Tom Grimwood

Given that, for the past thirty years or so, there has appeared a seemingly limitless range of approaches to the “problem of woman” in Nietzsche’s writing, it is somewhat surprising that his oft-cited philosophical mentor, Arthur Schopenhauer, has largely escaped the same scrupulous attention. Indeed, the idea that Schopenhauer despised women has gone relatively unchallenged in general philosophical literature from around the 1930’s onwards. Schopenhauer’s role as an “arch-misogynist” serves as an unproblematic background figure or frame of reference to the more unsavoury elements of texts by the likes of Nietzsche, Freud and so on. For example, in Francis Nesbitt Oppel’s recent work on Nietzsche, Schopenhauer’s texts are cited as a means to interpreting Nietzsche’s “misogyny” as ironic: in order to analyse Nietzsche’s writing on women as an ironic play on misogyny, there is aneed for an “original” misogyny to supply the object of such an irony. Schopenhauer, in brief citation, serves as a ready example of such “original” misogyny, without the need for direct interpretative engagement.

In a recent article in The European Legacy, Mark Cortes Favis argued that the figure of Kierkegaard expressed a tension between two aspects of writing—the Socratic and the Platonic. While Favis is correct to see a duality in Kierkegaard's writing, his article does not fully answer the problem of how we can account for our interpretation of this tension. Given that the duality within Kierkegaard's writing transgresses the boundaries of author and reader, we cannot easily circumscribe any claims on his writing without considering its effect on our reading. Rather, the characteristic duality of his authority manifests itself in a number of ways in the task of identifying the philosophical meaning of his texts. Kierkegaard's relationship to Socrates is thus symptomatic of a number of figural dualities that pervade interpretations of his work. By surveying the ways in which these interpretations draw on the axiom of duality in order to ascribe an authority to Kierkegaard's texts, I suggest Favis's argument that Kierkegaard's writing expresses both Socratic and Platonic aspects should be placed within the wider duality at work in the interpretation of Kierkegaard's work.

This article argues that reading the life of Catherine of Siena can fall into passive models of feminine agency that stifle the potential such a life has to offer. By investigating the way passivity is imposed by both traditional and feminist writers on her life, this article argues that new ways of conceptualizing asceticism are possible through the affirmation of Catherine of Siena’s agency as active. This involves viewing the relation of the ascetic body to its explanatory texts (both historical and contemporary) as something more than literal. Using recent interpretations of Paul, this article argues that Catherine of Siena can be read as a performative exposition of the hidden oppressiveness of the dualistic framework ascetics are often taken to be mere ‘victims’ of

This article provides a broad overview of the problem of irony to contemporary hermeneutics. It offers a thematic account of the effects of irony on interpretation, and argues that the problems of irony are embedded within the relation between the free play of irony and the regulative role of interpretative discourse. It argues, against hermeneutic theories such as that of Hans‐Georg Gadamer, that the “problems” which irony poses for interpretation can be seen as symptomatic of irony's identification: that irony is, essentially, problematic. It argues that any account of irony needs to account for the value of irony as a problem, rather than subsuming such problems into larger models of understanding. The article explores this notion by looking at the interpretative “discourse of irony” and noting its thematic features. It is argued that the account of irony as a negation of meaning is intrinsically tied to the construction of a sovereign economy in response to the excesses of ironic possibility, but that such a construction is determined only by the stepping‐away from the initial ironic possibilities which enabled its construction. Using the work of Gadamer as an example, the article argues that this in itself does not close irony, but produces yet more irony which frustrates the interpretative act while lending itself to interpretative possibility.

The order of influence from thesis to hypothesis, and from philosophy to the social sciences, has historically governed the way in which the abstraction and significance of language as an empirical object is determined. In this article, an argument is made for the development of a more reflexive intellectual relationship between ordinary language philosophy and the social sciences that it helped inspire. It is demonstrated that, and how, the social scientific traditions of ethnomethodology and conversation analysis press OLP to re-consider the variety of problematic abstractions it has previously made for the sake of philosophical clarity, thereby self-reinvigorating.

ABSTRACTThis paper draws on Ian Bogost’s argument that video games constitute a form of ‘procedural rhetoric’, in order to re-examine the representation of heroic madness First-Person-Shooter games. Rejecting the idea that games attempt to recreate the experience of madness to the player through linear representation, the paper instead identifies two persistent commonplace figures which appear within the genre: the monstrous double, and the reaching tentacle. While Bogost’s notion of procedural rhetoric allows analysis to move away from the more facile interpretations of gameplay, the paper argues that these figures also demand an account of the commonplace itself – the rhetorical ‘topic’ – which links the technical structure of gaming procedures with the tropes and figures that enable them to make sense within their wider cultural context and tradition. While the figures of the double and the tentacle purposefully draw on existing tropes and processes associated with the cultural meanings of mental healt...

