•  29
    At present, the science of consciousness is structured around the search for the neural correlates of consciousness. One of the alleged advantages of the NCCs framework is its metaphysical neutrality—the fact that it begs no contested questions with respect to debates about the fundamental nature of consciousness. Here, we argue that even if the NCC framework is metaphysically neutral, it is structurally committed, for it presupposes a certain model—what we call the Lite-Brite model—of conscious…Read more
  •  1
    Free Will and the Phenomenology of Agency
    In Kevin Timpe, Meghan Griffith & Neil Levy (eds.), Routledge Companion to Free Will., Routledge. pp. 633-644. 2016.
  •  27
    A Taxonomy for Disorders of Consciousness That Takes Consciousness Seriously
    with Andrew Peterson
    American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 8 (3): 153-155. 2017.
  •  33
    Response to Fazekas and Overgaard: Degrees and Levels
    with Jakob Hohwy and Adrian M. Owen
    Trends in Cognitive Sciences 20 (10): 716-717. 2016.
  •  1
    Philosophy of Religion: A Very Short Introduction
    Oxford University Press. 2018.
    Philosophy of religion contains some of our most burning questions about the role of religion in the world, and the relationship between believers and God. Tim Bayne considers the core debates surrounding the concept of God; the relationship between faith and reason; and the problem of evil, before looking at reincarnation and the afterlife.
  •  100
    Ensemble representation and the contents of visual experience
    Philosophical Studies 176 (3): 733-753. 2019.
    The on-going debate over the ‘admissible contents of perceptual experience’ concerns the range of properties that human beings are directly acquainted with in perceptual experience. Regarding vision, it is relatively uncontroversial that the following properties can figure in the contents of visual experience: colour, shape, illumination, spatial relations, motion, and texture. The controversy begins when we ask whether any properties besides these figure in visual experience. We argue that ‘ens…Read more
  •  46
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 116 (2): 107-126. 2016.
    A central debate in the philosophy of perception concerns the range of properties that can be represented in perceptual experience. Are the contents of perceptual experience restricted to ‘low-level’ properties such as location, shape and texture, or can ‘high-level’ properties such as being a tomato, being a pine tree or being a watch also be represented in perceptual experience? This paper explores the bearing of gist perception on the admissible contents debate, arguing that it provides quali…Read more
  •  36
    In this paper we respond to Benjamin Crowe's criticisms in this issue of our discussion of the grounds of worship. We clarify our previous position, and examine Crowe's account of what it is about God's nature that might ground our obligation to worship Him. We find Crowe's proposals no more persuasive than the accounts that we examined in our previous paper, and conclude that theists still owe us an account of what it is in virtue of which we have obligations to worship God.
  •  45
    Gamete Donation and Parental Responsibility
    Journal of Applied Philosophy 20 (1): 77-87. 2003.
    Unlike surrogacy and cloning, reproduction via gamete donation is widely assumed to be morally unproblematic. Recently, a number of authors have argued that this assumption is mistaken: gamete donors, they claim, have parental responsibilities that they typically treat too lightly. In this paper I argue that the ‘parental neglect’ case against gamete donation fails. I begin by examining and rejecting the view that gamete donors have parental responsibilities; I claim that none of the current acc…Read more
  •  10
    One of the many fault-lines within accounts of consciousness concerns the unity of consciousness. Some theorists claim that consciousness is unified—indeed, some theorists insist that consciousness is essentially unified. Other theorists assert that the unity of consciousness is an illusion, and that consciousness is often, if not invariably, disunified. Unfortunately, it is rare for proponents of either side of the debate to explain what the unity of consciousness might involve. What would it m…Read more
  •  35
    From the first-person point of view, seeing a red square is very different from thinking about a red square, hearing an alarm sound is very different from thinking that an alarm is sounding, and smelling freshly-roasted coffee is very different from thinking that there is freshly-roasted coffee in one’s vicinity. How might the familiar contrast between representing a fact in thought and representing it in perception be captured? One influential idea is that perceptual states are phenomenally con…Read more
  •  603
    What is the unity of consciousness?
    In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness, Oxford University Press. 2003.
    At any given time, a subject has a multiplicity of conscious experiences. A subject might simultaneously have visual experiences of a red book and a green tree, auditory experiences of birds singing, bodily sensations of a faint hunger and a sharp pain in the shoulder, the emotional experience of a certain melancholy, while having a stream of conscious thoughts about the nature of reality. These experiences are distinct from each other: a subject could experience the red book without the singing…Read more
  •  161
    The Oxford Companion to Consciousness (edited book)
    with Patrick Wilken and Axel Cleeremans
    Oxford University Press. 2009.
    Five years in the making and including over 250 concise entries written by leaders in the field, the volume covers both fundamental knowledge as well as more recent advances in this rapidly changing domain.
  •  232
    Closing the gap? Some questions for neurophenomenology
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (4): 349-64. 2004.
    In his 1996 paper Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy for the hard problem, Francisco Varela called for a union of Husserlian phenomenology and cognitive science. Varela''s call hasn''t gone unanswered, and recent years have seen the development of a small but growing literature intent on exploring the interface between phenomenology and cognitive science. But despite these developments, there is still some obscurity about what exactly neurophenomenology is. What are neurophenomenologist…Read more
  •  25
    Phenomenal holism, internalism and the neural correlates of consciousness: Comment
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1): 32-37. 2004.
