•  172
    ‘That’-Clauses and Non-nominal Quantification
    Philosophical Studies 137 (3). 2008.
    This paper argues that ‘that’-clauses are not singular terms (without denying that their semantical values are propositions). In its first part, three arguments are presented to support the thesis, two of which are defended against recent criticism. The two good arguments are based on the observation that substitution of ‘the proposition that p’ for ‘that p’ may result in ungrammaticality. The second part of the paper is devoted to a refutation of the main argument for the claim that ‘that’-clau…Read more
  •  140
    Is knowing-how simply a case of knowing-that?
    Philosophical Investigations 27 (4). 2004.
    Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson have argued that there is no fundamental distinction between what Gilbert Ryle famously called 'knowing how' and 'knowing that', and that the former can be treated as a special kind of the latter. I will endeavour to show that sentences of the form 'a knows how to F' are ambiguous between a reading in which we ascribe knowledge-that to a and another in which we ascribe something to a which is irreducible to any kind of knowledge-that and can most appropriatel…Read more
  •  100
    Frege, Pünjer, and Kant on Existence
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 82 (1): 329-351. 2011.
    The paper tries to shed new exegetical light on Frege's "Dialogue with Pünjer on Existence" by showing that Pünjer's position in the dialogue is strongly inspired by Kantian claims about existence. It is argued that Pünjer's wavering between a broadly Meinongian and a broadly Fregean view on existence can be explained by the fact that there are Kantian remarks which seem to speak in favour of each of these views. A suggestion is then made how Kant's claims can be interpreted in such a way that t…Read more
  •  98
    Kants Ich als Gegenstand
    Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 54 (2): 277-293. 2006.
    Ein Dilemma in Kants Theorie der Subjektivität besteht darin, dass er einerseits von einem identischen Ich als dem Gegenstand eines reinen Selbstbewusstseins spricht, andererseits bestreiten muss, dass es sich bei diesem Ich um einen realen Gegenstand handelt. Horstmanns Interpretation des kantischen Ichs als bloßer Aktivität wird als Ausweg aus diesem Dilemma verworfen. Dann wird gezeigt, dass Kant außer realen auch logische Gegenstände kennt und dass das Ich ein solcher bloß logischer Gegensta…Read more
  •  86
  •  62
    Commentary on Chapter 15 of Patricia Kitcher's Kant's Thinker
    Kantian Review 19 (1): 127-133. 2014.
    I argue that Patricia Kitcher's Kant-inspired account of self-consciousness overintellectualizes the requirements for rational cognition. Kitcher claims that a person can only believe something on the ground of another belief if she is able to recognize the grounding belief as grounding the first belief and as one of her own. I criticize this claim by arguing that (i) someone can believe something for a certain reason without recognizing this reason as a reason (the possibility of unreflected re…Read more
  •  55
    Counting Things that Could Exist
    Philosophical Quarterly 67 (266): 127-147. 2017.
    The paper deals with cases of counting things that could exist but do not actually exist that resist common strategies for actualist paraphrases and that play an important role in motivating Timothy Williamson's ontology of contingently concrete objects. It is argued that these cases should be understood as cases of quantification not over individual possible objects but rather over kinds of objects, some of which do not actually have instances. This claim is motivated by a comparison with other…Read more
  •  53
    Gefragt wird: Was ist das Besondere an Überzeugungen de se, also solchen Überzeugungen über sich selbst, bei denen man weiß, daß man selbst es ist, über den man eine Überzeugung hat? Kritisiert werden die Positionen Tugendhats und Henrichs: die von Tugendhat, weil dieser mit seinen Bemerkungen zur veritativen Symmetrie zwischen „ich"- und „er"-Sätzen die Besonderheit solcher Überzeugungen nur zirkulär erklären kann , seine Annahme einer epistemischen Asymmetrie zwischen Überzeugungen de se und a…Read more
  •  50
    Should Metaphysics Care About Linguistics?
    Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 49 (2): 161-178. 2018.
    Naturalized metaphysics is based on the idea that philosophy should be guided by the sciences. The paradigmatic science that is relevant for metaphysics is physics because physics tells us what fundamental reality is ultimately like. There are other sciences, however, that de facto play a role in philosophical inquiries about what there is, one of them being the science of language, i.e. linguistics. In this paper I will be concerned with the question what role linguistics should and does play f…Read more
  •  48
    Kant's Self: Real Entity and Logical Identity
    In Hans-Johann Glock (ed.), Strawson and Kant, Oxford University Press. 2003.
  •  46
    Kant on the epistemic role of the imagination
    Synthese 1-22. forthcoming.
    In recent years, more and more people have become attracted by the idea that the imagination should play a central role in explaining our knowledge of what is possible and necessary and what would be the case if things were different from how they actually are. The biggest challenge for this account is to explain how the imagination can be restricted in such a way that it can play this epistemic role, for there are certainly also unrestricted uses of the imagination in which it fails to yield th…Read more
  •  41
    Subject-Dependence and Trendelenburg’s Gap
    In Margit Ruffing, Claudio La Rocca, Alfredo Ferrarin & Stefano Bacin (eds.), Kant Und Die Philosophie in Weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des Xi. Kant-Kongresses 2010, De Gruyter. pp. 755-764. 2013.
  •  35
    Real possibility and relation to an object. Remarks on Kant's Modal Metaphysics
    European Journal of Philosophy 26 (3): 1148-1152. 2018.
  •  32
    In this paper I present a new solution to the so-called ‘neglected alternative’ objection against Kant’s argument for transcendental idealism. According to this objection, Kant does not give sufficient justification for his claim that not only are space and time forms of our intuition but they also fail to be things in themselves or properties thereof. I first discuss a proposal by Willaschek and Allais, who try to defend Kant against this charge by building on his account of a priori intuition,…Read more
  •  28
    Kant's Logic of Existence
    Journal of the History of Philosophy 58 (3): 521-548. 2020.
    one of kant's most famous claims is his dictum about existence. In the course of his criticism of the ontological argument, he writes:Being is obviously not a real predicate, i.e., a concept of something that could be added to the concept of a thing.One reason why this passage is so famous is that many people think that it anticipates a discovery about the logical form of existence claims that was later central for the development of analytic philosophy and its project of overcoming metaphysical…Read more
  •  27
    Alles existiert Ein Kommentar zu Dolf Ramis Existenz und Anzahl
    Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 73 (3): 423-428. 2019.
  •  21
    Zwei Regresse des Selbstbewusstseins bei Fichte
    In Jure Zovko, Dimitris Karydas & Sarah Schmidt (eds.), Begriff Und Interpretation Im Zeichen der Moderne, De Gruyter. pp. 63-76. 2015.
  •  16
    Kant on Representation and Objectivity
    Philosophical Review 116 (3): 468-470. 2004.
  •  7
    Kant über Sollen als Wollen
    In Violetta L. Waibel, Margit Ruffing & David Wagner (eds.), Natur Und Freiheit. Akten des Xii. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, De Gruyter. pp. 265-288. 2018.
  •  6
    Dinge an sich und sekundäre Qualitäten
    In Jürgen Stolzenberg (ed.), Kant in der Gegenwart, De Gruyter. pp. 167-212. 2007.
  •  3
    Kants Begriff der Existenz
    In Valerio Rohden, Ricardo Terra & Guido Almeida (eds.), Recht Und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants, De Gruyter. 2008.