• Justification-Skepticism
    Dissertation, The University of Rochester. 2003.
    Justification-skepticism is the view that all our beliefs based on perception, memory, and induction are epistemically unjustified. A typical argument for justification-skepticism argument runs as follows: ' Suppose that SE is your sensory evidence for target proposition p ; You have no good reason to believe that SE makes p probable; If you have no good reason to believe that SE makes p probable, then you are not epistemically justified in believing p ; Therefore, you are not epistemically just…Read more
  •  31
    Self-Interest and Beyond (review)
    Teaching Philosophy 25 (2): 163-165. 2002.
  •  68
    Is it True that ‘Evolution Is a Theory, Not a Fact’?
    International Journal of Applied Philosophy 21 (1): 89-108. 2007.
    The teaching of evolutionary theory in U.S. public school science classes has been called into question via numerous school board mandated “evolution is a theory, not a fact” disclaimers that have appeared on science textbooks in recent years and which have been the subject of recent court cases. I evaluate the scientific reasonability of such disclaimers by engaging in conceptual analysis on the crucial terms in the key claim: “evolution is a theory, not a fact.” Assessing various interpretatio…Read more
  •  88
    Proper Function Justification and Epistemic Rationality
    Southwest Philosophy Review 26 (1): 189-195. 2010.
  •  36
    Tolstoy on Aesthetics (review)
    Teaching Philosophy 25 (4): 369-372. 2002.
  •  7
    Is it True that ‘Evolution Is a Theory, Not a Fact’?
    International Journal of Applied Philosophy 21 (1): 89-108. 2007.
    The teaching of evolutionary theory in U.S. public school science classes has been called into question via numerous school board mandated “evolution is a theory, not a fact” disclaimers that have appeared on science textbooks in recent years and which have been the subject of recent court cases. I evaluate the scientific reasonability of such disclaimers by engaging in conceptual analysis on the crucial terms in the key claim: “evolution is a theory, not a fact.” Assessing various interpretatio…Read more
  •  53
    Riddles of Existence (review)
    Teaching Philosophy 31 (1): 98-101. 2008.
  •  159
    I answer Alvin Plantinga's challenge to provide a ‘proper’ de jure objection to religious belief. What I call the ‘sophisticates’ evidential objection' concludes that sophisticated Christians lack epistemic justification for believing central Christian propositions. The SEO utilizes a theory of epistemic justification in the spirit of the evidentialism of Richard Feldman and Earl Conee. I defend philosophical interest in the SEO against objections from Reformed epistemology, by addressing Planti…Read more
  •  121
    Michael Bergmann seeks to motivate his externalist, proper function theory of epistemic justification by providing three objections to the mentalism and mentalist evidentialism characteristic of nonexternalists such as Richard Feldman and Earl Conee. Bergmann argues that (i) mentalism is committed to the false thesis that justification depends on mental states; (ii) mentalism is committed to the false thesis that the epistemic fittingness of an epistemic input to a belief-forming process must be…Read more
  •  10
    Riddles of Existence (review)
    Teaching Philosophy 31 (1): 98-101. 2008.
  •  8
    The recent book Rush Rhees on Religion and Philosophy contains a stimulating collection of writin~s by Rush Rhees on a variety of topics in the philosophy of religion. Comprising accounts of personal, religious and moral struggles, these essays provide a refreshing change from the often dry, overly technical approach to philosophy writing. Despite spanning more than thirty years, Rhees' s essays disclose a fairly consistent philosophy.of religion with a clear emphasis. Since he was Wittgenstein'…Read more