My philosophical views

Question Answer Comments
A priori knowledge: yes and no Lean toward: yes
Abstract objects: Platonism and nominalism Lean toward: Platonism
Aesthetic value: objective and subjective Lean toward: subjective
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes and no Accept: yes
Epistemic justification: internalism and externalism Agnostic/undecided I am not persuaded by the typical objections to externalism. Though I am not sure if externalism is true.
External world: idealism, skepticism or non-skeptical realism Lean toward: non-skeptical realism
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism or no free will Agnostic/undecided
God: theism and atheism Lean toward: atheism My credence in atheism is probably as high as my credence in external world realism.
Knowledge: empiricism and rationalism Lean toward: empiricism
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism or invariantism Lean toward: invariantism
Laws of nature: Humean and non-Humean Accept: non-Humean
Logic: classical and non-classical Accept: classical
Mental content: internalism and externalism Lean toward: internalism
Meta-ethics: moral realism and moral anti-realism Accept: moral realism
Metaphilosophy: naturalism and non-naturalism Accept an intermediate view I think our philosophical views should be responsive to scientific data, but I also believe that we shouldn't dismiss our armchair intuitions about possibilities. I don't know if this makes me a naturalist or non-naturalist.
Mind: physicalism and non-physicalism Lean toward: physicalism Obviously this depends on what we mean by 'physicalism'. At the very least, I believe that our mental lives depend on what happens in our bodies and physical surroundings.
Moral judgment: cognitivism and non-cognitivism Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Moral motivation: internalism and externalism Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Newcomb's problem: one box and two boxes Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism or virtue ethics Lean toward: consequentialism
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism or sense-datum theory Agnostic/undecided
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view or further-fact view Lean toward: psychological view
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism or libertarianism Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Proper names: Fregean and Millian Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Science: scientific realism and scientific anti-realism Lean toward: scientific realism
Teletransporter (new matter): survival and death Lean toward: survival
Time: A-theory and B-theory Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch and don't switch Lean toward: switch
Truth: correspondence, deflationary or epistemic Accept: correspondence
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible or metaphysically possible Lean toward: conceivable but not metaphysically possible I change my mind about this very often.