•  250
    Roger’s official statement of the thesis that he defends reads as follows: Uniqueness : If an agent whose total evidence is E is fully rational in taking doxastic attitude D to P, then necessarily, any subject with total evidence E who takes a different attitude to P is less than fully rational. Following Roger, I’ll call someone who denies Uniqueness a Permissivist . In what follows, I’ll argue against Uniqueness and defend Permissivism
  •  18
    Bias: A Philosophical Study
    Oxford University Press. 2022.
    This book is a philosophical exploration of bias and our practices of attributing it. It develops and defends the norm-theoretic account of bias, according to which objectionable biases involve systematic departures from objective norms or standards of correctness. It explores the perspectival character of bias attributions, or the ways in which our views about which people and sources of information are biased about a topic are influenced and constrained, both rationally and psychologically, by…Read more
  •  12
    Quine and Epistemology
    In Gilbert Harman & Ernie Lepore (eds.), A Companion to W. V. O. Quine, Wiley. 2014.
    Lars Bergström: Quine and the a priori. Many philosophers believe that W.V. Quine says or implies that there is no a priori knowledge. It is argued here, on the contrary, that there is indeed a priori justification and that this claim is quite consistent with Quine's philosophy. Quine's views on analyticity are also explained and a Quinean notion of analyticity is proposed. The question of whether a posteriori justification and epistemological coherentism is justified a priori is also discussed.…Read more
  •  284
    Evidence and Normativity: Reply to Leite
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2): 465-474. 2007.
    According to one view about the rationality of belief, such rationality is ultimately nothing other than the rationality that one exhibits in taking the means to one’s ends. On this view, epistemic rationality is really a species or special case of instrumental rationality. In particular, epistemic rationality is instrumental rationality in the service of one’s distinctively cognitive or epistemic goals (perhaps: one’s goal of holding true rather than false beliefs). In my (2003), I dubbed this …Read more
  •  1
    The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement
    In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1, Oxford University Press Uk. 2005.
  •  26
    Historical Versus Current Time Slice Theories in Epistemology
    In Brian P. McLaughlin & Hilary Kornblith (eds.), Goldman and His Critics, Blackwell. pp. 43-65. 2016.
    This chapter explores one theme that in the author judgment has not received as much sustained attention as it warrants: the distinction between historical and current time slice theories of epistemic justification. It devotes to the hermeneutical tasks of explicating and contextualizing the distinction between historical and current time slice theories. The chapter examines Goldman's longstanding claim that no current time slice theory can possibly do justice to the epistemic role of preservati…Read more
  •  32
    According to Peter van Inwagen, there are no successful philosophical arguments for substantive conclusions. He argues for this thesis in two steps. First, he puts forward and defends a “criterion of philosophical success,” according to which a philosophical argument is a success just in case it has the power to convert any ideally rational agnostic to its conclusion. He then argues that, given the kind of disagreement we find among philosophers, we have good reason to think that no philosophica…Read more
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    Epistemic rationality as instrumental rationality: A critique
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3). 2003.
    In this paper, I explore the relationship between epistemic rationality and instrumental rationality, and I attempt to delineate their respective roles in typical instances of theoretical reasoning. My primary concern is with the instrumentalist conception of epistemic rationality: the view that epistemic rationality is simply a species of instrumental rationality, viz. instrumental rationality in the service of one's cognitive or epistemic goals. After sketching the relevance of the instrumenta…Read more
  •  2640
    Peer disagreement and higher order evidence
    In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings, Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217. 2010.
    My aim in this paper is to develop and defend a novel answer to a question that has recently generated a considerable amount of controversy. The question concerns the normative significance of peer disagreement. Suppose that you and I have been exposed to the same evidence and arguments that bear on some proposition: there is no relevant consideration which is available to you but not to me, or vice versa. For the sake of concreteness, we might picture
  •  980
    Disagreement, Dogmatism, and Belief Polarization
    Journal of Philosophy 105 (10): 611-633. 2008.
    Suppose that you and I disagree about some non-straightforward matter of fact (say, about whether capital punishment tends to have a deterrent effect on crime). Psychologists have demonstrated the following striking phenomenon: if you and I are subsequently exposed to a mixed body of evidence that bears on the question, doing so tends to increase the extent of our initial disagreement. That is, in response to exactly the same evidence, each of us grows increasingly confident of his or her origin…Read more
  •  1382
    The epistemic significance of disagreement
    In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Volume 1, Oxford University Press. pp. 167-196. 2005.