In order to practice effectively in today's complex and changing environment, social workers need to have an understanding of how contemporary cultural and philosophical concepts relate to the people they work with and the fields they practice in. Exploring the ideas of philosophers, including Nietzsche, Gadamer, Taylor, Adorno, MacIntyre, Zizek and Derrida, this text demonstrates their relevance to social work practice and presents new approaches and frameworks to understanding social change. Key Debates in Social Work and Philosophyintroduces a range of concerns central to social work and social care, with chapters looking at questions such as: - What is the 'self'? - How are communities formed? - Why is 'choice' important? - Are certain rights really applicable to all humans? - What are the political and ethical implications of documenting your practice? - What does it mean to be a professional social worker? Each chapter focuses on a particular area of dispute, presenting the relevant philosophical theories, and considering how relevant social work examples and research can be used to further inform theoretical debate, and includes questions to prompt discussion and reflection. The only book to examine the philosophical ideas that underlie and inform contemporary issues for social work and social care practitioners, this is a useful resource for those studying social work theory, policy and practice.

This paper explores how the poetic speaks to philosophical treatments of post-truth. In doing so, it reconsiders the relationship between poetry and philosophy, and the aspects of the poetic that are pertinent to the performance of rumour. It examines classic performances of rumour in both philosophy and poetry, through the lens of Nietzsche’s account of poetry as a rhythm that creates an economy of memory. In doing so, it suggests that the poetic can alert us to the ways in which different dimensions of rhythm and memory are at work in the ‘post-truth age.’

"What is it to claim that misogyny might be ironic? Why is it that, in the works of Nietzsche, Kierkegaard and Schopenhauer, the possibility of irony constantly interferes with a conclusive ethical judgment over the meaning of their misogyny? How do we hold our interpretations of such ambiguous texts ethically accountable? This book brings together the driving concerns of hermeneutics, feminist philosophy and the history of philosophy in dealing with the problem of irony. It develops a thematic account of the concept of irony as a philosophical form of interpretation, and explores this through close readings of three key sites of controversy regarding the relationship between irony and misogyny: Schopenhauer's On Women, Kierkegaard's In Vino Veritas and Nietzsche's Woman and Child. Rather than aiming to rescue their misogynistic texts by appealing to irony, the book suggests that ironic ambiguity is a formative, rather than distractive, aspect of these texts' misogyny. Working from the productive intersection between hermeneutics and deconstruction, the book explores the substantial ways in which authority and value are constructed in terms of ironic possibility"--Publisher.

The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the significance of the politics of health as an ongoing interpretative event. The effectiveness of delivering prevention strategies is in negotiation with day-to-day arguments in the public sphere, not just by “experts” in peer-reviewed papers, but also in the everyday interpretations and discussions of available expertise on print and digital media platforms. In this paper I explore ae particular facet of these public debate over the politics of health: the deployment of the commonplace of stupidity. I argue that the growth of this commonplace within discussion is rooted in particular models of interpretation which limit self-understanding, by over-emphasising certain points of significance within the interpretative horizon over more banal aspects that are, nevertheless, influential on health interventions.

This article argues that reading the life of Catherine of Siena can fall into passive models of feminine agency that stifle the potential such a life has to offer. By investigating the way passivity is imposed by both traditional and feminist writers on her life, this article argues that new ways of conceptualizing asceticism are possible through the affirmation of Catherine of Siena’s agency as active. This involves viewing the relation of the ascetic body to its explanatory texts as something more than literal. Using recent interpretations of Paul, this article argues that Catherine of Siena can be read as a performative exposition of the hidden oppressiveness of the dualistic framework ascetics are often taken to be mere ‘victims’ of.

The development of four-dimensional ultrasound pre-natal scans carries with it an intriguing range of philosophical questions. While ultrasound in pregnancy is a medical test for detecting foetal abnormalities, it has also become a social ritual in Western culture. The scan has become embedded within a discourse of the parent’s ante-relationships with their future child as much as it is a screening function. Within such a scene, the advance of technology – the move, for example, the increasing addition of dimensions to pre-natal imaging, from 2D to 3D and 4D – is inextricably merged with the spatial rhetoric of the foetus. Drawing on both Heidegger’s insights into the relationship between the human and technology, and debates within feminist cultural theory, this paper explores how these spatial and temporal rhetorics of the foetal ultrasound relate to the philosophical motifs around self, knowledge, gender and the technical image. It charts these relationships through an analysis of two classic images of the foetal self, before considering how the fourth dimension of ultrasound – that of real-time image streaming of a foetal scan – enhances, develops and critiques these motifs.