Vicente Medina

El artículo consta de cuatro partes. En la primera parte, la introducción, señalo algunos aspectos de la importancia del proyecto. Segundo, describo y evalúo como Varela interpreta la filosofía. Tercero, exploro su eclecticismo dentro de su filosofía. Por último, explico el concepto de utilidad en el quehacer filosófico de Varela. Estos tres conceptos: filosofía, eclecticismo y utilidad están correlacionados en su obra. La filosofía con la recta razón. El eclecticismo, o lo que Varela llama la “verdadera filosofía,” con la sabia selección de argumentos, incluyendo diversos métodos para explorar nuestras experiencias cotidianas, y la utilidad con la mesurada evaluación de nuestra conducta, incluyendo el bien común. Dado que estos tres conceptos son polisémicos, ellos pueden ser manipulados, y de hecho han sido tergiversados, por pensadores que han tratado de explicar el pensamiento filosófico vareliano con fines partidistas, ya sea con buenas intenciones o con fines ideológicos tendenciosos.

The polemic was an important cultural event in 19th-century Cuba. From 1838 to 1840, issues of metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, pedagogy, and the influence of Victor Cousin’s eclecticism were discussed in the island’s leading newspapers. A brief historical account preceding the polemic is offered. It is argued that the predominant view of the polemic as motivated by a widespread desire for Cuba’s independence from Spain is misleading — promoting an emancipatory myth. Lastly, it is argued that José de la Luz y Caballero’s appeal to patriotism during the polemic unwittingly established a dangerous precedent for self-appointed guardians of patriotism to condition public debates.

In this paper, it is argued that terrorism undermines the justification of perspective relativism. The cliché, “one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter,” is offered as an example of perspective relativism. Perspective relativists argue that moral principles and judgments have no universal moral import. Those who defend the cliché expression presuppose that the evaluation of terrorism is necessarily perspectival. For them, there are no morally objective differences, e.g., between deliberately killing combatants and deliberately killing innocent noncombatants. Yet there are morally objective differences between these two acts. While the first act might be justified, the second act is considered murder. Hence, the evaluation of terrorism is not necessarily perspectival. Therefore, in the face of the evil that terrorists bring about, it is argued that perspective relativists have a substantive burden of proof to show that there are no transcultural moral values.

In my replies to some of my critics I argue that while the practice of terrorism is never justified, I concede that it is rarely but sometimes excused. As result, those who engage in excusable terrorism has a substantial burden of proof. They need to offer a compelling argument to show that the harm caused by their terrorist violence is actually excused by the extenuating circumstances and the goal that they are trying to achieve, so they will not be morally or legally blameworthy for bringing about such harm. I am assuming that they will need to demonstrate that the alleged harm is excusable because it is necessary to accomplish a worthy goal and there is no other reasonable way to obtain such a worthy goal without deliberately harming those who can be reasonably conceived of as impeccably or objectively innocent. That is, those who are innocent beyond reasonable doubt.

In this article, it is argued that a significant internal tension exists in John Rawls' political liberalism. He holds the following positions that might plausibly be considered incongruous: (1) a commitment to tolerating a broad right of freedom of political speech, including a right of subversive advocacy; (2) a commitment to restricting this broad right if it is intended to incite and likely to bring about imminent violence; and (3) a commitment to curbing this broad right only if there is a constitutional crisis. By supporting a broad right of freedom of political speech in Political Liberalism, he allows militant intolerant people such as Jihadists, White Supremacists and Neo-Nazis to advocate publicly their dangerously intolerant beliefs. Public advocacy of dangerously intolerant beliefs can be construed as subversive advocacy. As demonstrated by the historical examples of the Weimar Republic and the Second Spanish Republic, militant intolerant groups could use a right of subversive advocacy to threaten the stability of liberal democracies. Hence, by allowing them to exercise a broad right of freedom of political speech, Rawls could jeopardize that which he intends to defend, namely the actual political stability of a liberal democratic order. Lastly, Rawls' conception of ideal constitutional interpretation, which privileges a broad right of freedom of political speech, might be insufficient to deal effectively with the threat posed by militant intolerant groups. Yet a tradition of American constitutional interpretation that balances freedom of speech with other important constitutional and/or political values has overcome a civil war, two world wars, the Cold War and the 9/11 terrorist attacks without abandoning democracy or permanently renouncing those values. Still, Rawls' ideal approach to constitutional interpretation might, in hindsight, help us to understand some of the excesses and deficiencies of American jurisprudence in times of emergency.<br><br><br><br>.

