Tim Heysse

In Toleranz im Konflikt and in other works the German philosopher Rainer Forst presents an intricate interpretation of tolerance as a moral-political virtue. His aim is to resolve many of the well-known paradoxes by distinguishing different components of tolerance and distinguishing the reasons that we may have for objecting, accepting or rejecting certain practices and views. Good ethical reasons for objecting to certain practices and views do not morally justify their suppression by legal means and state power. In this way Forst connects his inclusive analysis of tolerance, with both his account of the contexts of justification and his defense of what he calls the moral right to justification. In his critical discussion Tim Heysse sounds the political implications of this analysis of tolerance. He criticizes its exclusive focus on political and legal power and its corresponding neglect of social power. However, he also calls attention to the fact that Forst’s analysis has the merit of revealing tolerance as a potential source of political conflict in society

How does public discussion contribute to the reasonableness with which power is exercised in a democracy? Contemporary answers to this question (such as formulated by Rawls or Habermas), are often based upon two interconnected preconceptions. These are, 1. the idea that the value of public discussion lies primarily in the fact that citizens can reach a reasonable consensus through argumentation and discussion and, 2. the belief that the exercise of power is legitimate only if it is determined by a reasonable consensus among citizens. In this sense, 'reasonable consensus among citizens' eliminates, under ideal conditions, the 'autonomy' of the exercise of power. However, these ideals of democracy appear to conflict with certain aspects of democratic society; aspects, moreover, which we tend to value quite highly. I therefore advance an alternative account of the reasonableness of power in democratic societies; one which acknowledges both the characteristically unlimited scope of public discussion in democratic society and the fact that such discussion rarely or perhaps even never ends in a general consensus. In order to elucidate the democratic character of society we must explain the relationship between discussion and power in such a way that we understand both the need for discussion and the necessity of an autonomous exercise of power.

How should we look back on the history and the origins of our ethical outlook and our way of life? We know that in the past, strange and appalling ethical views and practices have enjoyed widespread and sincere support. Yet we do not regard our contemporary outlook – to the extent that we do, at the present, have a common outlook – as one option among many. However bemused we may feel in ethical matters, at least on some issues we claim to have reasons that are good . If we do not object to the use of the predicate ‘true’ in ethics, we may say that we are confronted with the truth of an outlook. Or, to echo a provocative expression of David Wiggins, we claim that ‘there is nothing else to think’

Philosophically, the study of argumentation is important because it holds out the prospect of an interpretation of rationality. For this we need to identify a transcendent perspective on the argumentative interaction. We need a normative theory of argumentation that provides an answer to the question: should the hearer accept the argument of the speaker. In this article I argue that formal logic implies a notion of transcendence that is not suitable for the study of argumentation, because, from a logical point of view, argumentation ’disappears from sight‘. We should therefore not expect formal logic to provide an interesting interpretation of the rationality intrinsic in argument and discussion.

Supporters of political realism and republicanism as well as students of political feasibility and non-ideal theory progressively focus on the dimension of power in the political relation. Yet we lack the theoretical framework to represent these features of power. In this essay, I take a first step towards designing the necessary conceptual tools for such a framework by analyzing the relations between the concepts of power and normativity that define the political relation. Adopting a ‘methodological cynicism’, I analyse the reasons that motivate cynics who are only interested in power to obey a norm against force or violence and to seek legitimacy. This allows us to characterize external or mediate relations between power and normativity (such as the relation underlying political theory’s ambition of offering normative guidance for power) and identify internal and immediate relations between power and normativity.

According to Thomas Nagel we have a natural impulse to transcend our personal point of view. However, it appears to be difficult to give this notion of transcendence any real content while maintaining a connection with everyday speech and behaviour. In this essay I show that the description of what happens in a discussion when a speaker convinces a listener suggests an interesting interpretation of transcendence. The notion of 'truth' linked to the listener who is being convinced introduces a normative dimension in argumentation. This inescapable normative stance of the listener saddles her with the obligation to answer all credible objections against all arguments she has accepted. The evaluation of the arguments is not reserved for the participants of a discussion. Nothing more is required. For instance, the notion of a universal consensus has no place in the analysis of argumentation. If there is a universal dimension in argumentation and discussion, it is because there is no way of telling where convincing objections may come from.

Realism criticizes the idea, central to what may be called ‘the priority view’, that philosophy has the task of imposing from the outside general norms of morality or standards of reasonableness on politics understood as the domain of power. According to realism, political philosophy must reveal the specific standards internal to the political practice of handling power appropriately and as it develops in actual circumstances. Framed in those terms, the debate evokes the idea that political power itself is lacking normativity until such time as norms are devised that govern its use. In contrast, this essay identifies a normative dimension internal to power. Power depends on recognition and support in the form of belief. This dependence explains how an interest in power introduces a responsiveness to normative considerations into the domain of politics.

