Tomas Marvan

Predictive Processing theory, hotly debated in neuroscience, psychology and philosophy, promises to explain a number of perceptual and cognitive phenomena in a simple and elegant manner. In some of its versions, the theory is ambitiously advertised as a new theory of conscious perception. The task of this paper is to assess whether this claim is realistic. We will be arguing that the Predictive Processing theory cannot explain the transition from unconscious to conscious perception in its proprietary terms. The explanations offer by PP theorists mostly concern the preconditions of conscious perception, leaving the genuine material substrate of consciousness untouched.

The present paper was written as a contribution to ongoing methodological debates within the NCC project. We focus on the neural correlates of conscious perceptual episodes. Our claim is that the NCC notion, as applied to conscious perceptual episodes, needs to be reconceptualized. It mixes together the processing related to the perceived contents and the neural substrate of consciousness proper, i.e. mechanisms making the perceptual contents conscious. We thus propose that the perceptual NCC be divided into two constitutive subnotions. The main theoretical idea that emerges as a consequence of this reconceptualization is that the neural correlate of a perceptual episode is formed in the neural interaction between content-processing and consciousness-conferring mechanisms. The paper elaborates this distinction, marshals some initial arguments in its favour, and tests it against some of the most debated theories of consciousness.

We present a theoretical view of the cellular foundations for network-level processes involved in producing our conscious experience. Inputs to apical synapses in layer 1 of a large subset of neocortical cells are summed at an integration zone near the top of their apical trunk. These inputs come from diverse sources and provide a context within which the transmission of information abstracted from sensory input to their basal and perisomatic synapses can be amplified when relevant. We argue that apical amplification enables conscious perceptual experience and makes it more flexible, and thus more adaptive, by being sensitive to context. Apical amplification provides a possible mechanism for recurrent processing theory that avoids strong loops. It makes the broadcasting hypothesized by global neuronal workspace theories feasible while preserving the distinct contributions of the individual cells receiving the broadcast. It also provides mechanisms that contribute to the holistic aspects of integrated information theory. As apical amplification is highly dependent on cholinergic, aminergic, and other neuromodulators, it relates the specific contents of conscious experience to global mental states and to fluctuations in arousal when awake. We conclude that apical dendrites provide a cellular mechanism for the context-sensitive selective amplification that is a cardinal prerequisite of conscious perception.

A distinguished team of fourteen European philosophers addresses the current debates on internalism versus externalism in the philosophy of language and mind. The main objective of the volume is to demonstrate the philosophical significance and fruitfulness of the internalism/externalism debate on a wide range of issues, and to do so in a manner which is sophisticated yet accessible to non-specialists. The issues authors deal with include linguistic deference, interpreting classical externalist thought-experiments by Putnam and Burge, the nature of Wittgenstein's externalism, apriority, intersubjective externalism, and object-dependence of thought and temporal externalism. Some of the contributors try to strike a balance between internalist and externalist position.

Manzotti (2021) surveys recent variants of identity theories, defending his own preferred version, mind-object identity theory (MOI). According to this view, experiences are identical with the external objects, and the mind is thus literally “spread” in the world. Manzotti supports this view with considerations about indiscernibility of properties and other theoretical considerations. He claims that brain-mind accounts of identity commit the “fallacy of the center,” locating conscious mind inside the skull. Amongst other recent works, he comments on our (Polák and Marvan, 2018) article, in which we defended a standard, neurocentrist version of type identity theory, and supplemented it with a sketch of neuro-phenomenal typing. Manzotti holds that although we appeal to neuro-phenomenal types in our account of mind-brain identity, we nevertheless “lack a convincing explanation as to why the type of neural processes should be identical to the type of one's experience.” This is a fair point. We didn't do much in our 2018 article to support our views on the principles of neuro-phenomenal typing, either by detailed theoretical considerations or by empirical evidence. In this short rejoinder, we offer the missing argument. By doing so, we also respond both to Manzotti's cited objection and to the charge of the “fallacy of the center.”

In this article we aim to reconstruct some aspects of Davidson's idea of triangulation, and against this reconstruction, ask whether the idea is viciously circular. We begin by looking at the claim that without a triangularn setting, there is no saying what the cause of a being's responses is. In the first section we discuss the notion of relevant similarity, and what difference the presence of a second non‐linguistic being could make for the individuation of a common focus of attention. In the second section we look at the role of a second person in language‐acquisition. It is important that being corrected to ‘go on as others do’ does not yet presuppose thought, and similarity standards can be applied to a learner's reactions even before she is aware of these standards. We also show why Davidson is not committed to any consensus view of correctness. In the last section we discern three charges of circularity that can be levelled against the idea of triangulation. We argue that Davidson can respond to the first two charges, and point to a way of answering the third. But the response we propound raises a new question, namely, why does the second being have to be a speaker or thinker even before the learner is aware of the three points of the triangle?

