Thord Svensson

Due to the potential ethical and psychological implications of screening, and especially inregard of screening on children without available and acceptable therapeutic measures, there is a common view that such procedures are not advisable. As part of an independent research- and bioethical case study, our aim was therefore to explore and describe bioethical issues among a representative sample of participant families (n = 17,055 children) in the ABIS (All Babies In South-east Sweden) research screening for Type 1 diabetes (IDDM).The primary aim is the identification of risk factors important for the development of diabetes and other multifactorial immune-mediated diseases. Four hundred, randomly chosen, participant mothers were asked to complete a questionnaire exploring issues of information, informed consent, bio-material, confidentiality and autonomy, and of prevention/intervention. 293 completed the questionnaire, resulting in a response rate of 73.3%. The majority of questions had the form of 6-point Likert-type response scales (1–6).We found that the majority of respondents felt calm in regard of samples and written material, and also concerning the possibility of their child in the future being identified as having high risk of developing Type 1 diabetes. An important finding concerning access and control of mainly biological data was indicated, with the respondents expressing concern for potential future use. We believe our findings indicate that this kind of empirical studies can substantially contribute to our understanding of bioethical issues of medical research involving genetics. Issues, such as safeguards ensuring theethical criteria of autonomy and respect, were emphasised by our respondents. We believe theissues brought up may promote further discussion, and do suggest issues for consideration by, among others, researchers, bioethicists and Institutional Review Boards.

When trying to do justice to the discourse of a certain religion it is often implicitly assumed that one’s analysis should accord with and respect the opinions held by the people preaching and practicing that religion. One reason for this assumption may be the acceptance of a more general thesis, that adherents of a given religious tradition cannot fail to know the proper content and function of the language and concepts constitutive of it. In this article, the viability of this thesis is explored through an investigation of the extent to which people belonging to a certain religion may be in error about what they mean. I assume that people, if mistaken, are wrong according to a standard which is mind-dependent enough for them to be committed and accountable to it but, at the same time, mind-independent enough for them to be mistaken about it. I try to account for this delicate balance by identifying the standard with a social norm, a mind-independent object of worship or people’s int

Can we be mistaken or ignorant about the meaning of our own words? This dissertation explores this question. More specifically it investigates to what extent and in what sense, if at all, the semantic meaning of religious and existentially important words – like ‘God’, ‘friendship’, ‘justice’ or ‘life’ – can be recognition-transcendent to the competent user of them. The possibility of words having such a meaning is assumed to presuppose a delicate balance: The meaning must be external and objective enough to the user for them to possibly be mistaken or ignorant about it. At the same time, the meaning must be internal and subjective enough to the user for them to be committed to it; to be what they mean by the terms in question. In my dissertation I put forward and examine the viability of several attempts to make sense of this balance and, hence, the possibility of recognition-transcendent meaning. In the course of doing so a number of important questions are addressed and investigated. Can people belonging to a certain religion misunderstand the meaning of the words they use to express their religious conviction? Is the reason for our failure to present an adequate definition of ‘life’ the fact that it refers to an unknown natural kind? And if we try to make explicit what is implicit in our use of religious and existentially important words, can intuition-driven conceptual analysis aid us in this endeavour? And to what extent can religious people refer to their object of worship while being mistaken about its true nature? I conclude that the meaning of religious and existentially important terms can be recognition-transcendent and this in more than one sense

WHO suggests mental ill health in terms of depression to be the highest ranking disease problem in the developed world in 2020–2030 and claims a public health approach to be the most appropriate response. But some argue that the alarming reports on mental ill health have their ground in the methods of inquiry themselves and refer to medicalization as an important issue. The aim of this article is to explore and illuminate the issue of what is meant by mental health and mental ill health and what it means that mental ill health is a major public health problem. Basically, two understandings and aspects of public health exist: a ‘reductionist’ and a ‘holistic’ with connections to different theories of health. These diverging understandings may lead to quite different public health responses, and they may have different consequences with regard to medicalization. It is concluded that we need more clearly elaborated ways to think about public health so that the increased attention to mental ill health as a public health problem does not in itself lead to medicalization in terms of just medical treatment. Otherwise, we risk losing the importance of public health as an overarching social and political instrument