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1104World and Subject: Themes from McDowellDissertation, National Chengchi University, Taiwan. 2008.This essay is an inquiry into John McDowell’s thinking on ‘subjectivity.’ The project consists in two parts. On the one hand, I will discuss how McDowell understands and responds to the various issues he is tackling; on the other, I will approach relevant issues concerning subjectivity by considering different aspects of it: a subject as a perceiver, knower, thinker, speaker, agent, person and (self-) conscious being in the world. The inquiry begins by identifying and resolving a tension generat…Read more
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1038Attention, Fixation, and Change BlindnessPhilosophical Inquiries 5 (1): 19-26. 2017.The topic of this paper is the complex interaction between attention, fixation, and one species of change blindness. The two main interpretations of the target phenomenon are the ‘blindness’ interpretation and the ‘inaccessibility’ interpretation. These correspond to the sparse view (Dennett 1991; Tye, 2007) and the rich view (Dretske 2007; Block, 2007a, 2007b) of visual consciousness respectively. Here I focus on the debate between Fred Dretske and Michael Tye. Section 1 describes the target ph…Read more
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966The Sceptical Paradox and the Nature of the SelfPhilosophical Investigations 39 (1): 3-14. 2015.In the present article, I attempt to relate Saul Kripke's “sceptical paradox” to some issues about the self; specifically, the relation between the self and its mental states and episodes. I start with a brief reconstruction of the paradox, and venture to argue that it relies crucially on a Cartesian model of the self: the sceptic regards the Wittgensteinian “infinite regress of interpretation” as the foundation of his challenge, and this is where he commits the crucial mistake. After the diagno…Read more
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953Quine's Naturalism and BehaviorismsMetaphilosophy 49 (4): 548-567. 2018.This paper investigates the complicated relations between various versions of naturalism, behaviorism, and mentalism within the framework of W. V. O. Quine's thinking. It begins with Roger Gibson's reconstruction of Quine's behaviorisms and argues that it lacks a crucial ontological element and misconstrues the relation between philosophy and science. After getting clear of Quine's naturalism, the paper distinguishes between evidential, methodological, and ontological behaviorisms. The evidentia…Read more
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938Evaluating Williamson’s Anti-ScepticismSorites 21 06-11. 2008.Timothy Williamson’s Knowledge and its Limits has been highly influential since the beginning of this century. It can be read as a systematic response to scepticism. One of the most important notions in this response is the notion of «evidence,» which will be the focus of the present paper. I attempt to show primarily two things. First, the notion of evidence invoked by Williamson does not address the sceptical worry: he stipulates an objective notion of evidence, but this begs the question agai…Read more
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917Sensory integration and the unity of consciousness (review)Philosophical Psychology 29 (4): 632-635. 2016.Based on but not limited to material from a conference at Brown University in 2011, Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness is an ambitious collection that brings together two distinct but inter- twined topics.1 In what follows, I briefly explain what sensory integration and the unity of conscious- ness amount to, highlight the contents of the papers, and finally end with general observations and suggestions. I will spend more time on sensory integration, since it is relatively unfami…Read more
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878The trajectory of selfTrends in Cognitive Sciences 20 (7): 481-482. 2016.In a recent Opinion article, Sui and Humphreys [1] argue that experimental findings suggest self is ‘special’, in that self-reference serves a binding function within human cognitive economy. Contrasting their view with other functionalist positions, chiefly Dennett's [2], they deny that self is a convenient fiction and adduce findings to show that a ‘core self representation’ serves as an ‘integrative glue’ helping to bind distinct types of information as well as distinct stages of psycho- logi…Read more
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746A mechanism for spatial perception on human skinCognition 178 (C): 236-243. 2018.Our perception of where touch occurs on our skin shapes our interactions with the world. Most accounts of cutaneous localisation emphasise spatial transformations from a skin-based reference frame into body-centred and external egocentric coordinates. We investigated another possible method of tactile localisation based on an intrinsic perception of ‘skin space’. The arrangement of cutaneous receptive fields (RFs) could allow one to track a stimulus as it moves across the skin, similarly to the …Read more
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721The Recurrent Model of Bodily Spatial PhenomenologyJournal of Consciousness Studies 25 (3-4): 55-70. 2018.In this paper, we introduce and defend the recurrent model for understanding bodily spatial phenomenology. While Longo, Azañón and Haggard (2010) propose a bottom-up model, Bermúdez (2017) emphasizes the top-down aspect of the information processing loop. We argue that both are only half of the story. Section 1 intro- duces what the issues are. Section 2 starts by explaining why the top- down, descending direction is necessary with the illustration from the ‘body-based tactile rescaling’ para…Read more