In this article, I contend that the three Cuban philosophers/pedagogues of the nineteenth century – Félix Varela y Morales, José de la Luz y Caballero, and Enrique José Varona were responsible for overcoming the teaching of late scholastic at the Royal and Pontifical University of St. Jerome of Havana. Against late scholastic philosophers and pedagogues who preferred syllogistic logic and the authority of tradition over induction, they argued in favor of the latter over the first. Since they defended liberal and republican ideas, they also argued against those who appeal to the authority of tradition rather than to our ordinary experiences. Of course, their liberal spirit challenged not only the tyrannical regime imposed by Spain at the time but any other regime whose authority depends on force rather than on the will of the people.

The claim that historians “write from a present-day perspective” does not entail that the past only matters when interpreted by categories of social justice. The past is a set of amorphous events and people, including their actions and motives. So, historians are free to explore various aspects of it to offer meaningful and compelling interpretations without necessarily privileging one category. The past is richer than we can humanely understand. Hence, it is important that new generations of scholars revise it from different angles and without ideological restrictions.

The adage, “one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter,” is offered as a plausible example of evoking moral relativism. Moral relativists recognize no transcultural moral facts. So, for them, even the concept of harm would be subjective or context-sensitive. Yet one can appeal to cogent transcultural moral reasons to distinguish between deliberately and unjustifiably harming impeccably innocent people and those who might engage in justifiably harming those guilty of grave crimes. In the face of the preventable evil acts that terrorists frequently perpetrate against impeccably innocent people, it is argued that moral relativists have a substantive burden of proof to demonstrate that no cogent transcultural moral reasons exist against the practice of terrorism. In the absence of such a demonstration, it is reasonable to believe that the practice of terrorism, while not totally defeating moral relativism, seems to undermine its credibility.

The so-called cultural war in classics seems to have evolved into a false dilemma, at least according to Dan-el Padilla Peralta’s and Johanna Hanink’s understanding of their profession (“If Classics Doesn’t Change, Let It Burn, The Chronicle Review, February 11): Either one accepts the views of those who have glorified and romanticized about Roman and Greek classical culture or one accepts the views of those who are ready to “burn down” the classical tradition. Between the two extremes there is plenty of room and issues to be explored from serious, critical, and contestable points of view.

Hamas’s deliberate attack on October 7th against innocent civilians is absolutely wrong. Therefore, it should be universally condemned. And yet, I wonder how a universal recognition of an absolute duty of respect for human dignity can help solving the existential conflict confronting Israelis and Palestinians. Ideally, a two-state solution proposed by the international community can be seen as a reasonable and fair compromise. Nevertheless, the reality on the ground is different. Thus far the existence of one state has precluded the existence of another with no end in sight to their mutually destructive violence. Their conflict demands that people who are reasonable and fair-minded try to understand it holistically and to offer an impartial assessment of this intractable conflict without relativizing the undeserved human suffering of all those involved and affected by it.

The controversy over the possibility of an indigenous Latin American Philosophy might be understood as dealing with an older question about the nature of philosophy itself: Is the nature of philosophy purely speculative, practical, or both? For the sake of argument, I am using the term “Latin American Philosophy” in a normative sense as referring to social and political philosophy written by Latin Americans to change oppressive conditions and policies affecting their societies. I am assuming that liberation philosophers fall under the above description. Unlike liberationists, I argue that universalist philosophers can present illuminating and hence persuasive arguments for their position. Of course, liberationists might argue that I am begging the question. But if they could successfully demonstrate that I am doing so, they would be compelled to appeal to at least some nonarbitrary principle of adjudication. If they were to do so, they would be supporting rather than undermining my argument in favor of a universalist conception of philosophy.

