•  2
    Conceptualism and the Objection from Animals
    In Violetta L. Waibel, Margit Ruffing & David Wagner (eds.), Natur Und Freiheit. Akten des Xii. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, De Gruyter. pp. 1269-1276. 2018.
  •  115
    Each of Kant’s three Critiques offers an account of the nature of a mental faculty and arrives at this account by means of a procedure I call ‘faculty analysis’. Faculty analysis is often regarded as among the least defensible aspects of Kant’s position; as a consequence, philosophers seeking to inherit Kantian ideas tend to transpose them into a different methodological context. I argue that this is a mistake: in fact faculty analysis is a live option for philosophical inquiry today. My argumen…Read more
  •  1
    Moderate Conceptualism and Spatial Representation
    In Dennis Schulting (ed.), Kantian Nonconceptualism, Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 145-170. 2016.
    In this paper I argue that Kant’s theory of spatial representation supports a Moderate Conceptualist view of his theory of intuition, according to which Kantian intuitions depend for their objective purport on actualizations of spontaneity in a particular kind of synthesis. In making the case for this I focus on three aspects of the theory of spatial representation: the distinction Kant draws between what he calls the original representation of space and the representations of determinate spaces…Read more
  •  64
    Intuition and Judgment: How Not to Think about the Singularity of Intuition
    In Stefano Bacin, Claudio La Rocca, Alfredo Ferrarin & Margit Ruffing (eds.), Kant and Philosophy in a Cosmopolitan Sense, De Gruyter. 2013.
    According to a widely held view, a Kantian intuition functions like a singular term. I argue that this view is false. Its apparent plausibility, both textual and philosophical, rests on attributing to Kant a Fregean conception of judgment. I show that Kant does not hold a Fregean conception of judgment and argue that, as a consequence, intuition cannot be understood on analogy with singular terms.
  •  96
    I give an argument against nonconceptualist readings of Kants claim that intuitions and concepts constitute two distinct kinds of representation than is assumed by proponents of nonconceptualist readings. I present such an interpretation and outline the alternative reading of the Deduction that results.
  •  548
    Kantian Conceptualism
    In Guenther Abel & James Conant (eds.), Rethinking Epistemology, De Gruyter. pp. 1--197. 2011.
    In the recent debate between conceptualists and nonconceptualists about perceptual content, Kant’s notion of intuition has been invoked on both sides. Conceptualists claim Kant as a forerunner of their position, arguing that Kantian intuitions have the same kind of content as conceptual thought. On the other hand, nonconceptualists claim Kant as a forerunner of their own position, contending that Kantian intuitions have a distinctly nonconceptual kind of content. In this paper, I argue first, th…Read more
  •  57
    Spatial representation, magnitude and the two stems of cognition
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (5-6): 524-550. 2014.
    The aim of this paper is to show that attention to Kant's philosophy of mathematics sheds light on the doctrine that there are two stems of the cognitive capacity, which are distinct, but equally necessary for cognition. Specifically, I argue for the following four claims: The distinctive structure of outer sensible intuitions must be understood in terms of the concept of magnitude. The act of sensibly representing a magnitude involves a special act of spontaneity Kant ascribes to a capacity he …Read more
  •  125
    Kant’s Spontaneity Thesis
    Philosophical Topics 34 (1/2): 189-220. 2006.
    Philosophers seeking to formulate a philosophy of mind that offers an alternative to the cur-rently dominant reductionist positions frequently appeal to the Kantian thesis that the mind is essentially spontaneous. Yet it is far from clear what the content of this thesis is, and what recommends it. In this paper, I discuss this question and propose a new answer – one that makes better philosophical and textual sense of Kant’s own claims than I believe has hitherto been offered. I do this by focus…Read more
  •  79
    No Other Use than in Judgment?: Kant on Concepts and Sensible Synthesis
    Journal of the History of Philosophy 53 (3): 461-484. 2015.
    it is sometimes said that one of Kant’s decisive advances over his predecessors was to have anticipated Frege’s functional theory of concepts, along with its corollary that a concept has significance only in the context of the whole proposition.1 Kant is said to break with a tradition that held that there is a self-standing species of concept-use—called apprehensio simplex, or the conceiving of an idea—in which one represents objects by having a concept before one’s mind, independently of connec…Read more