•  5
    Rethinking the Evolution of Consciousness
    In Susan Schneider & Max Velmans (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, Wiley. 2017.
    Reasoning about consciousness concerns theoretical connections between the etiology of consciousness and philosophical theories of its nature. Discussions concerning the origins of consciousness are different from those about the origins of hearts, lungs, and stomachs. And it is these lines of reasoning that concern this chapter. Before examining some arguments concerning the evolution of consciousness, we need to understand what a good explanation of the adaptation of consciousness would look l…Read more
  •  42
    Responses to critics
    Philosophical Psychology 31 (3): 446-457. 2018.
    In response to points raised by our critics in this book symposium, we offer some clarifications about how to understand the role of science in assessing the multiple realization thesis. We also consider the connection between functionalism and multiple realization in the contexts of both psychological and biological sciences.
  •  190
    Physicalism and Moorean Supervenience
    Analytic Philosophy 54 (1): 72-92. 2013.
    G. E. Moore argues that goodness is an intrinsic non-natural property that supervenes irreducibly on the intrinsic natural properties of its bearers. Accordingly, it is often supposed that “Moorean” supervenience is incompatible with physicalism, a naturalistic thesis. In this paper I argue that Moorean supervenience is not in itself incompatible with physicalism, Moore’s ethical non-naturalism notwithstanding. Understanding why will help us to better appreciate the full range of resources avail…Read more
  •  73
    In defense of interventionist solutions to exclusion
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 68 51-57. 2018.
    Mental and physical causes do not competedthe presence of one does not exclude the efficacy of the other. This point is obvious from the perspective of an interventionist theory of causation, but only when this theory gets its proper due. Doubts about the interventionist justification for concluding that there is both physical and mental causation, we have argued, rest on misunderstandings of interventionism. When looking to interventions to reveal causal structures, care must be taken to consid…Read more
  •  92
    The Puzzling Resilience of Multiple Realization
    with Lawrence A. Shapiro
    Minds and Machines 33 (2): 321-345. 2023.
    According to the multiple realization argument, mental states or processes can be realized in diverse and heterogeneous physical systems; and that fact implies that mental state or process kinds cannot be identified with particular kinds of physical states or processes. More specifically, mental processes cannot be identified with brain processes. Moreover, the argument provides a general model for the autonomy of the special sciences. The multiple realization argument is widely influential, but…Read more
  •  9
    This collection offers cutting-edge chapters on themes related to the philosophical work of Owen Flanagan. Flanagan is an influential philosopher in the late 20th and early 21st Century, whose wide-ranging work spans philosophy of mind (especially consciousness, identity, and the self), ethics and moral psychology, comparative philosophy, and philosophical study of psychopathology (especially disorders of self, dreams, and addiction). Flanagan is the author of numerous scholarly and popular arti…Read more
  •  6
    Peter Godfrey-Smith's Other Minds (review)
    BJPS Review of Books. 2017.
    Godfrey-Smith begins with the particular, with the peculiarities of some creatures in a small corner of the animal kingdom, and builds up his reasoning and evidence through a series of detailed comparisons with other creatures. He often finds that similar effects have different causes, and appears to rely on the inverse of the Newtonian principle, namely, that similar causes will have similar effects. But the similarities and differences that occupy Godfrey-Smith are not only or mainly by compar…Read more
  •  29
    Naturalizing the Metaphysics of Science
    Philosophia 50 (2): 659-670. 2021.
    Most practitioners of the metaphysics of science agree that it should be a naturalized metaphysics. But, just as in other areas of philosophy, there is no consensus on what constitutes naturalism. Here I will focus on just one aspect, viz., the idea that the metaphysics of science should be epistemically naturalized. In the first section I will characterize the kind of epistemic naturalism relevant to the metaphysics of science. The main idea, drawing on the work of Penelope Maddy, is that metap…Read more
  •  99
    The Multiple Realization Book
    Oxford University Press UK. 2016.
    Since Hilary Putnam offered multiple realization as an empirical hypothesis in the 1960s, philosophical consensus has turned against the idea that mental processes are identifiable with brain processes, and multiple realization has become the keystone of the 'antireductive consensus' across philosophy of science. Thomas W. Polger and Lawrence A. Shapiro offer the first book-length investigation of multiple realization, which serves as a starting point to a series of philosophically sophisticated…Read more
  •  675
    Some people believe that there is an “explanatory gap” between the facts of physics and certain other facts about the world—for example, facts about consciousness. The gap is presented as a challenge to any thoroughgoing naturalism or physicalism. We believe that advocates of the explanatory gap have some reasonable expectations that cannot be merely dismissed. We also believe that naturalistic thinkers have the resources to close the explanatory gap, but that they have not adequately explained …Read more
  •  53
    Review of Drew Khlentzos' Naturalistic Realism and the Antirealist Challenge (review)
    Review of Metaphysics 59 (3): 181-183. 2005.
