimism's foundations consist of three theories, theories I call the algesic theory of human nature, the hamartiac theory of human reason, and the eikaic theory of the universe. The algesic theory holds that human beings are mortal and conscious of it, acutely conscious of time's passing, prone to keenly desire what they cannot achieve and what cannot be, prone to believe what they strongly desire to be true, prone to suffer when they (realize they) cannot fulfill their desires or when their desire-driven beliefs are undermined, prone to keenly desire that everything come out well, and prone to believe that things in general get better. The hamartiac theory holds that human theoretical reason is a powerful tool for discovering the truth of things; but when using practical reason, humans tend to set themselves ends their pursuit of which leads to bad or unwanted consequences. The eikaic theory holds that the universe and the flow of events have no propensity to make things in general get better; so too, they are both replete with change, chance, and unexpected events.

The questions: "What are the functions of law?" "What is morality's function?" are familiar problems in legal and moral philosophy. But political philosophy has not pressed the corresponding question about politics. This paper accordingly asks: What are politics' main functions? In answer, the paper argues for the Dual-Function Thesis: politics has two main functions: first, to allow groups and their members to make a significant mark on the world and society, a mark more significant than the members individually or severally could make; second, to make the general arrangements of a group's affairs responsive to the wants and fears of at least some of the group's current members. This means, as the paper will show, that politics solves two deep human problems: the Significant Mark Problem and the Responsiveness Problem. The paper starts with an analysis of the concept of politics, refutes six alternative conception of politics' main function, shows that the Dual-Function Thesis implies that politics solves the two problems, mounts a direct argument for the Thesis, and refutes the objection that politics has no main function.

Many philosophers and political theorists now agree that morality and ethics are not the same. But in virtue of what do morality and ethics — understood as what philosophical and empirical ethics together study — differ? This question is important because unless we answer it, we shall not be able to give an adequate philosophical account of morality. In answer to the question, this paper argues that what distinguishes morality from ethics is that ethics is a set of normative requirements aimed at promoting people's well-being, while morality is the proper subset of ethical normative requirements consisting in the set of all ethical obligations and duties, the aim of which is to reduce the amount of harm persons suffer. The paper defends this thesis by arguing directly for it and by arguing for definitions of ethics and morality which support the thesis.

What are the different styles by which political theorists deal with intellectual problems? This question is important because if we do not answer it, we shall not know why methodological disagreements are so much more intense and heated than substantive disagreements. Nor shall we know why particular political theorists take the positions they do in methodological controversies. This paper argues that there are now five main styles by which political theorists deal with intellectual problems: the Classicist, the Mannerist, the Baroque, the Romantic, and the Collectivist. Classicism solves the problem it poses, Mannerism presses it, the Baroque resolves it, Romanticism dissolves it, and Collectivism publicizes it. For each style, we give an account of its main features, give examples of how it has been applied to different problems in political theory, and then identify its strengths and weaknesses.

Everyone agrees that freedom is a good, and many would hold that it is a supreme good. But do human beings need freedom? That is, do we need freedom in the same way that we need food, shelter, love, and the respect of others? In this paper, I argue, first, that we do have a vital need for a good measure of negative freedom. I call this "the Negative Necessity Thesis." I then argue, second, that we do not have a vital need for positive freedom. This I call "the Positive Non-necessity Thesis." Following D. Wiggins, I hold that someone vitally needs x if, and only if, it is necessary, things being what they are, that she avoids being severely harmed only if she has x. I reach the first thesis on the ground that if you lack a good measure of negative freedom, then you suffer from imprisoned agency and special vulnerability to having your interests trampled. This suffices for the severe harms involved in a vital needs not being met. I reach the second thesis on the ground that lacking positive freedom does not pose a serious threat to your enjoying all the capabilities essential to ordinary human functioning, and thus does not severely harm you. The two theses help explain the widespread feeling that negative and positive freedom are both very valuable, but that in the end, negative freedom is the more important.

