•  1908
    Kant's Argument for the Principle of Intensive Magnitudes
    Kantian Review 18 (3): 387-412. 2013.
    In the first Critique, Kant attempts to prove what we can call the "Principle of Intensive Magnitudes," according to which every possible object of experience will possess a determinate "degree" of reality. Curiously, Kant argues for this principle by inferring from a psychological premise about internal sensations (they have intensive magnitudes) to a metaphysical thesis about external objects (they also have intensive magnitudes). Most commentators dismiss the argument as a failure. In this ar…Read more
  •  454
    Sensations as Representations in Kant
    British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (3): 492-513. 2014.
    This paper defends an interpretation of the representational function of sensation in Kant's theory of empirical cognition. Against those who argue that sensations are ?subjective representations? and hence can only represent the sensory state of the subject, I argue that Kant appeals to different notions of subjectivity, and that the subjectivity of sensations is consistent with sensations representing external, spatial objects. Against those who claim that sensations cannot be representational…Read more
  •  364
    Kantian Phenomenalism Without Berkeleyan Idealism
    Kantian Review 22 (2): 205-231. 2017.
    Phenomenalist interpretations of Kant are out of fashion. The most common complaint from anti-phenomenalist critics is that a phenomenalist reading of Kant would collapse Kantian idealism into Berkeleyan idealism. This would be unacceptable because Berkeleyan idealism is incompatible with core elements of Kant’s empirical realism. In this paper, I argue that not all phenomenalist readings threaten empirical realism. First, I distinguish several variants of phenomenalism, and then show that Berke…Read more
  •  102
    Intentionality and Sensory Consciousness in Kant
    Journal of Philosophical Research 41 623-649. 2016.
    According to “intentionalist” interpretations of Kant’s transcendental idealism, Kant’s empirical objects are to be understood as mere intentional objects. This interpretation requires a corresponding account of intentionality and intentional objects. This paper defends an account of how the intentionalist should understand the intentional structures at work in the sensory consciousness of physical bodies. First a relational conception of intentionality (articulated in terms of an object’s prese…Read more
  •  70
    Kant on the Continuity of Alterations
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1): 49-66. 2020.
    The metaphysical “Law of Continuity of Alterations” says that whenever an object alters from one state to another, it passes through a continuum of intermediate states. Kant treated LCA as a transcendental law of understanding. The primary purpose of the paper is to reconstruct and evaluate Kant’s three arguments for LCA. All three are found to be inadequate. However, a secondary goal of the paper is to show that LCA would have more naturally been construed as a regulative principle of reason. I…Read more
  •  8
    Kant, Immanuel
    Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2014.
    Immanuel Kant Towards the end of his most influential work, Critique of Pure Reason(1781/1787), Kant argues that all philosophy ultimately aims at answering these three questions: “What can I know? What should I do? What may I hope?” The book appeared at the beginning of the most productive period of his career, and by the […].
  • Meat on the Bones: Kant's Account of Cognition in the Anthropology Lectures
    with Eric Watkins
    In Alix Cohen (ed.), Kant's Lectures on Anthropology: A Critical Guide, Cambridge University Press. pp. 57-75. 2014.
    This chapter describes Immanuel Kant's conception of anthropology and the most basic distinctions he draws when invoking faculties throughout the anthropology transcripts. It explains Kant's account of the objective senses (hearing, sight, and touch), and shows that the sensory material provided by these senses are empirical conditions of experience that supplement the a priori conditions articulated in the Critique of Pure Reason. The chapter also describes some of the central details of Kant's…Read more