Tijs Vandemeulebroucke

This paper aims to show that dominant conceptions of intelligence used in artificial intelligence (AI) are biased by normative assumptions that originate from the Global North, making it questionable if AI can be uncritically applied elsewhere without risking serious harm to vulnerable people. After the introduction in Sect. 1 we shortly present the history of IQ testing in Sect. 2, focusing on its multiple discriminatory biases. To determine how these biases came into existence, we define intelligence ontologically and underline its constructed and culturally variable character. Turning to AI, specifically the Turing Test (TT), in Sect. 3, we critically examine its underlying intelligence conceptions. The test has been of central influence in AI research and remains an important point of orientation. We argue that both the test itself and how it is used in practice risk promoting a limited conception of intelligence which solely originated in the Global North. Hence, this conception should be critically assessed in relation to the different global contexts in which AI technologies are and will be used. In Sect. 4, we highlight how unequal power relations in AI research are a real threat, rather than just philosophical sophistry while considering the history of IQ testing and the TT’s practical biases. In the last section, we examine the limits of our account and identify fields for further investigation. Tracing colonial continuities in AI intelligence research, this paper points to a more diverse and historically aware approach to the design, development, and use of AI.

The COVID-19 pandemic has had, and still has, the risk to have an enormous impact on how people socially interact with each other due to possible lockdowns, quarantine and isolation measures to reduce infection rates. Consequently, these measures hold great implications for those medical disciplines that inherently rely on social interaction, such as psychiatry. In their article, ‘Can you hear me?’— Communication, Relationship and Ethics in Video-based Telepsychiatric Consultations’, Frittgen and Haltaufderheide1 show that videoconferencing holds potential to ensure that this social interaction is guaranteed, be it in a technology mediated manner. In this sense, videoconferencing needs to be conceived as a pharmakon, a medicine, having both curative and toxifying elements, depending on why and how it is used.2 For example, videoconferencing allows continuity of care when physical proximity is impossible. At the same time, it allows the patient to interrupt the therapy by muting the therapist or ending the call at his/her convenience. To guarantee the curative side of videoconferencing, and as such avoid the toxifying elements, an ethical prescription needs to be developed and used. Despite the fact that videoconferencing seems to have a similar clinical effectiveness as face-to-face interaction, Frittgen and Haltaufderheide rightly point out that there are ethical impacts to be addressed to avoid …

Socially Assistive Robots are increasingly conceived as applicable tools to be used in aged care. However, the use carries many negative and positive connotations. Negative connotations come forth out of romanticized views of care practices, disregarding their already established technological nature. Positive connotations are formulated out of techno-deterministic views on SAR use, presenting it as an inevitable and necessary next step in technological development to guarantee aged care. Ethical guidance of SAR use inspired by negative connotations tends to be over-restrictive whereas positive connotations tend to provide over-permissive guidance. To avoid these extremes, we report on the development and content of 21 ethical orientations regarding SAR use in aged care. These orientations resulted from a multi-phased project, which consisted of empirical-ethical research focusing on older adults’ intuitions regarding SAR use and philosophical-ethical research focusing on philosophical-ethical argumentations regarding SAR use. This project led to the Socio-historical contextualization of the ethics of SAR use, in which the ethical impact of SAR use is localized on three interrelated analysis levels: societal, organizational, and individual-relational. The 21 novel orientations regarding SAR use are structured according to these levels and further categorized into foundational and applied orientations. The first category leads to critical reflection on SAR use while the latter category inspires decision-making processes regarding this use. While going beyond the care-romantic and techno-deterministic gaze of SAR use in aged care, the described orientations balance themselves between their over-restrictiveness and over-permissiveness.

Innovations permeate healthcare settings on an ever-increasing scale. Health technology innovations impact our perceptions and experiences of health, care, disease, etc. Because of the fast pace these HTIs are being introduced in different healthcare settings, there is a growing societal consensus that these HTIs need to be governed by ethical reflection. This paper reports a systematic review of argument-based literature which focused on articles reporting on ethical frameworks to screen or evaluate HTIs. To do this a four step methodology was followed: Literature search conducted in five electronic literature databases; Identification of relevant articles; Development of data-extraction tool to analyze the included articles; Analysis, synthesis of data and reporting of results. Fifty-seven articles were included, each reporting on a specific ethical framework. These ethical frameworks existed out of characteristics which were grouped into five common ones: Motivations for development and use of frameworks; Objectives of using frameworks; Specific characteristics of frameworks ; Ethical approaches and concepts used in the frameworks; Methods to use the frameworks. Although this multiplicity of ethical frameworks shows an increasing importance of ethically analyzing HTIs, it remains unclear what the specific role is of these analyses. An ethics of caution, on which ethical frameworks rely, guides HTIs in their design, development, implementation, without questioning their technological paradigm. An ethics of desirability questions this paradigm, without guiding HTIs. In the end, a place needs to be found in-between, to critically assess HTIs.

Different embodiments of technology permeate all layers of public and private domains in society. In the public domain of aged care, attention is increasingly focused on the use of socially assistive robots supporting caregivers and older adults to guarantee that older adults receive care. The introduction of SARs in aged-care contexts is joint by intensive empirical and philosophical research. Although these efforts merit praise, current empirical and philosophical research are still too far separated. Strengthening the connection between these two fields is crucial to have a full understanding of the ethical impact of these technological artefacts. To bridge this gap, we propose a philosophical-ethical framework for SAR use, one that is grounded in the dialogue between empirical-ethical knowledge about and philosophical-ethical reflection on SAR use. We highlight the importance of considering the intuitions of older adults and their caregivers in this framework. Grounding philosophical-ethical reflection in these intuitions opens the ethics of SAR use in aged care to its own socio-historical contextualisation. Referring to the work of Margaret Urban Walker, Joan Tronto and Andrew Feenberg, it is argued that this socio-historical contextualisation of the ethics of SAR use already has strong philosophical underpinnings. Moreover, this contextualisation enables us to formulate a rudimentary decision-making process about SAR use in aged care which rests on three pillars: stakeholders’ intuitions about SAR use as sources of knowledge; interpretative dialogues as democratic spaces to discuss the ethics of SAR use; the concretisation of ethics in SAR use.