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676Consciousness and the Flow of AttentionDissertation, City University of New York, Graduate Center. 2012.Visual phenomenology is highly elusive. One attempt to operationalize or to measure it is to use ‘cognitive accessibility’ to track its degrees. However, if Ned Block is right about the overflow phenomenon, then this way of operationalizing visual phenomenology is bound to fail. This thesis does not directly challenge Block’s view; rather it motivates a notion of cognitive accessibility different from Block’s one, and argues that given this notion, degrees of visual phenomenology can be tracked …Read more
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600The Situational Structure of Primate BeliefsPerspectives: International Postgraduate Journal of Philosophy 6 (1): 50-57. 2016.This paper develops the situational model of primate beliefs from the Prior-Lurz line of thought. There is a strong skepticism concerning primate beliefs in the analytic tradition which holds that beliefs have to be propositional and non-human animals do not have them. The response offered in this paper is twofold. First, two arguments against the propositional model as applied to other animals are put forward: an a priori argument from referential opacity and an empirical argument from varietie…Read more
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571Iconic Memory and Attention in the Overflow DebateCogent Psychology 4 (1): 01-11. 2017.The overflow debate concerns this following question: does conscious iconic memory have a higher capacity than attention does? In recent years, Ned Block has been invoking empirical works to support the positive answer to this question. The view is called the “rich view” or the “Overflow view”. One central thread of this discussion concerns the nature of iconic memory: for example how rich they are and whether they are conscious. The first section discusses a potential misunderstanding of “visib…Read more
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518Spatial Perception and the Sense of TouchIn The Subject's Matter: Self-Consciousness and the Body, Mit Press. pp. 97-114. 2017.It remains controversial whether touch is a truly spatial sense or not. Many philosophers suggest that, if touch is indeed spatial, it is only through its alliances with exploratory movement, and with proprioception. Here we develop the notion that a minimal yet important form of spatial perception may occur in purely passive touch. We do this by showing that the array of tactile receptive fields in the skin, and appropriately relayed to the cortex, may contain the same basic informational bu…Read more
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514Why Animals are PersonsAnimal Sentience 1 (10): 5-6. 2016.Rowlands’s case for attributing personhood to lower animals is ultimately convincing, but along the way he fails to highlight several distinctions that are crucial for his argument: Personhood vs. personal identity; the first person vs. its mental episodes; and pre- reflective awareness in general vs. one specific case of it.
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510Obstacles to Testing Molyneux's Question EmpiricallyI-Perception 6 (4). 2015.There have recently been various empirical attempts to answer Molyneux’s question, for example, the experiments undertaken by the Held group. These studies, though intricate, have encountered some objections, for instance, from Schwenkler, who proposes two ways of improving the experiments. One is “to re-run [the] experiment with the stimulus objects made to move, and/or the subjects moved or permitted to move with respect to them” (p. 94), which would promote three dimensional or otherwise view…Read more
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483Self, Action and PassivityPhilosophical Writings 44 (1): 01-19. 2015.In a series of works Hubert Dreyfus argues that phenomenological considerations can show the falsity of John McDowell’s claim that ours actions are permeated with rationality. Dreyfus changes the details of his objections several times in this debate, but I shall argue that there is an implicit false assumption lurking in his thinking throughout his exchanges with McDowell. Originally Dreyfus proposed a distinction between “detached rule-following” and “situation-specific way of coping,” and lat…Read more
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456Phenomenal SpecificityDissertation, University College London. 2014.The essay is a study of phenomenal specificity. By ‘phenomenal’ here we mean conscious awareness, which needs to be cashed out in detail throughout the study. Intuitively, one dimension of phenomenology is along with specificity. For example it seems appropriate to say that one’s conscious awareness in the middle of the visual field is in some sense more specific than the awareness in the periphery under normal circumstances. However, it is difficult to characterise the nature of phenomenal spec…Read more
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358Compositionality and Believing ThatLinguistic and Philosophical Investigations 15 60-76. 2016.This paper is about compositionality, belief reports, and related issues. I begin by introducing Putnam’s proposal for understanding compositionality, namely that the sense of a sentence is a function of the sense of its parts and of its logical structure (section 1). Both Church and Sellars think that Putnam’s move is superfluous or unnecessary since there is no relevant puzzle to begin with (section 2). I will urge that Putnam is right in thinking that there is indeed a puzzle with a discussio…Read more
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354Book Review: The First Sense (review)Frontiers in Psychology 6 1196. 2015.The First Sense: A Philosophical Study of Human Touch is one of the rare contributions in theoretical and philosophical psychology exclusively on human's sense of touch in the past decades. Although the study is conducted from a philosophical point of view, it is highly empirically informed. The author seeks to base his distinctions and arguments on empirical findings, but also offers his own original ideas and theses. In Section The Structure and Contents of the Book I discuss the structure and…Read more
