Thomas Mautner

Central parts of the natural law theories of Grotius and Pufendorf assume that persons by nature have individual realms of their own, violations of which constitute a wrong. This is the basis for their accounts of promises, ownership and reactions against wrongs. These accounts are significantly independent of any assumption that a superior being imposes obligations: rather, the individuals themselves create obligations by their own acts of will. The translator's introducton draws attention to the author's relation to Hägerström, and remarks briefly on related points in Ames, Köhler and Georges Davy

Heidegger’s treatment of self-sacrifice has suffered neglect. In this paper, it is critically analysed and found wanting, and it is argued that for a proper understanding its historical location must be taken into account. The way he treats self-sacrifice presents a particular instance of many recurrent features in his thinking. Some of these can be better understood by reference to the kinship with certain forms of religious thought. In particular, the absence of a moral dimension has a counterpart in certain familiar forms of religiosity.

Statements to the effect that a certain law exists are generally considered to be statements of certain contingent, empirical facts. We will discuss a particular view of this kind-namely, legal positivism'-as presented by G.H. von Wright in Norm and Action.2 Statements to the effect that a certain law exists are also generally considered to obey the laws of deontic logic. This is also von Wright's view. The combination of these two views creates problems. These become particularly conspicuous with regard to a possible defect in laws-namely, inconsistency.3 They will be discussed in Sections 2-2i of this essay. With regard to certain logical or moral defects in laws, philosophers tend to claim, as truths a priori, that laws cannot have them. With regard to some other defects (for example, excessive complexity) no similar tendency is evident. A discussion of this difference is contained in Sections 22-25 of this essay.

This paper discusses the place of philosophical naturalism in the philosophy of law, with special reference to Scandinavian Realism. Hägerström originated a non-cognitivist analysis of certain fundamental legal concepts, but he also proposed an error theory. The two approaches are incompatible, but were not always clearly distinguished. Among his followers, Olivecrona and Ross gradually abandoned the latter, at least from the late 1940s. Many accounts of their views are unclear, because the presence of these two kinds of analysis, their incompatibility, and the gradual abandonment of one, has often been overlooked. A corollary of the discussion is that there are some important corrigenda in the entry “Naturalism in legal philosophy” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy