University of Colorado, Boulder
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2009
Mobile, Alabama, United States of America
  •  46
    An Axiological-Trajectory Theodicy
    Sophia 59 (3): 577-592. 2020.
    I develop a new theodicy in defense of Anselmian theism, one that has several advantages over traditional and recent replies to the Problem of Evil. To make my case, I first explain the value of a positive trajectory: a forward-in-time decrease in ‘first-order-gratuitous’ evil: evil that is not necessary for any equal-or-greater first-order good, but may be necessary for a higher-order good, such as the good of strongly positive axiological trajectory. Positive trajectory arguably contributes go…Read more
  •  35
    Gun Violence as Industrial Pollution
    Public Affairs Quarterly 32 (2). 2018.
    I offer a new proposal to prevent some of the harms of gun violence in the United States. First, I argue that gun violence is a negative externality of gun production, on an analogy with industrial pollution. Second, I outline a law that the United States might use to internalize the violent costs of gun production. This law would provide a financial incentive for gun manufacturers to reduce gun violence in whatever legally permissible way they can, not necessarily by reducing the prevalence of …Read more
  •  40
    Robert Maydole has recently presented a sophisticated ontological argument that he calls the Modal Perfection Argument for the existence of a supreme being. While this ontological argument is probably better than most of its peers, it is nonetheless open to at least one decisive objection. The purpose of this brief comment is to develop that objection. I claim that this objection indicates an important further point about the concept of entailment and its role in ontological arguments at large, …Read more
  •  24
    Fine-Tuning the Multiverse
    Faith and Philosophy 35 (1): 3-32. 2018.
    I present and defend an “indexical” version of the Fine-Tuning Argument. I begin by outlining the dialectic between the Fine-Tuning Argument, the Multiverse Objection, and the This-Universe Reply. Next, I sketch an indexical fine-tuning argument and defend it from two new objections. Then, I show that such an argument is immune to the Multiverse Objection. I explain how a further augmentation to the argument allows it to avoid an objection I call the “Indifference Objection.” I conclude that my …Read more
  •  7
    An Epistemic-Virtue Solution to Some Peer Disagreements in Philosophy
    Southwest Philosophy Review 34 (1): 103-116. 2018.
    I present a new way to resolve some peer disagreements in philosophy. While a straightforward majority-based argument would be inconclusive, I show that some philosophical majorities are special cases. I focus on the example of moral realism. First, I discuss how mathematically, small variations in our justified confidence in some particular cognizer’s judgment entail large differences in our justified confidence in the decision of a populous voting bloc comprising such cognizers. Second, I argu…Read more
  •  47
  •  30
    Ontological Parsimony, Erosion, and Conservatism
    Metaphilosophy 47 (4-5): 700-718. 2016.
    This article presents a novel argument against a common principle of parsimony in philosophy. First, it identifies a widely employed principle of positive ontological parsimony, according to which we should, ceteris paribus, prefer smaller ontologies to larger ontologies. Next, it shows how this principle is used as part of a strategy by which to argue for antirealist positions in many subfields of philosophy: the ockhamistic antirealist strategy. Third, it argues that this principle commits its…Read more
  •  16
    The Under-Determination Objection to Deductive Bare-Difference Arguments
    Southwest Philosophy Review 29 (1): 107-118. 2013.
  •  81
    Omniscience and maximal power
    Religious Studies 40 (3): 289-306. 2004.
    This essay examines a conflict between God's omnipotence and His omniscience. I discuss our intuitions regarding omnipotence and omniscience and describe a method by which we can decide whether a being is omnipotent. I consider the most promising versions of omnipotence and argue that they produce a genuine conflict with omniscience. Finally, I suggest that we can take the example of omniscience and generalize it to several of God's essential properties and thereby reveal incompatibilities that …Read more