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334Perspectival shapes are viewpoint-dependent relational propertiesPsychological Review (1): 307-310. 2022.Recently, there is a renewed debate concerning the role of perspective in vision. Morales et al. (2020) present evidence that, in the case of viewing a rotated coin, the visual system is sensitive to what has often been called “perspectival shapes.” It has generated vigorous discussions, including an online symposium by Morales and Cohen, an exchange between Linton (2021) and Morales et al. (2021), and most recently, a fierce critique by Burge and Burge (2022), in which they launch various conce…Read more
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304ConsciousnessIn Heather Salazar (ed.), Introduction to Philosophy: Philosophy of Mind, Rebus Foundation Publishing. pp. 41-48. 2019.The term “consciousness” is very often, though not always, interchangeable with the term “awareness,” which is more colloquial to many ears. We say things like “are you aware that ...” often. Sometimes we say “have you noticed that ... ?” to express similar thoughts, and this indicates a close connection between consciousness (awareness) and attention (noticing), which we will come back to later in this chapter. Ned Block, one of the key figures in this area, provides a useful characterization o…Read more
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127Post-perceptual confidence and supervaluative matching profileInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (3): 249-277. 2022.ABSTRACT Issues concerning the putative perception/cognition divide are not only age-old, but also resurface in contemporary discussions in various forms. In this paper, I connect a relatively new debate concerning perceptual confidence to the perception/cognition divide. The term ‘perceptual confidence’ is quite common in the empirical literature, but there is an unsettled question about it, namely: are confidence assignments perceptual or post-perceptual? John Morrison in two recent papers put…Read more
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68Spatial representations in sensory modalitiesMind and Language 37 (3): 485-500. 2022.Some sensory modalities, such as sight, touch and audition, are arguably spatial, and one way to understand these spatial senses is to investigate spatial representations in them. Here I focus on a specific element in this area— the interplay between perspectival variation and spatial constancy—and discuss recent interdisciplinary works on this topic. With these relevant experimental works, we will see clearly how traditional controversies in philosophy, for example, whether we perceive perspect…Read more
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56Review of Shaun Gallagher’s and Dan Zahavi’s The Phenomenological Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science (review)PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 16 (2): 01-04. 2010.One might interpret the locution “the phenomenological mind” as a declaration of a philosophical thesis that the mind is in some sense essentially phenomenological. Authors Gallagher & Zahavi appear to have intended it, however, to refer more to the phenomenological tradition and its methods of analysis. From the subheading of this book, one gains an impression that readers will see how the resources and perspectives from the phenomenological tradition illuminate various issues in philosophy of …Read more
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55Spatial Senses: Philosophy of Perception in an Age of Science (edited book)Routledge. 2019.This collection of essays brings together research on sense modalities in general and spatial perception in particular in a systematic and interdisciplinary way. It updates a long-standing philosophical fascination with this topic by incorporating theoretical and empirical research from cognitive science, neuroscience, and psychology. The book is divided thematically to cover a wide range of established and emerging issues. Part I covers notions of objectivity and subjectivity in spatial percept…Read more
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50Touch and other Somatosensory SensesIn Felipe De Brigard & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (eds.), Neuroscience and philosophy, The Mit Press. pp. 211-240. 2022.In 1925, David Katz published an influential monograph on touch, Der Aufbau der Tastwelt, which was translated into English in 1989. Although it is called “the world of touch,” it also discusses the thermal and the nociceptive senses, albeit briefly. In this chapter, we will follow this approach, but we will speak about “somatosensory senses” in general in order to remind ourselves that perceptions of temperatures and pains should also be considered together in this context.
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46Review of Perception and Reality in Kant, Husserl, and McDowell (review)Phenomenological Reviews 6. 2020.
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46PerceptionIn Benjamin D. Young & Carolyn Dicey Jennings (eds.), Mind, Cognition, and Neuroscience: A Philosophical Introduction, Routledge. pp. 367-384. 2021.Humans and other animals perceive with many different sensory modalities, includ- ing olfaction, touch, audition, vision, echolocation, proprioception, gustation, and some other senses, depending on different criteria and definitions. Given its broad range, it is not possible to give a comprehensive overview of all of the philosophi- cal, psychological, and neuroscientific studies about perception in one chapter, so what will be offered here is quite selective. In the introduction, we will discu…Read more
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41Bodily AwarenessInternet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2022.Bodily Awareness Most of us agree that we are conscious, and we can be consciously aware of public things such as mountains, tables, foods, and so forth; we can also be consciously aware of our own psychological states and episodes such as emotions, thoughts, perceptions, and so forth. Each of us can be aware of … Continue reading Bodily Awareness →
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The Nature of Perceptual Experience |
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