Johannesburg, Gauteng, South Africa
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology
Meta-Ethics
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Action
  •  15
    Many influential philosophers have claimed that truth is valuable, indeed so valuable as to be the ultimate standard of correctness for intellectual activity. Yet most philosophers also think that truth is only instrumentally valuable. These commitments make for a strange pair. One would have thought that an ultimate standard would enjoy more than just instrumental value. This paper develops a new argument for the non-instrumental value of truth: inquiry is non-instrumentally valuable; and truth…Read more
  •  38
    Decolonising Knowledge Here and Now
    Philosophical Papers 49 (2): 191-212. 2020.
    The topic of epistemic decolonisation is currently the locus of lively debate both in academia and in everyday life. The aim of this piece is to isolate a few main strands in the philosophical lite...
  •  3
    What do I care About Epistemic Norms?
    In Martin Grajner & Pedro Schmechtig (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals, De Gruyter. pp. 199-224. 2016.
  •  18
    Explanatory Injustice and Epistemic Agency
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (5): 707-722. 2020.
    What is going on when we explain someone’s belief by appeal to stereotypes associated with her gender, sexuality, race, or class? In this paper I try to motivate two claims. First, such explanations involve an overlooked form of epistemic injustice, which I call ‘explanatory injustice’. Second, the language of reasons helps us shed light on the ways in which such injustice wrongs the victim qua epistemic agent. In particular, explanatory injustice is best understood as occurring in explanations …Read more
  • Believable Evidence
    Cambridge University Press. 2017.
    Believable Evidence argues that evidence consists of true beliefs. This claim opens up an entirely overlooked space on the ontology of evidence map, between purely factualist positions and purely psychologist ones. Veli Mitova provides a compelling three-level defence of this view in the first contemporary monograph entirely devoted to the ontology of evidence. First, once we see the evidence as a good reason, metaethical considerations show that the evidence must be psychological and veridical.…Read more
  •  18
    A Quasi-Pragmatist Explanation of Our Ethics of Belief
    Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 28 (3): 113-130. 2009.
  •  19
    What do I care About Epistemic Norms?
    In Pedro Schmechtig & Martin Grajner (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms, and Goals, De Gruyter. pp. 199-224. 2016.
  •  2
    Epistemic motivation: towards a metaethics of belief
    In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief, Cambridge University Press. 2011.
  •  27
    Why pragmatic justifications of epistemic norms don't work
    South African Journal of Philosophy 27 (2): 139-150. 2008.
    Pragmatic justifications of epistemic norms tell us to observe these norms as the best means to attaining the things we value. I argue that such justifications do not work, because they harbour an irresolvable tension: their non-alethic character intrinsically conflicts with the truth-aiming character of the epistemic norms they are justifying. We should abandon, then, either epistemic norms or pragmatic justifications of these norms. I therefore argue that we should abandon pragmatic justificat…Read more
  •  114
    Truthy psychologism about evidence
    Philosophical Studies 172 (4): 1105-1126. 2015.
    What sorts of things can be evidence for belief? Five answers have been defended in the recent literature on the ontology of evidence: propositions, facts, psychological states, factive psychological states, all of the above. Each of the first three views privileges a single role that the evidence plays in our doxastic lives, at the cost of occluding other important roles. The fifth view, pluralism, is a natural response to such dubious favouritism. If we want to be monists about evidence and ac…Read more
  •  50
    Why W. K. Clifford was a Closet Pragmatist
    Philosophical Papers 37 (3): 471-489. 2008.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  20
    Age and Agency
    Philosophical Papers 41 (3): 335-369. 2012.
    Abstract I defend the following three-part hypothesis: (1) the sense that one is running out of time diminishes one's capacity to reauthor oneself; (2) this capacity is constitutive of agency par excellence; so, (3) the sense of running out of time attenuates agency. (2) is shown to enjoy both intuitive and abductive plausibility. (1) and (3) are confirmed by existing reflections on old age, as well as by empirical research
  •  30
    The value of epistemic norms
    South African Journal of Philosophy 24 (2): 65-76. 2005.
    t is argued that, contrary to popular pragmatist opinion, the source of epistemic normativity does not lie in the realm of practical rationality. Epistemic norms are indeed hypothetical, as the pragmatist anticipates, but he has misjudged how much their antecedent can do for him. I first consider the most general argument available to the pragmatist. I then focus on the way John Heil and Hilary Kornblith have refined it. Kornblith's position poses the most plausible challenge to the defender of …Read more