Thomas Mertens

Cephalos and Kant. A conversation on duties Socrates’s first conversational partner in Plato’s Politeia is Cephalos, the host of the dialogue. But the conversation between Cephalos and Socrates does not appear to be very fruitful. It merely seems to function as the setting of the stage. Nonetheless, what Cephalos has to say about life and old age, about justice and doing one’s duty is far from uninteresting. Indeed, if Cephalos had presented his views to Immanuel Kant, they would have been well received. Kant would have agreed with Cephalos’s emphasis on duties: the duty to speak truthfully; the duty of returning what one has borrowed from another and the duty of gratitude for what one has been given. Kant’s fictional conversation with Cephalos even presents us with some unexpected vistas.

While almost everyone has heard of human rights, few will have reflected in depth on what human rights are, where they originate from and what they mean. A Philosophical Introduction to Human Rights – accessibly written without being superficial – addresses these questions and provides a multifaceted introduction to legal philosophy. The point of departure is the famous 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which provides a frame for engagement with western legal philosophy. Thomas Mertens sketches the philosophical and historical background of the Declaration, discusses the ten most important human rights with the help of key philosophers, and ends by reflecting on the relationship between rights and duties. The basso continuo of the book is a particular world view derived from Immanuel Kant. 'Unsocial sociability' is what characterises humans, i.e. the tension between man's individual and social nature. Some human rights emphasize the first, others the second aspect. The tension between these two aspects plays a fundamental role in how human rights are interpreted and applied.

Despite Kant's explicit statement that every murderer must suffer death, there are at least four situations to be found in Kant's work in which the killing of a human being should not lead to the death penalty: when too many murderers are involved; when a mother kills her illegitimate child; when one duellist kills the other; when one person pushes another off a plank in order to save his life. This paper discusses these situation and concentrates on the last situation - Kant's interpretation of the plank of Carneades – with an eye to what they learn us about Kant understanding of the law. Does Kant acknowledge a legal vacuum? In order to come to a conclusion, Kant's 'solution' of the plank is compared with those suggested by other authors, such as Cicero, Pufendorf and Lon Fuller in his famous 'speluncean explorers' case.

Although Kant’s final work in moral philosophy, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, currently attracts much scholarly attention, there is still a lot to explore. This article is an attempt to get to grips with a particular, often neglected passage of the Rechtslehre, namely §35. Here Kant defends the view that not only can a person’s good reputation can be tarnished after his death, but also that this constitutes a violation of this dead person’s property. Here I will not be able to fully clarify what Kant means when he holds that persons can be harmed after their death, but I will put Kant’s view in a few perspectives.

Despite Kant's explicit statement that every murderer must suffer death, there are at least four situations to be found in Kant's work in which the killing of a human being should not lead to the death penalty: when too many murderers are involved; when a mother kills her illegitimate child; when one duellist kills the other; when one person pushes another off a plank in order to save his life. This paper discusses these situation and concentrates on the last situation - Kant's interpretation of the plank of Carneades – with an eye to what they learn us about Kant understanding of the law. Does Kant acknowledge a legal vacuum? In order to come to a conclusion, Kant's 'solution' of the plank is compared with those suggested by other authors, such as Cicero, Pufendorf and Lon Fuller in his famous 'speluncean explorers' case.

The small article “Statutory Injustice and Suprastatutory Law” published in 1946 by Gustav Radbruch is one of the most important texts in 20th century legal philosophy. Until recently, its importance was said to stem from its renewal of ‘natural law’ and from its ‘formula’, according to which the value of justice should override that of legal certainty in extreme cases. In this contribution, a close examination will show that Radbruch's text is less univocal than often suggested. I argue that Radbruch deals here with the acute problems of apparent criminal legality during the Nazi-era rather than with problems of validity. In order to make this clear, I first briefly sketch Radbruch's personal history and the context into which the article fits. Secondly, I analyze the text itself and focus on how to understand the well-known grudge informer case. Finally, I pay some attention to the renewed topical interest of Radbruch's formula, owing to the fact that it was used in the trials against former-GDR soldiers who shot fugitives at the Berlin Wall,and their superiors.

Jeff McMahan, one of the leading contemporary writers on ‘just war thinking’, argues in the book under review, Killing in War, that one of the central tenets of the ‘ius in bello’, namely the moral equality of combatants, is both conceptually and morally untenable. This results from a reflection upon and a departure from two basic assumptions in Walzer’s work, namely the idea that war itself isn’t a relation between persons, but between political entities and their human instruments and the idea that the ‘ius ad bellum’ and ‘ius in bello’ are and should be kept distinct. This book merits serious reflection. However, the disadvantages of McMahan’s position are obvious. If the rights of combatants during war depend on the justice of their cause, the immunity of the civilians on the side of the supposed ‘unjust’ enemy is seriously endangered

In his moral writings, Kant states that moral duty cannot be derived from “the special characteristics of human nature.” This statement is untenable if one takes seriously Kant 's moral views on sexual desire. Instead close study reveals that considerations based on both morality and nature play a role here. The combination of these two elements leads to inconsistencies and difficulties in Kant 's understanding of sexual desire, but they enable us to better understand the importance Kant attributes to marriage within his philosophy of law

In, Kant defends a position that cannot be salvaged. The essay is nonetheless important because it helps us understand his philosophy of law and, more specifically, his interpretation of the social contract. Kant considers truthfulness a strict legal duty because it is the necessary condition for the juridical state. As attested by Kants arguments against the death penalty, not even the right to life has such strict unconditional status. Within the juridical state, established by the social contract, the innate right to freedom is transformed into a bundle of merely positive rights, including the right to life. Understanding the reason for the rejection of thus helps us understand the, in a sense, character of Kant’s legal philosophy. In conclusion, some suggestions are made to bring his position closer to our common moral understanding

Not only today, but also in the 18th century the question whether human history reveals moral progress, is widely discussed. In one of his last writings, the second part of The Contest of Faculties: 'A Renewed Attempt to Answer the Question: Is the Human Race Continually Improving?' (1797), Kant answers this question affirmatively. His main reason for this answer resides in the so-called 'historical sign' (Geschichtszeichen), which proves, as Kant writes, the moral tendency of the human race. In this ‘historical sign’ both the French Revolution and the enthusiasm displayed by those who witnessed this event, play an important role. In this article the author evaluates these two elements and tries to assess their value. Contrary to the interpretation of Arendt and Lyotar,he argues that according to Kant there can only be progress in history by establishing legal relations among citizens and nations. In view of this process the principles of the French Revolution are crucially important