The aim of this paper is to study Williams's relativism of distance and to examine the conception of the history of ethics that follows from it. Relativism of distance, applied to the history of ethics, can be understood as saying that the language of appraisal is inappropriate in confrontations with ethical outlooks of the past; no real judgments are made. The author argues that this view does not follow from Williams's general meta-ethical position. Moreover, he tries to show that it rests on an implicit but implausible view of the hermeneutics of history. More in particular, it rests on the premise that we should set aside our ethical convictions while studying the past. In the concluding section, an alternative view is explored with regard to the attitude that we should adopt towards the historical processes that have shaped our own ethical outlook. This analysis, purged of Williams's implausible view of the hermeneutics of history as it is, is actually more in line with his meta-ethics than his own relativism of distance

According to Rainer Forst, a critical theory of power must break with the tendency of political theorists to conceive of power in opposition to normativity. Appropriately, Forst proposes a noumenal definition according to which power is normative: It works through recognition of reasons and is thereby open to critical assessment. In this discussion note, I first clarify the normativity of power in Forst’s noumenal theory by means of Donald Davidson’s theory of action and then explain how theory of action leads to a different understanding of force and violence from Forst’s noumenal theory. In doing this, I find reason to endorse a non-normative definition of power on the lines proposed by Robert Dahl and endorsed by most authors in analytical political theory. This definition nevertheless remains faithful to Forst’s methodological guideline that a theory of power must keep in view the relations between power and normativity.

This article clarifies the recent epistemic rehabilitation of democracy and adds to it in two respects. First, I point out that the epistemic rehabilitation of democracy identifies an internal connection of democracy with normative truths—but only an external connection with substantial truth and correctness. Second, such an internal connection surfaces when we focus on the place of criticism in democracy. Criticism, however, presupposes pluralism and a recognition of the provisionality of decisions. So I, third, analyse prominent theories of truth and examine what conceptions of pluralism and provisionality they allow. This evokes a view emphasizing the unruly role of truth; criticism introduces a commitment to correctness, and this commitment to correctness underwrites the provisional nature of democratic decisions.

Philosophically, the study of argumentation is important because it holds out the prospect of an interpretation of rationality. For this we need to identify a transcendent perspective on the argumentative interaction. We need a normative theory of argumentation that provides an answer to the question: should the hearer accept the argument of the speaker. In this article I argue that formal logic implies a notion of transcendence that is not suitable for the study of argumentation, because, from a logical point of view, argumentation ’disappears from sight‘. We should therefore not expect formal logic to provide an interesting interpretation of the rationality intrinsic in argument and discussion.

Historians and theoreticians of nationalism and nationalist movements are perplexed by the fact that so much of what nationalists believe is evidently not the case. One example of this concerns the ontological or metaphysical status of the nation: whether nations as a form of political community are in the very nature of things or whether they are rather a recent way of imagining the political community.I question the meaning terms such as 'natural', 'imagined' and 'objective'/'subjective' have when we are talking about the nation as the foundation of political legitimacy. Ido this by explaining what meaning those terms have in the philosophical reconstruction of interpretation and communication by the American philosopher Donald Davidson.

According to Thomas Nagel the desire for autonomy leads to a dilemma: to be certain that no unknown influence determines our decisions, we are driven to seek as much information as possible about what makes the reasons we have the reasons for us. Eventually, we end up with a perspective that is so objective that there are no longer such things as decisions or choices, but only alternatives in the course of the world. A way out is suggested by the work on interpretation of Donald Davidson and by remarks of Habermas: autonomy does not require a totally objective view, because in the interpretation of actions, we decide on their autonomy. However, on Habermas's own view, autonomy is also not something that we can have, because he links autonomy to a final interpretation. The common root of Nagel's and Habermas' failure to make sense of autonomy are the famous views of C. S. Peirce about rational inquiry and knowledge. If autonomy presupposes transparency in so far that we know that there are no external influences and if we think of this knowledge as the final and absolute knowledge of eternal truths, it is only to be expected that this kind of knowledge, and therefore autonomy, cannot be had.

In "'Chinese Philosophy' at European Universities," Professor Defoort criticizes the institutional "place" of Chinese and "non-Western" studies at European universities. In order to demonstrate the problem, she describes the situation at the KU Leuven Department of History and its Institute of Philosophy. Regarding many of the important issues Defoort raises, I do not feel sufficiently competent to respond. For I am caught in Schwitzgebel's vicious circle : completely ignorant about non-Western philosophy and lacking the required language skills, I cannot engage, as a philosopher, with non-Western texts. At the end of her article, however, Defoort...