This Chapter elucidates and defends the third and final premise of the dissertation's argument. The premise defended here runs thus: Any theory claiming that a certain set of normative requirements ranges over (a) some actions, (b) some states of affairs, (c) some ways of life, or (d) some policies, the actualization of which would advance or set back the interests of persons, analytically depends on some theory claiming that a certain set of normative requirements ranges over (i) all actions, (ii) any states of affairs, (iii) any ways of life, (iv) any policies, or (v) any character traits, the actualization of which would advance or set back the interests of persons. We shall call this premise the Universal-Particular Thesis. The Thesis implies, first, that any theory of the first kind is a logical consequence of a theory of the second kind. It implies, second, that any theory of the first kind has the meanings of its theoretical terms shaped by the theory on which it depends. The Chapter defends this Thesis with an argument of three premises and one lemma. Parts 2-6 explicate the Thesis and defend each premise and the lemma. Part 7 reviews the argument to the Universal-Particular Thesis. Part 8 considers and replies to an objection to the Thesis. The objection is the famous meaning-change argument, due to Paul Feyerabend. It holds that the meanings of terms denoted by the same word differ across different theories. E.g., "mass" in classical mechanics means something different than mass in relativistic mechanics. Part 9 then proves the dissertation's thesis from the chapter Thesis and the theses of the previous Chapters. Part 10 concludes.

One of the many striking theses for which Virginia Held argues in How Terrorism Is Wrong is that terrorism is not necessarily morally wrong. In principle, she argues, terrorism can sometimes be permissible . Call this "the Non-necessity Thesis," or NNT. As so often in this deep and thought-provoking book, Held gives a powerful and illuminating argument to this thesis. The argument begins by asserting what we may call "the Violations Distribution Principle" : if we must have rights violations, then a more equitable distribution of such violations is better than a less equitable . It then claims that this implies that "it is better to equalize rights violations in a transition to bring an end to rights violations than it is to subject a given group that has already suffered extensive rights violations to continued such violations" . But this in turn implies that where one group's rights are severely and systematically violated— say, by an oppression, in which their right to personal safety is systematically violated—and another group's rights are not so violated, then a transition which involves a sharing of proportionate rights violations between the oppressed and the non-oppressed is permissible, "if this and only this can be expected to lead to a situation in which rights are more adequately respected" . In those and only those circumstances, terrorism would be permissible, since it centrally violates the right to personal safety. Hence NNT. The idea, then, is that VDP implies that where there is a systematic imbalance in the distribution of severe rights violations between one group and another , and where only a transition which involves a sharing of proportionate rights violations between the oppressed and the non-oppressed can be expected to achieve a situation in which rights are more adequately respected , then terrorism aimed at the oppressors and in conformity with the Uniqueness condition is permissible

This paper asks whether an individual or a political community (henceforth: 'constitutional community') ever incurs moral responsibility for the requirements made by the norms of their constitution. We argue, first, that any constitutional community bears collective moral responsibility for those requirements. We reach this thesis by showing that (i) a constitutional community is a group which can take collective actions attributable to the group as a whole, and (ii) any given set of constitutional norms is the outcome of such collective action. We argue, second, that ordinary citizens of constitutional communities can, in normal circumstances, bear individual moral responsibility for such norms. We reach this second thesis by showing that an average citizen bears individual responsibility for the direct outcome of her polity's collective action whenever she both (1) contributes to the collective action where she need not fear serious reprisals for not contributing, and (2) supports and reflectively endorses the outcome.

What today divides analytical from Continental philosophy? This paper argues that the present divide is not what it once was. Today, the divide concerns the styles in which philosophers deal with intellectual problems: solving them, pressing them, resolving them, or dissolving them. Using ‘the boundary problem’, or ‘the democratic paradox’, as an example, we argue for two theses. First, the difference between most analytical and most Continental philosophers today is that Continental philosophers find intelligible two styles of dealing with problems that most analytical philosophers find unintelligible: pressing them and resolving them. Second, when it comes to a genuine divide in which not understanding the other side’s basic philosophical purposes combines with disagreement on fundamental questions of doctrine, the only such divide today is that between those analytical philosophers who tend to solve problems and those Continental philosophers who tend to press problems. It is among these subgroups that there is a real philosophical divide today. So the analytical–Continental divide is more a matter of style than of substance; but as we try to show, differences in style shape differences over substance