    Looking back on it, it seems almost incredible that so many equally educated, equally sincere compatriots and contemporaries, all drawing from the same limited stock of evidence, should have reached so many totally different conclusions---and always with complete certainty
  •  174
    Hume, Norton, and Induction without Rules
    Philosophy of Science 77 (5): 754-764. 2010.
    With respect to inductive reasoning, there are at least two broad projects that have been of interest to philosophers. The first project is that of accurately describing paradigmatic instances of inductive reasoning in the sciences and in everyday life. Thus, we might ask, of some particular historical episode, how exactly Newton, or Darwin, or Einstein arrived at some conclusion on the basis of the evidence that was before him. The second project is one of justification. The task here is that o…Read more
  •  1
    Peer Disagreement and Higher
    Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. forthcoming.
  •  300
    Evidence
    Philosophy Compass. 2006.
    The concept of evidence is central to both epistemology and the philosophy of science. Of course, ‘evidence’ is hardly a philosopher's term of art: it is not only, or even primarily, philosophers who routinely speak of evidence, but also lawyers and judges, historians and scientists, investigative journalists and reporters, as well as the members of numerous other professions and ordinary folk in the course of everyday life. The concept of evidence would thus seem to be on firmer pre-theoretical…Read more
  •  119
    The Rationality of Belief and Some Other Propositional Attitudes
    Philosophical Studies 110 (2): 163-196. 2002.
    In this paper, I explore the question of whether the expectedconsequences of holding a belief can affect the rationality ofdoing so. Special attention is given to various ways in whichone might attempt to exert some measure of control over whatone believes and the normative status of the beliefs thatresult from the successful execution of such projects. I arguethat the lessons which emerge from thinking about the case ofbelief have important implications for the way we should thinkabout the rati…Read more
  •  506
    Is reflective equilibrium enough?
    Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1): 325-359. 2010.
    Suppose that one is at least a minimal realist about a given domain, in that one thinks that that domain contains truths that are not in any interesting sense of our own making. Given such an understanding, what can be said for and against the method of reflective equilibrium as a procedure for investigating the domain? One fact that lends this question some interest is that many philosophers do combine commitments to minimal realism and a reflective equilibrium methodology. Here, for example, i…Read more
  •  365
    Common sense as evidence: Against revisionary ontology and skepticism
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1): 53-78. 2008.
    In this age of post-Moorean modesty, many of us are inclined to doubt that philosophy is in possession of arguments that might genuinely serve to undermine what we ordinarily believe. It may perhaps be conceded that the arguments of the skeptic appear to be utterly compelling; but the Mooreans among us will hold that the very plausibility of our ordinary beliefs is reason enough for supposing that there must be something wrong in the skeptic’s arguments, even if we are unable to say what it is. …Read more
  •  296
    If you are more likely to continue a course of action in virtue of having previously invested in that course of action, then you tend to honor sunk costs. It is widely thought both that (i) individuals often do give some weight to sunk costs in their decision-making and that (ii) it is irrational for them to do so. In this paper I attempt to cast doubt on the conventional wisdom about sunk costs, understood as the conjunction of these two claims.
  •  475
    Evidence: Fundamental concepts and the phenomenal conception
    Philosophy Compass 3 (5): 933-955. 2008.
    The concept of evidence is among the central concerns of epistemology broadly construed. As such, it has long engaged the intellectual energies of both philosophers of science and epistemologists of a more traditional variety. Here I briefly survey some of the more important ideas to have emerged from this tradition of reflection. I then look somewhat more closely at an issue that has recently come to the fore, largely as a result of Williamson's Knowledge and Its Limits: that of whether one's e…Read more
  •  134
    Soames and Moore on method in ethics and epistemology
    Philosophical Studies 172 (6): 1661-1670. 2015.
  •  354
    Moorean Facts and Belief Revision, or Can the Skeptic Win?
    Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1): 179-209. 2005.
    A Moorean fact, in the words of the late David Lewis, is ‘one of those things that we know better than we know the premises of any philosophical argument to the contrary’. Lewis opens his seminal paper ‘Elusive Knowledge’ with the following declaration.
  •  238
    Disagreement and the Burdens of Judgment
    In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays, Oxford University Press. 2013.
  •  103
    The Cost of Skepticism: Who Pays?
    Philosophical Studies 131 (3): 695-712. 2006.
    Those who favor externalist accounts of knowledge and justification often accuse their internalist opponents of playing into the hands of skeptic. According to this line of thought, internalists characteristically set overly demanding requirements for knowledge and justification, requirements which ordinary believers infrequently satisfy: the internalist is thus committed by his or her own theory to a massive and implausible revisionism about the extent of what we know and justifiably believe. F…Read more