Primero, arguyo que aunque el término “terrorismo” es debatible eso no es suficiente para justificar el ataque a personas que pudieran ser consideradas como no combatientes o civiles inocentes más allá de cualquier duda razonable; segundo, que los estados pueden ser tan crueles y viciosos, o aún más, que los propios actores no estatales en perpetrar actos que pudiéramos describir como actos terroristas, y tercero, que una definición adecuada del término “terrorismo internacional” debe estar enfocada en identificar y valorar sobre todo a las víctimas inocentes de estos actos macabros de violencia.

El ataque deliberado de Hamás el 7 de octubre contra civiles inocentes es absolutamente inicuo. Por lo tanto, debe ser condenado universalmente. Y, sin embargo, me pregunto cómo un reconocimiento universal de un deber absoluto de respeto por la dignidad humana puede ayudar a resolver el conflicto existencial al que se enfrentan israelíes y palestinos. Idealmente, una solución de dos Estados propuesta por la comunidad internacional puede ser vista como un compromiso razonable y justo. Sin embargo, la realidad sobre el terreno es diferente. Hasta ahora, la existencia de un Estado ha impedido la existencia de otro, sin que se vislumbre el final de su violencia mutuamente destructiva. Su conflicto exige que las personas razonables e imparciales traten de entenderlo de manera holística y de ofrecer una evaluación justa de este conflicto insoluble sin relativizar el sufrimiento humano inmerecido de todos los involucrados y afectados por él.

Carl Schmitt contends that liberal constitutionalism or the rule of law fails because it neglects the state of exception and the political, namely politics viewed as a distinction between friend and enemy groups. Yet, as a representative of liberal constitutionalism, Locke grapples with the state of exception by highlighting a magistrate prerogative and/or the right of the majority to act during a serious political crisis. Rather than neglecting the political, Locke’s state of war presupposes it. My thesis is that Schmitt’s assault against Locke’s liberal constitutionalism is one-sided, and hence Locke’s militant liberalism can disarm it. In support of my thesis I shall argue (1) that Schmitt overlooks Locke’s distinction between liberty and license; (2) that, ironically, Schmitt’s conception of politics resembles Locke’s state of war; and (3) that Locke’s liberalism is militant rather than neutral because it excludes extremists from enjoying equal civil and political rights, as reasonable citizens do, to compete for political power.

La polémica fue un importante evento cultural durante el siglo XIX en Cuba. De 1838 a 1840 se debatieron en los principales periódicos de la isla temas en torno a la metafísica, la epistemología, la ética, la pedagogía y la influencia del eclecticismo de Víctor Cousin. Exploro en esta investigación brevemente algunos de los hechos históricos que antecedieron a esta polémica. Arguyo que es inexacta la interpretación predominante que esta polémica fue motivada por el deseo de independizar a Cuba de España. Tal interpretación promueve un mito de emancipación. Según mi análisis, cuando en su intervención en la polémica José de la Luz y Caballero apela al patriotismo, establece sin saberlo un precedente peligroso que usarán los autodenominados protectores del patriotismo para restringir los debates públicos. La polémica filosófica en la Habana se refiere a una serie de debates públicos que acaecieron en el siglo XIX en Cuba principalmente entre jóvenes intelectuales de la época. Con frecuencia estos debates resultaron en argumentos apasionados y algunas veces en ataques ad hominem entre los participantes de dicha polémica.

Vitoria and Suárez defend the categorical immunity of the innocent not to be intentionally killed. But they allow for inflicting collective punishment on the innocent and the noninnocent alike during and after a just war. So they allow for deliberately harming them. Inflicting harm on the innocent can often result in their death. Hence, holding both claims seems incoherent. First, the objections against using the term “innocent” are explained. Second, their views on just war are explored. And third, by appealing to Aquinas' double-effect reasoning, it is shown how they try to avoid the above-mentioned incoherence. Still, their appeal might be insufficient to palliate the tension between the above-mentioned claims. If just wars are possible, the deliberate harming of the innocent is reasonably unavoidable for defeating and punishing those who wage them. Hence, defenders of just wars, whether from a religious or a secular perspective, must live with such a tension