    Drew Khlentozos’ Naturalistic Realism and the Antirealist Challenge is a meticulous introduction and roadmap to the core arguments of the contemporary realism/antirealism debate. It has several features that I especially admire. The book is carefully argued and for the most part clearly written. Rare among recent writers in Anglo-American philosophy, Khlentzos is a charitable reader of his opponents and earnestly endeavors to present their views as clearly and generously as possible. This genero…Read more
  •  96
    Metaphysics of Mind
    In Robert Barnard Neil Manson (ed.), Continuum Companion to Metaphysics, . 2012.
    The enduring metaphysical question about minds and mental phenomena concerns their nature. At least since Descartes this question—the mind-body problem—has been understood in terms of the viability or necessity of mind-body dualism, the thesis that minds and bodies are essentially distinct kinds of substance. Assuming that the nonmental (‘body’) portions of the world are constituted of physical stuff, the remaining question is: Are minds or mental phenomena essentially distinct non-physical subs…Read more
  •  274
    Consider what the brain-state theorist has to do to make good his claims. He has to specify a physical–chemical state such that any organism (not just a mammal) is in pain if and only if (a) it possesses a brain of suitable physical–chemical structure; and (b) its brain is in that physical–chemical state. This means that the physical–chemical state in question must be a possible state of a mammalian brain, a reptilian brain, a mollusc’s brain (octopuses are mollusca, and certainly feel pain), et…Read more
  •  325
    Are sensations still brain processes
    Philosophical Psychology 24 (1): 1-21. 2011.
    Fifty years ago J. J. C. Smart published his pioneering paper, “Sensations and Brain Processes.” It is appropriate to mark the golden anniversary of Smart’s publication by considering how well his article has stood up, and how well the identity theory itself has fared. In this paper I first revisit Smart’s text, reflecting on how it has weathered the years. Then I consider the status of the identity theory in current philosophical thinking, taking into account the objections and replies that Sma…Read more
  •  122
    Michael Tye has recently been a vocal defender of color realism or, as I shall call it, color objectivism. Objectivism about color is the view that color properties are identical to intrinsic physical properties of the surfaces of objects. Subjectivism about color is the denial of color objectivism. Objectivists argue that color claims must be taken at face value. In this paper I forego the usual bickering about whether there are surface reflectance properties that can be identified with colors …Read more
  •  156
    Putnam's intuition
    Philosophical Studies 109 (2): 143-70. 2002.
    Multiple realizability has recently attractedrenewed attention, for example Bickle, 1998;Bechtel and Mundale, 1999; Bechtel and McCauley,1999; Heil, 1999; and Sober, 1999. Many of thesewriters revisit the topic of multiplerealizability in order to show that someversion of a mind-brain identity theory isviable. Although there is much of value inthese recent explorations, they do not addressthe underlying intuitions that have vexedphilosophers of mind since Hilary Putnamintroduced the concern (196…Read more
  •  152
    Review of The Mind Incarnate by Lawrence A. Shapiro (review)
    Trends in Cognitive Science 8 394-95. 2004.
    To what degree must the brains and bodies of creatures with minds have to be similar to the brains and bodies of human beings? Since the late 1960’s, most philosophers and cognitive scientists have supposed that there a relatively few constraints on what sorts of brains and bodies can realize minds. It is widely believed that minds are multiply realizable. Of course there were always dissenters, and in recent years their grumbling has grown harder to dismiss. In The Mind Incarnate , Lawrence Sha…Read more
  •  169
    Review of David J. Chalmers, Constructing the World
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65 (2): 419-423. 2014.
    David Chalmers burst onto the philosophical scene in the mid-1990s with his work on consciousness, which awakened slumbering zombie arguments against physicalism and transformed the explanatory gap into the hard problem of consciousness. The distinction between hard and easy problems of consciousness became a central dogma of the movement. Chalmers’ influence in philosophy and consciousness studies is unquestionable. But enthusiasts of Chalmers’ work on consciousness may be excused for not fully…Read more
  •  165
    Zombies
    A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind. 2001.
    What Are Zombies? Zombies are stipulated to be creatures that are in some way identical to human beings-and thus, in some sense, indistinguishable from human beings-but which lack consciousness. Zombies are at least behaviorally identical to human beings or other conscious creatures, and they may also be like us in other ways.
  •  104
    The 1990’s, we’ve been told, were the decade of the brain. But without anyone announcing or declaring, much less deciding that it should be so, the 90’s were also a breakthrough decade for the study of consciousness. (Of course we think the two are related, but that is another matter altogether.) William G. Lycan leads the charge with his 1987 book Consciousness (MIT Press), and he has weighed-in again with Consciousness and Experience (1996, MIT Press). Together these two books put forth Lycan’…Read more
  •  191
    Rethinking the evolution of consciousness
    In Susan Schneider & Max Velmans (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, Blackwell. pp. 72--87. 2007.
