Troy Catterson

I argue that moral goodness is necessarily self-predicating. That is to say, the property of being morally good is morally good. I then argue that reductions of moral goodness to natural properties, particularly utilitarian specifications, are not necessarily self-predicating. Therefore, such reductions are not successful. Finally, I consider the possibility of defining the good as “fulfilling God’s design plan.” I show that, under an Aristotelian construal of property existence this property is provably self-predicating.

I utilize recent work in analytic epistemology on the notion of essentially indexical knowledge, as well as Marion’s notion of saturated phenomenality, to ground the psychological model of the Trinity. I argue that classical theism implies that God is essentially omniscient. This omniscience entails complete self-knowledge on God’s part. There are, however, truths about God’s consciousness that are reducible neither to concepts nor to 1st person experience. These are the truths about how God’s presence is perceived from a 2nd person perspective. In order for God to know such truths about himself, he would have to experience himself as both an ‘I’ and a ‘You.’ Thus, God must exist as a being with multiple subjective centers of consciousness

In his paper, “Identity Statements and Essentialism,” Loux seeks to demonstrate sortal essentialism based on Frege’s thesis that all statements of number concerning a collection require that the members fall under the same sortal concept. I shall attempt to argue that a detailed analysis of Loux’s argument reveals it as failing to imply the type of sortal dependency thesis necessary for the justification of sortal essentialism. However, if one construes the transworld identity relation as no different from our run of the mill identity relation, then his argument can serve as the basis for a proof of a type of nontrivial essentialism, thereby showing that the possible worlds picture of modality is indeed committed to a robust essentialism

In this paper I shall attempt to argue for the simple view of personal identity. I shall first argue that we often do have warrant for our beliefs that we exist as continuing subjects of experience, and that these beliefs are justified independently of any reductionist analysis of what it means to be a person. This has two important implications that are relevant to the ongoing debate concerning the number of persons that are in existence throughout any duration in time: (1) the lack of logically or metaphysically necessary and sufficient conditions for distinguishing one person from another should imply neither that there is only one person nor that personhood is not individuative; and (2) the lack of such universally applicable identity criteria should not imply that the term ‘person’ is a folk term with no real application. In other words, lack of reductionist analysis does not entail lack of existence

This dissertation addresses the problem of trans-world identity in possible worlds semantics, and argues that essentialism does not provide a satisfactory solution to it. If one takes possible worlds semantics seriously as a viable elucidation of the logic of the metaphysical modalities, one must also take a realistic stance toward possible worlds. But then, contrary to Kripke, Plantinga, Van Inwagen, and others, there is a problem with trans-world identity; the real problem being, not the problem of identifying individuals across possible worlds, but rather the problem of the theoretical basis for these identifications. Possible worlds semantics presupposes a substantive theory of what constitutes the cross-world continuation or persistence of individuals. Standard formulations of these semantics nevertheless fail to articulate such a theory. Therefore cross-world identifications become inherently problematic. All available solutions to this problem either presuppose non-trivial essentialism or are incoherent. Non-trivial essentialism is the view that there are certain non-identity properties which a given individual has in every world in which it exists but which other possible individuals fail to have in some of the worlds in which they exist. ;But the question of the coherence of essentialism itself is intimately connected with one's views concerning the nature and existence of properties. Three Cantorian paradoxes are adduced, one against individuative essentialism, one against non-trivial essentialism, and one against properties in general. The paradoxes against properties in general and non-trivial essentialism can be avoided only if one eschews a Quine/Goodman view of property existence---the view that any extensionally well-defined class answers to a property---and makes some kind of distinction between natural and artificial properties. Nevertheless such an eschewal does not avoid the paradox of individuative essentialism. Thus essentialism cannot provide a completely adequate theory of trans-world individuation. For although it provides the necessary conditions for the identity of individuals across possible worlds, it does not allow us to identify these individuals on this basis alone. This conclusion precludes actualist solutions to the problem of the individuation of possibilia which quantify over individual essences.

Nathan Salmon, in his paper Trans-World Identification and Stipulation (1996) purports to give a proof for the claim that facts concerning trans-world identity cannot be conceptually reduced to general facts. He calls this claim ‘Extreme Haecceitism.’ I argue that his proof is fallacious. However, I also contend that the analysis and ultimate rejection of his proof clarifies the fundamental issues that are at stake in the debate between the reductionist and haecceitist solutions to the problem of trans-world identity. These issues hinge on the ability of modal logic and possible worlds semantics to draw a hard and fast distinction between the logic and the metaphysics of modal logic. I shall claim that the considerations in this paper call into question the viability of such a distinction.