This paper explores whether terrorist violence could be morally justified or excused. It defends the absolute immunity of innocent people against those who might want to sacrifice them for other goals. The defense is based on recognizing people’s stringent natural duty of nonmaleficence, which entails an obligation on moral agents to refrain from intentionally bringing about harm or significant risk of it to the innocent. The paper is divided into two parts. The first part distinguishes between unconditional and conditional critics’ arguments regarding the use of terrorist violence, and between a narrow and a broad definition of terrorism. While unconditional critics accept the narrow definition or one akin to it because they equate terrorism with murder, conditional critics accept the broad definition or one akin to it because they attempt to justify or excuse the use of terrorism based, e.g., on an analogy with a just war approach, consequentialism, moral relativism, supreme emergency or last resort. Exception is taken with the latter arguments since they attempt to justify or excuse morally unjustifiable and inexcusable actions such as the deliberate use of violence against the innocent. The second part explores plausible conditional critics’ reasons for justifying or excusing the 9/11/01 attacks and find them wanting. If the argument works, then, with minor modifications, it could also apply to the 3/11/04 attacks in Madrid, the 7/7/05 attacks in London, and similar attacks elsewhere.

Physicians, so it will be argued have by virtue of their profession a weightier obligation than patients to disclose their HIV infection, and also have a duty to refrain from performing exposure-prone invasive procedures. This argument supports both the AMA and CDC guidelines on HIV infected health care workers (HCWS), while undermining the recommendations against disclosure suggested by the National Commission on AIDS (NCA). The argument is divided into three parts. First, a distinction is made between entrenched and fuzzy roles. Second, the physician-patient relationship is described as essentially fiduciary rather than businesslike or merely contractual. Third, the conflict between patients' and physicians' right to know is portrayed as one between patients' and physicians' right to life. Last, given the the probability of infection from seropositive patients to seronegative physicians, and, conversely, is roughly the same, it is recommended as a fair social policy that whenever an invasive procedure occurs, both physicians and patients have a duty to disclose any serious infection that may jeopardize their lives.

A fundamental tension exists between Rawls's ideal Kantian conception of justice as fairness (JAF), which requires respecting people as ends, and his realistic non-Kantian consequentialist conception of a supreme emergency in a just war. By justifying the targeting of objectively innocent noncombatants during a supreme emergency exception, Rawls allows for treating them as means only. Hence, his appeal to a supreme emergency is insufficient to avoid this tension. First, since for him JAF is ideal but also practical, one might argue that his fictional people in the original position must reflect on the justification for using force on behalf of JAF. And second, since Rawls justifies targeting objectively innocent people during a supreme emergency exemption, he justifies what one might conceive of as emergency terrorism. Emergency terrorism, however, treats people as means only. Therefore, Rawls's Kantian conception of JAF is in tension with his consequentialist justification of a supreme emergency in a just war and hence with emergency terrorism.

I offer a hopefully compelling defense of the view of those whom I refer to as hard-core opponents of terrorism. For hard-core opponents, terrorism is categorically wrong and, therefore, morally and legally unjustified. I view terrorism as either equivalent to murder or man slaughter in domestic law, or equivalent to crimes against humanity or war crimes in international law. If my argument is compelling, at least two important results follow from it. First, that under no circumstances is terrorism justified. And second, that even if my argument were to be compelling, it will not necessarily end debates about the nature, justification, or excuse of terrorism.

“Terrorism” is a polysemic, emotionally laden term. Belligerent groups could be labeled “terrorist” by some and “freedom” or “guerrilla” fighters by others. Similarly, the same organization or group could be labeled “terrorist” by some and “humanitarian organization” by others. Hence, depending on which perspective people take in a given conflict, and how the international community reacts to the conflict in question, members of different organizations or groups might end up being classified in a negative sense as terrorists or in a positive sense as freedom fighters. Such perspectivism partly explains why so much disagreement exists on the meaning, justification, or excuse of terrorism.

Different forms of contractarianism are assessed and explained. The concept of the social contract, as it is used by Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, and Rawls, is found to be inadequate for the development of a coherent political philosophy. Moreover it is argued that both contractarians as well as the anti-contractarians I shall consider fail in their account of political authority and in their account of political obligation. If this is so, then it follows that there is no general prima facie moral obligation to obey the state and its institutions. Thus it is argued that most citizens do not have political obligations. The legitimacy of the state and its institutions will ultimately depend upon its moral qualities