•  606
    Members of oppressed groups are often silenced. One form of silencing is what Kristie Dotson calls “testimonial smothering”. Testimonial smothering occurs when a speaker limits her testimony in virtue of the reasonable risk of it being misunderstood or misapplied by the audience. Testimonial smothering is thus a form of epistemic paternalism since the speaker is interfering with the audience’s inquiry for their benefit without first consulting them. In this paper, we explore the connections betw…Read more
  •  359
    The Moral Permissibility of Nudges
    Florida Philosophical Review 19 (1): 33-47. 2020.
    Nudging is the idea that people’s decisions and behaviors can be influenced in predictable, non-coercive ways by making small changes to the choice architecture. In this paper, I differentiate between type-1 nudges and type-2 nudges according to the thinking processes involved in each. With this distinction in hand, I present the libertarian paternalistic criteria for the moral permissibility of intentional nudges. Having done this, I motivate an objection to type-1 nudges. According to this obj…Read more
  •  221
    Conscientiousness and Other Problems: A Reply to Zagzebski
    with Jonathan Matheson, Jensen Alex, and Kyle Mallard
    Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 7 (1): 10-13. 2018.
  •  212
    The Ethics and Applications of Nudges
    PANDION: The Osprey Journal of Research and Ideas 1 (2). 2020.
    Nudging is the idea that people’s decisions should be influenced in predictable, non-coercive ways by making changes to the way that options are presented to them. Central to the debate about nudging is the question of whether it is morally permissible to intentionally nudge others. Libertarian paternalists maintain that this can be the case. In this paper, I present the libertarian paternalistic criteria for the moral permissibility of intentional nudges. Having done this, I motivate two object…Read more
  •  191
    Exploring Epistemic Vices: A Review of Cassam's Vices of the Mind (review)
    Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 8 (8): 48-55. 2019.
    In Vices of the Mind, Cassam provides an accessible, engaging, and timely introduction to the nature of epistemic vices and what we can do about them. Cassam provides an account of epistemic vices and explores three broad types of epistemic vices: character traits, attitudes, and ways of thinking. Regarding each, Cassam draws insights about the nature of vices through examining paradigm instances of each type of vice and exploring their significance through real world historical examples. With h…Read more
  •  162
    A Review of Linda Zagzebski's Epistemic Authority (review)
    with Jonathan Matheson, Jensen Alex, and Kyle Mallard
    Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 6 (10): 56-59. 2017.
  •  136
    Do No Harm: Notes on The Ethical Use of Nudges
    Journal of Design Strategies 10 (1): 86-99. 2021.
    Advances in cognitive and behavioral science show that the way options are presented—commonly referred to as “choice architecture”—strongly influences our decisions: we tend to react to a particular option differently depending on how it is presented. Studies suggest that we often make irrational choices due to the interplay between choice architecture and systematic errors in our reasoning—cognitive biases. Based on this data, Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein came up with the idea of a "nudge,"…Read more
  •  84
    The Possibility of Epistemic Nudging: Reply to Grundmann
    Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 10 (8): 36-42. 2021.
    In “The Possibility of Epistemic Nudging” (2021), Thomas Grundmann examines nudging as applied to doxastic attitudes. Grundmann argues that given the right presuppositions about knowledge, justified beliefs, and the relevant belief-forming processes, doxastic nudging can result in justified beliefs and even knowledge in the nudgee. In this short response we will raise some critical concerns for Grundmann’s project as well as open up a path for epistemic nudges (nudges that result in justified be…Read more
  •  79
    Science Communication and Epistemic Injustice
    Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 8 (1): 1-9. 2019.
    Epistemic injustice occurs when someone is wronged in their capacity as a knower.[1] More and more attention is being paid to the epistemic injustices that exist in our scientific practices. In a recent paper, Fabien Medvecky argues that science communication is fundamentally epistemically unjust. In what follows we briefly explain his argument before raising several challenges to it.
  •  32
    Knowledge and Entailment (review)
    Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 7 (10): 55-58. 2018.