I have studied physics and philosophy first in Italy, my home country, and then in the United States. I have worked in the foundations of quantum mechanics. My main concern has always been how we can use our best physical theory to answer such general metaphysical questions.
In my physics doctoral dissertation (Genova, 2002), I discussed the classical limit of quantum mechanics, to analyze the connections between the quantum and the classical theories. What does it mean that a theory, in a certain approximation, reduces to another? Is the classical explanation of macroscopic phenomena essentially different from the one provided by quantum mec…
I have studied physics and philosophy first in Italy, my home country, and then in the United States. I have worked in the foundations of quantum mechanics. My main concern has always been how we can use our best physical theory to answer such general metaphysical questions.
In my physics doctoral dissertation (Genova, 2002), I discussed the classical limit of quantum mechanics, to analyze the connections between the quantum and the classical theories. What does it mean that a theory, in a certain approximation, reduces to another? Is the classical explanation of macroscopic phenomena essentially different from the one provided by quantum mechanics?
In my philosophy doctoral dissertation (Rutgers, 2007) I turned to more general questions that involve the structure of fundamental physical theories, the metaphysical status and the epistemological role of the theoretical entities used in these theories. Do all fundamental physical theories have the very same structure, contrarily to what one might think? If so, what is this telling us about the nature of explanation?
