•  1694
    Overselling the case against normativism
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5): 255-255. 2011.
    Though we are in broad agreement with much of Elqayam & Evans' (E&E's) position, we criticize two aspects of their argument. First, rejecting normativism is unlikely to yield the benefits that E&E seek. Second, their conception of rational norms is overly restrictive and, as a consequence, their arguments at most challenge a relatively restrictive version of normativism
  •  137
    Do accounts of scientific theory formation and revision have implications for theories of everyday cognition? We maintain that failing to distinguish between importantly different types of theories of scientific inference has led to fundamental misunderstandings of the relationship between science and everyday cognition. In this article, we focus on one influential manifestation of this phenomenon which is found in Fodor's well-known critique of theories of cognitive architecture. We argue that …Read more
  •  88
    Non-Conceptual Content
    Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (1): 143-154. 2012.
    In this paper I argue that a principal argument in favor of the existence of non-conceptual content (henceforth NCC) fails. That is, I do not accept that considerations regarding the richness of our perceptual experiences support the existence of NCC. I argue instead that the existence of NCC is empirically motivated. Here is an outline of the paper. First, I set out the distinction between conceptual content and NCC as we understand it. Second, I consider the richness argument (RA), and argue t…Read more
  •  53
    (2013). Is scientific theory change similar to early cognitive development? Gopnik on science and childhood. Philosophical Psychology: Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 109-128. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2011.625114
  •  33
    Cognitive Architecture, Holistic Inference and Bayesian Networks
    Minds and Machines 29 (3): 373-395. 2019.
    Two long-standing arguments in cognitive science invoke the assumption that holistic inference is computationally infeasible. The first is Fodor’s skeptical argument toward computational modeling of ordinary inductive reasoning. The second advocates modular computational mechanisms of the kind posited by Cosmides, Tooby and Sperber. Based on advances in machine learning related to Bayes nets, as well as investigations into the structure of scientific and ordinary information, I maintain neither …Read more
  •  25
    The following books have been received, and many of them are available for review. Interested reviewers please contact the reviews editor: jim. oshea@ ucd. ie (review)
    with Chris Abel, W. Aiken, J. Haldane, E. Alliez, W. P. Alston, G. E. M. Anscombe, R. Ariew, D. Des Chene, and D. M. Jesseph
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13 (4): 543-551. 2005.