One of the greatest challenges of consciousness research is to understand the relationship between consciousness and its implementing substrate. Current research into the neural correlates of consciousness regards the biological brain as being this substrate, but largely fails to clarify the nature of the brain-consciousness connection. A popular approach within this research is to construe brain-consciousness correlations in causal terms: the neural correlates of consciousness are the causes of states of consciousness. After introducing the notion of the neural correlate of consciousness, we argue (in section 2) that this causal strategy is misguided. It implicitly involves an undesirable dualism of matter and mind and should thus be avoided. A non-causal account of the brain-mind correlations is to be preferred. We favor the theory of the identity of mind and brain, according to which states of phenomenal consciousness are identical with their neural correlates. Research into the neural correlates of consciousness and the theory of identity (in the philosophy of mind) are two major research paradigms that hitherto have had very little mutual contact. We aim to demonstrate that they can enrich each other. This is the task of the third part of the paper in which we show that the identity theory must work with a suitably defined concept of type. Surprisingly, neither philosophers nor neuroscientists have taken much care in defining this central concept; more often than not, the term is used only implicitly and vaguely. We attempt to open a debate on this subject and remedy this unhappy state of affairs, proposing a tentative hierarchical classification of phenomenal and neurophysiological types, spanning multiple levels of varying degrees of generality. The fourth part of the paper compares the theory of identity with other prominent conceptions of the mind-body connection. We conclude by stressing that scientists working on consciousness should engage more with metaphysical issues concerning the relation of brain processes and states of consciousness. Without this, the ultimate goals of consciousness research can hardly be fulfilled.

The paper addresses the recurrent charge that Richard Rorty is a “linguistic idealist”. I show what the charge consists of and try to explain that there is a charitable reading of Rorty’s works, according to which he is not guilty of linguistic idealism. This reading draws on Putnam’s well-known conception of “internal realism” and accounts for the causal independence of the world on our linguistic practices. I also show how we can reconcile this causal independence of things and the sense of our discourse being guided by them with our autonomy with regard to the construction of various “vocabularies” with which we describe, or cope with, reality. In the final part, I address in some detail Rorty’s animadversions concerning the idea of the intrinsic nature of reality. I show them to be only partly successful

The aim of the paper is twofold. First, it expounds the thesis of ‘conceptual relativity’ propounded in a series of writings of the well-known philosopher Hilary Putnam and indicates the alleged manner in which the thesis, according to Putnam, undermines the foundations of metaphysical realism (understood in a peculiar way spelled out in the paper). Second, a critical examination of Putnam’s anti-metaphysical-realist argument is offered. It is argued that Putnam offers examples only of a trivial, so-called indexical relativity, and that his strategy leaves the foundations of metaphysical realism intact.

In this collection of essays, experts in the field of consciousness research shed light on the intricate relationship between conscious and unconscious states of mind. Advancing the debate on consciousness research, this book puts centre stage the topic of commonalities and differences between conscious and unconscious contents of the mind. The collection of cutting-edge chapters offers a breadth of research perspectives, with some arguing that unconscious states have been unjustly overlooked and deserve recognition for their richness and wide scope. Others contend that significant differences between conscious and unconscious states persist, highlighting the importance of their distinct characteristics. Explorations into the nature of the transition from unconscious to conscious mind further complicate the picture, with some authors questioning whether a sharp divide between unconscious and conscious states truly exists. Delving into ontological, epistemological, and methodological issues, this thought-provoking text challenges established paradigms and paves the way for a reimagining of consciousness research. It does so in an understandable and accessible way, making this a perfect companion to both experts and students of philosophy, psychology, and related fields.

Text se formou polemiky zabývá otázkou, zda je možné rozřešit filozofický spor mezi realismem a konstruktivismem. Oproti mínění Jaroslava Peregrina hájí autor tezi, že tento spor rozřešit lze, a to ve prospěch realismu. Argumenty pro realismus jsou výrazně přesvědčivější, zatímco konstruktivistické argumenty nejsou ničím podložené a zároveň vedou k absurdním důsledkům. The text adresses, in a polemical fashion, the question whether the philosophical dispute between realism and constructivism can be resolved. Against the opinion of Jaroslav Peregrin, the author defends the thesis that this dispute can be resolved, in favor of realism. The arguments for realism are much more convincing, while constructivist arguments are baseless and at the same time lead to absurd consequences.

Text kriticky hodnotí tvrzení o pojmu fenomenálního vědomí, která jsou obsažena v šesté kapitole knihy Tomáše Hříbka Jaké to je, nebo o čem to je? Mým východiskem je teze Erica Schwitzgebela, že fenomenální vědomí můžeme definovat natolik neutrálně a minimalisticky, že se na jeho existenci mohou shodnout i teoretikové vědomí z velmi rozdílných táborů. Hříbek tento názor nesdílí, snažím se ale ukázat, že na základě lichých argumentů. Značnou pozornost v textu věnuji názorům Daniela Dennetta na podstatu vědomí, především pak „iluzionismu“ jakožto teorii vědomí. Ten pokládám za teorii se značně nejasným obsahem a navrhuji, aby se o něm ve filozofii vědomí vedly soustředěné diskuze.