    Suppose that consciousness is a natural feature of biological organisms, and that it is a capacity or property or process that resides in a single organ. In that case there is a straightforward question about the consciousness organ, namely: How did the consciousness organ come to be formed and why is its presence maintained in those organisms that have it? Of course answering this question might be rather difficult, particularly if the consciousness organ is made of soft tissue that leaves at b…Read more
  •  80
    Natural Minds
    Bradford. 2004.
    In Natural Minds Thomas Polger advocates, and defends, the philosophical theory that mind equals brain -- that sensations are brain processes -- and in doing so brings the mind-brain identity theory back into the philosophical debate about consciousness. The version of identity theory that Polger advocates holds that conscious processes, events, states, or properties are type- identical to biological processes, events, states, or properties -- a "tough-minded" account that maintains that minds a…Read more
  •  166
    Functionalism
    Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2008.
    Saying that psychological states are functional states, the functionalist claims more than that psychological states have functions. Rather, functionalism is the theory that psychological states are defined and constituted by their functions. On this view, what it is to be a psychological state of a certain sort just is and consists entirely of having a certain function. Anything that has that function in a suitable system would therefore be that psychological state. If storing information for l…Read more
  •  105
    There is an argument for functionalism—and _ipso facto_ against identity theory—that can be sketched as follows: We are, or want to be, or should be dedicated to functional explanations in the sciences, or at least the special sciences. Therefore—according to the principle that what exists is what our ideal theories say exists—we are, or want to be, or should be committed to metaphysical functionalism. Let us call this the _argument from functional_ _explanation_. I will try to reveal the motiva…Read more
  •  206
    Two Confusions Concerning Multiple Realization
    Philosophy of Science 75 (5): 537-547. 2008.
    Forthcoming in Philosophy of Science. Despite some recent advances, multiple realization remains a largely misunderstood thesis. Consider the dispute between Lawrence Shapiro and Carl Gillett over the application of Shapiro’s recipe for deciding when we have genuine cases of multiple realization. I argue that Gillett follows many philosophers in mistakenly supposing that multiple realization is absolute and transitive. Both of these are problematic. They are tempting only when we extract the que…Read more
  •  658
    Consciousness, adaptation, and epiphenomenalism
    with Owen J. Flanagan
    In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Consciousness Evolving, John Benjamins. 1998.
    Consciousness and evolution are complex phenomena. It is sometimes thought that if adaptation explanations for some varieties of consciousness, say, conscious visual perception, can be had, then we may be reassured that at least those kinds of consciousness are not epiphenomena. But what if other varieties of consciousness, for example, dreams, are not adaptations? We sort out the connections among evolution, adaptation, and epiphenomenalism in order to show that the consequences for the nature …Read more
  •  234
    Realization and Multiple Realization, Chicken and Egg
    European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4): 862-877. 2015.
    A common view is that the truth of multiple realization—e.g., about psychological states—entails the truth of functionalism. This is supposed to follow because what is multiply realized is eo ipso realized. I argue that view is mistaken by demonstrating how it misrepresents arguments from multiple realization. In particular, it undermines the empirical component of the arguments, and renders the multiplicity of the realization irrelevant. I suggest an alternative reading of multiple realizabilit…Read more
  •  299
    Saul Kripke’s modal essentialist argument against materialism remains an obstacle to any prospective Identity Theorist. This paper is an attempt to make room for an Identity Theory without dismissing Kripke’s analytic tools or essentialist intuitions. I propose an explanatory model that can make room for the Identity Theory within the constraints of Kripke’s view; the model is based on ideas from Alan Sidelle’s, “Identity and Identity-like” . My model explains the apparent contingency of some sc…Read more
  •  304
    Recently some philosophers interested in consciousness have begun to turn their attention to the question of what evolutionary advantages, if any, being conscious might confer on an organism. The issue has been pressed in recent dicussions involving David Chalmers, Todd Moody, Owen Flanagan and Thomas Polger, Daniel Dennett, and others. The purpose of this essay is to consider some of the problems that face anyone who wants to give an evolutionary explanation of consciousness. We begin by framin…Read more
  •  138
    Zombies explained
    In Andrew Brook, Don Ross & David L. Thompson (eds.), Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment, Mit Press. pp. 259--286. 2000.
    In this article I reply to the challenge set forth by Dennett in his critique of Flanagan and Polger (1995). Through careful textual analysis, I show that Dennett is presenting us with a dilemma and that this dilemma is the keystone of Dennett’s argument in his Consciousness Explained. I argue that one horn of the dilemma does not have the consequence that Dennett claims; Specifically, I argue that theories that allow for the possibility of non-conscious functional duplicates of conscious beings…Read more