    The target paper by Noë and Thompson is a very welcome addition to the literature on the neural correlates of consciousness. It raises a number of important issues, and the debate it will generate should go some way towards clarifying the conceptual terrain that we’re in. In this commentary I focus on three issues: the link between isomorphism and the matching-content doctrine; the argument against the matching-content doctrine; and the argument against experiential internalism.
  •  155
    Moral status and the treatment of dissociative identity disorder
    Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 27 (1): 87-105. 2002.
    Many contemporary bioethicists claim that the possession of certain psychological properties is sufficient for having full moral status. I will call this thepsychological approach to full moral status. In this paper, I argue that there is a significant tension between the psychological approach and a widely held model of Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID, formerly Multiple Personality Disorder). According to this model, the individual personalities or alters that belong to someone with DID pos…Read more
  •  95
    The inclusion model of the incarnation: Problems and prospects
    Religious Studies 37 (2): 125-141. 2001.
    Thomas Morris and Richard Swinburne have recently defended what they call the ‘two-minds’ model of the Incarnation. This model, which I refer to as the ‘inclusion model’ or ‘inclusionism’, claims that Christ had two consciousnesses, a human and a divine consciousness, with the former consciousness contained within the latter one. I begin by exploring the motivation for, and structure of, inclusionism. I then develop a variety of objections to it: some philosophical, others theological in nature.…Read more
  • Although the notion can be found in Anscombe
  •  340
    Self-consciousness and the unity of consciousness
    The Monist 87 (2): 219-236. 2004.
    Consciousness has a number of puzzling features. One such feature is its unity: the experiences and other conscious states that one has at a particular time seem to occur together in a certain way. I am currently enjoying visual experiences of my computer screen, auditory experiences of bird-song, olfactory experiences of coffee, and tactile experiences of feeling the ground beneath my feet. Conjoined with these perceptual experiences are proprioceptive experiences, experiences of agency, affect…Read more
  •  106
    Co-consciousness: Review of Barry Dainton's Stream of Consciousness (review)
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (3): 79-92. 2001.
  •  3
    Is Consciousnes Multisensory?
    with Charles Spence
    In Dustin Stokes, Stephen Biggs & Mohan Matthen (eds.), Perception and Its Modalities, Oxford University Press. pp. 95-132. 2014.
    Is consciousness multisensory? Obviously it is multisensory in certain ways. Human beings typically possess the capacity to have experiences in at least the five familiar sensory modalities, and quite possibly in a number of other less commonly recognised modalities as well. But there are other respects in which it is far from obvious that consciousness is multisensory. This chapter is concerned with one such respect. Οur concern here is with whether consciousness contains experiences associated…Read more
  •  258
    Given its ubiquitous presence in everyday experience, it is surprising that the phenomenology of doing—the experience of being an agent—has received such scant attention in the consciousness literature. But things are starting to change, and a small but growing literature on the content and causes of the phenomenology of first-person agency is beginning to emerge.2 One of the most influential and stimulating figures in this literature is Daniel Wegner. In a series of papers and his book The Illu…Read more
  •  305
    In defence of the doxastic conception of delusions
    with Timothy J. Bayne and Elisabeth Pacherie
    Mind and Language 20 (2): 163-88. 2005.
    In this paper we defend the doxastic conception of delusions against the metacognitive account developed by Greg Currie and collaborators. According to the metacognitive model, delusions are imaginings that are misidentified by their subjects as beliefs: the Capgras patient, for instance, does not believe that his wife has been replaced by a robot, instead, he merely imagines that she has, and mistakes this imagining for a belief. We argue that the metacognitive account is untenable, and that th…Read more
  •  327
    Phenomenology and delusions: Who put the 'alien' in alien control?
    with Elisabeth Pacherie and Melissa Green
    Consciousness and Cognition 15 (3): 566-577. 2006.
    Current models of delusion converge in proposing that delusional beliefs are based on unusual experiences of various kinds. For example, it is argued that the Capgras delusion (the belief that a known person has been replaced by an impostor) is triggered by an abnormal affective experience in response to seeing a known person; loss of the affective response to a familiar person’s face may lead to the belief that the person has been replaced by an impostor (Ellis & Young, 1990). Similarly, the Co…Read more
  •  19
    Agentive experiences as pushmi-pullyu representations
    In A. Buckareff, J. Aguilar & K. Frankish (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Action, Palgrave-macmillan. pp. 219--36. 2010.
  •  1271
    The unity of consciousness and the split-brain syndrome
    Journal of Philosophy 105 (6): 277-300. 2008.
    According to conventional wisdom, the split-brain syndrome puts paid to the thesis that consciousness is necessarily unified. The aim of this paper is to challenge that view. I argue both that disunity models of the split-brain are highly problematic, and that there is much to recommend a model of the split-brain—the switch model—according to which split-brain patients retain a fully unified consciousness at all times. Although the task of examining the unity of consciousness through the lens of…Read more
  •  203
    Chalmers on the Justification of Phenomenal Judgments
    Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (2): 407-419. 2001.
    We seem to enjoy a very special kind of epistemic relation to our own conscious states. In The Conscious Mind, David Chalmers argues that our phenomenal judgments are fully-justified or certain because we are acquainted with the phenomenal states that are the objects of such judgments. Chalmers holds that the acquaintance account of phenomenal justification is superior to reliabilist accounts of how it is that our PJs are justified, because it alone can underwrite the certainty of our phenomenal…Read more
  •  55
    Analysis 74 (3): 488-490. 2014.