Timothy Rutzou

In light of the recent symposium, this paper analyses integral theory through original and dialectical critical realism. This paper maintains that Integral theory is unable to sustain its critique against modernity and postmodernity as a result of the adoption of Kantian, Hegelian, and Heideggerian ontology. The resulting actualism and structure, perpetrates ontological violence, as it attempts to resolve the problems of modernity and postmodernity. An adoption of critical realism as underlabourer would call into question many of the theoretical underpinnings of integral theory resulting in a serious re-evaluation of its core features

This article continues the discussion surrounding the questions of metatheory which emerged from a symposium in 2011 between critical realism and integral theory. It maintains and develops the critique that integral theory is fraught with problems arising from a monovalent neo-Platonic dialectic resulting in actualism and problematic metaphysical speculations. Consequently, as a metatheory it is unable to underlabour for robust theorization and critique, and as a worldview it is quintessentially western and illicitly universalizing. Politically this results in an insufficient and pathological response to the crises generated by late capitalism, while still raising legitimate questions about the need for and function of robust metatheory.

This critical review focuses on the problems of modernity as outlined by Žižek and Milbank in The Monstrosity of Christ: Paradox or Dialectic? It argues that both Žižek’s nihil-a-theology and Milbank’s radical orthodoxy cannot provide satisfactory resolutions to the problem of the universal and the particular in both its epistemic and ethical inflections on account of being unable to make intelligible the deeper problem of order and chaos. Both authors generate a flat actualist ontology characteristic of the epistemic fallacy, and hold to some form of either perspectival realism or superidealism. It is argued that it is only by affirming something like a dialectical critical realist ontology that these problems are able to be addressed while maintaining the intelligibility of scientific understanding, paradox, progress, the universal and the particular and our ethical relation to the Other.

This article examines the reception of Roy Bhaskar amongst some contemporary Deleuzians. It proceeds by rejecting the all too often predilection of opposing realism to ‘postmodernism’ or ‘post-structuralism’ arguing instead for the need to bring one into dialogue with the other. To this end, the paper explores the resonances and points of departure between the work of Gilles Deleuze and Roy Bhaskar. In particular, it examines the language of causation, object-oriented versus process-oriented ontologies, as well as the charge by Deleuzians that Bhaskar is an essentialist. Through this engagement it attempts to develop and rethink explanation and causation in terms of a more chaotic ontology of machines, centered around the concept of structure, process, and production in an open, heterogeneous, and dynamic world. The end result is a more chaotic concept of realism.

Social science, history, and philosophy have often been neglect in thinking through their fundamentally intertwined relationship. The result is often an inattention to philosophy where social science and history is concerned, or a neglect of historicity and social analysis where philosophy is concerned. Meanwhile, the place of values in research is often uneasily passed over in silence. The inattention to, and loss of, the intersection between these different disciplines and their subject matters, leaves our investigations all the more impoverished as a result. In resolving these problems, it is not enough to strive for cooperation or integration, but to rethink of the nature of the disciplines themselves; their interests, purposes, and presuppositions. In this volume, contributors explore different facets of these relationships, and move beyond the problematics erected by positivism often cast in terms of value-free or value-neutral science, that is, a science obsessed with empirical data, schematic classifications, and the pursuit of law-like forms. While positivism has been subject to critique, the influence and legacy of positivism remains. It remains in the way in which we often think about science; the line drawn between the sciences and the humanities; the norms researchers should follow; what a successful explanation looks like; and the ethical, normative, and political implications of scientific research. Aimed at students and researchers of philosophy, history and the social sciences, this book is driven by a desire to revindicate questions concerning ontology and social ontology, to rethink the nature of explanation, and to resituate normativity and values within scientific, social scientific, and historical pursuits.