Todd Mei

Machines are often employed in Heidegger’s philosophy as instances to illustrate specific features of modern technology. But what is it about machines that allows them to fulfill this role? This essay argues there is a unique ontological force to the machine that can be understood when looking at distinctions between techne and mechane in ancient Greek sources and applying these distinctions to a reading of Heidegger’s early thought on equipment and later thought on poiesis. Especially with respect to Heidegger’s appropriation of Aristotle’s conception of dunamis, it becomes apparent from a Heideggerian perspective that machines provide an increase in capacity to its human users, but only so at a cost. This cost involves a problem of knowledge where the set of operations required in machine use results in the loss of understanding our dependency on being. The essay then concludes with a discussion of how this relation to machinic capacity is not merely pessimistic and deterministic, but indicates what might constitute a free relation to machines.

Meaningful work refers to the idea that human work is an integral part of the way we think of our lives as going well. The concept is prevalent in sociology and business studies. In philosophy, its discussion tends to revolve around matters of justice and whether the State should take steps to eradicate meaningless work. However, despite the breadth of the recent, general literature, there is little to no discussion about how it is in fact the case that work is meaningful. There is a basic assumption that certain facts about work make it meaningful. After noting the shortcomings in the literature, this essay argues that we can better understand the production of meaning in work by an analogy to speech acts. Using Paul Ricoeur’s theory of action as discourse, one can see how meaning is predicated in the performance of work in ways that are locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary.

It is often assumed that science provides the most accurate knowledge about nature. This view not only collapses distinctions between different forms of knowing but also results in a paradox whereby understanding what it means to exist in the world is dictated by practioners of science. In this essay I argue for the relevance of an existential conception of nature via the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, and how his notions of thrownness and phusis enable us to recognize a certain ethical bond to nature. I conclude with a critical analysis of liability insurance and actuarial science to demonstrate my points

Despite the way we think of saints as belonging to a certain historical period and confronting specific historical obstacles, we tend to see their acts as being universally meaningful, and therefore, that these acts are practices which should be imitated in some manner. However this understanding carries with it a significant difficulty: namely, there is a risk of interpreting the lives and actions of saints as providing rules of conduct to be followed, as if their enactment was an end in-itself. In other words, a simplistic notion of imitation can lead to the problem of voluntarism, where the intention to imitate an action is viewed to be sufficient or equal to actualizing goodness or piety. But there is a further, perhaps more significant problem with this understanding, and this involves how we tend to conflate the performance of actions with their meaning. Does an action, especially that of a saint, have a meaning that is identical to its effect? Or, does the action itself produce a sense of meaning that outruns its effect? If the answer to this last question is affirmative, then the actions of a saint can be said to predicate an emergent meaning, that is, a meaning that has not yet been articulated, let alone realized. A saint would therefore be less a figure of convention and more a figure of innovation. In this chapter, I employ Paul Ricoeur’s theory of symbol to show how, beyond the historical specificity of the lives of saints, their actions can be understood to offer new ways of understanding the possibility for being, which I will unapologetically link to the Christian notion of “the New Being.” My discussion will first include a summary of Ricoeur’s theory of symbol, turning next to an application of this theory to saints and the contrasting context of the Prophet in the Hebrew Bible. The chapter will conclude with an elaboration of a symbolic understanding of action in relation to the New Being.

Poststructural criticisms of classical and neoclassical economic conceptions of human motivation and agency often include rejections of how market exchange is conceived to involve only the desires and rationality of a solitary human agent. While many of these criticisms are illuminating, they also tend not to offer a positive, constructive alternative. In this chapter, I discuss the contributions of Paul Ricoeur's understanding of mutual recognition and how it can be used--albeit perhaps despite Ricoeur's own intention and critical assessment of economics--to retrieve a theory of exchange in which mutuality is possible. My analysis consists of five sections. First, I recapitulate Ricoeur’s criticism of exchange. Second, I examine how the economist Richard Ebeling attempts to read mutuality in exchange through the hermeneutics of Ricoeur and why this attempt fails. Third, I revive Ricoeur’s broader conception of value in relation to care for the other. This allows me, in the fourth section, to correlate Ricoeur’s discussion of ethical value to exchange-value. Finally, I join exchange to mutual recognition via Ricoeur’s discussion of epieikeia