My philosophical views

Question Answer Comments
A priori knowledge: yes and no Lean toward: yes lakoff and Johnson's Metaphors or schemata
Abstract objects: Platonism and nominalism Accept: nominalism
Aesthetic value: objective and subjective Accept an intermediate view cfr Foucault, Luhmann and Bourdieu on aesthetics
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes and no Lean toward: yes
Epistemic justification: internalism and externalism Accept another alternative Enactive cognition
External world: idealism, skepticism or non-skeptical realism Accept an intermediate view In favor of the "embodied cognition" or enactive view, initiated by Francisco Varela
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism or no free will Accept: libertarianism
God: theism and atheism Accept: atheism
Knowledge: empiricism and rationalism Lean toward: empiricism
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism or invariantism Accept: contextualism
Laws of nature: Humean and non-Humean Accept: Humean
Logic: classical and non-classical Lean toward: non-classical
Mental content: internalism and externalism Accept another alternative Embodied Enactive Cognition of "bringing forth a world"
Meta-ethics: moral realism and moral anti-realism Lean toward: moral anti-realism
Metaphilosophy: naturalism and non-naturalism Accept: naturalism
Mind: physicalism and non-physicalism Accept another alternative Embodied Cognition of enactive view of Mind
Moral judgment: cognitivism and non-cognitivism Accept another alternative Enacted view of contextualized moral judgement
Moral motivation: internalism and externalism Accept another alternative Enactive view of bringing forth a world, including moral motivations
Newcomb's problem: one box and two boxes Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism or virtue ethics Accept: virtue ethics
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism or sense-datum theory Accept another alternative Embodied Cognition view of perception
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view or further-fact view Accept an intermediate view An enactive open-ended view where phenomenological first-person accounts co-exist with a bio-neurological approach
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism or libertarianism Lean toward: libertarianism
Proper names: Fregean and Millian Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Science: scientific realism and scientific anti-realism Accept an intermediate view Enactivism
Teletransporter (new matter): survival and death Accept: survival
Time: A-theory and B-theory Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch and don't switch Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Truth: correspondence, deflationary or epistemic Accept another alternative
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible or metaphysically possible Lean toward: inconceivable