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526Comment on Amie Thomasson's "self-awareness and self-knowledge"PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12. 2006.In this paper, I raise an objection to Thomasson
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395Aristotle on consciousnessMind 111 (444): 751-815. 2002.Aristotle's discussion of perceiving that we perceive has points of contact with two contemporary debates about consciousness: the first over whether consciousness is an intrinsic feature of mental states or a higher-order thought or perception; the second concerning the qualitative nature of experience. In both cases, Aristotle's views cut down the middle of an apparent dichotomy, in a way that does justice to each set of intuitions, while avoiding their attendant difficulties. With regard to t…Read more
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238Aristotle and the problem of intentionalityPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2): 249-298. 1998.Aristotle not only formulates the problem of intentionality explicitly, he makes a solution to it a requirement for any adequate theory of mind. His own solution, however, is not to be found in his theory of sensation, as Brentano and others have thought. In fact, it is precisely because Aristotle regards this theory as inadequate that he goes on to argue for a distinct new ability he calls "phantasia." The theory of content he develops on this basis (unlike Brentano's) is profoundly naturalisti…Read more
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199Epiphenomenalisms, ancient and modernPhilosophical Review 106 (3): 309-363. 1997.This debate, I shall argue, has everything to do with Aristotle. Aristotle raises the charge of epiphenomenalism himself against a theory that seems to have close affinities to his own, and he offers what has the makings of an emergentist response. This leads to controversy within his own school. We find opponents ranged on both sides, starting with his own pupils, several of whom are stout defenders of epiphenomenalism, and culminating in the developed emergentism of later commentators. Aristot…Read more
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165Aristotle's Two Intellects: A Modest ProposalPhronesis 44 (3): 199-227. 1999.In "De anima" 3.5, Aristotle argues for the existence of a second intellect, the so-called "Agent Intellect." The logical structure of his argument turns on a distinction between different types of soul, rather than different faculties within a given soul; and the attributes he assigns to the second species make it clear that his concern here -- as at the climax of his other great works, such as the "Metaphysics," the "Nicomachean" and the "Eudemian Ethics" -- is the difference between the human…Read more
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84Aristotle on the Reality of Colors and Other Perceptible QualitiesRes Philosophica 95 (1): 35-68. 2017.Recent interpreters portray Aristotle as a Protagorean antirealist, who thinks that colors and other perceptibles do not actually exist apart from being perceived. Against this, I defend a more traditional interpretation: colors exist independently of perception, to which they are explanatorily prior, as causal powers that produce perceptions of themselves. They are not to be identified with mere dispositions to affect perceivers, or with grounds distinct from these qualities, picked out by thei…Read more
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83Form without Matter: Empedocles and Aristotle on Color PerceptionPhilosophical Review 126 (3): 385-389. 2017.
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67Aristotle on Perceiving Objects by Anna MarmodoroJournal of the History of Philosophy 53 (4): 776-777. 2015.The study of Aristotle’s psychology has long been dominated by metaphysical concerns, centering above all on the relation between the soul and the body. For centuries, this was inevitable, given the widespread preoccupation with immortality and considerable puzzlement as to whether Aristotle’s views about the intellect committed him to it or not. But in the twentieth century the soul-body relation has continued to be the main focus, even when talking about perception. The debate over perception …Read more
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59Pourquoi aristote a besoin de l'imaginationLes Etudes Philosophiques. forthcoming.Le présent article offre une nouvelle interprétation du concept aristotélicien d' « imagination » ou phantasia par les moyens d'une lecture attentive du Traité de l'âme, III, 3, tout particulièrement de son début. Aristote soutient que ses prédécesseurs ne peuvent expliquer comment l'erreur se produit. Mais c'est également une difficulté pour sa propre explication des formes de base de la perception et de la pensée, et Aristote introduit la phantasia précisément pour répondre à cette question. I…Read more
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50Aristotle on the Relation of the Intellect to the Body: Commentary on BroadieProceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 12 (1): 177-192. 1996.
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35Review of David Sedley, Plato's Cratylus (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (7). 2004.
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34Review of Dorothea Frede (ed.), Brad Inwood (ed.), Language and Learning: Philosophy of Language in the Hellenistic Age (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (5). 2006.
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34Colloquium 5Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 16 (1): 135-175. 2000.
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33Presocratic philosophy: essays in honour of Alexander Mourelatos (edited book)Ashgate. 2002.This book presents some of the most recent trends and developments in Presocratic scholarship. A wide range of topics are covered - from the metaphysical to the moral to the methodological - as well as a broad a range of authors: from recognized figures such as Heraclitus and Parmenides to Sophistic thinkers whose place has traditionally been marginalized, such as Gorgias and the author of the Dissoi Logoi. Several of the pieces are concerned with the later reception and influence of the Presocr…Read more
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32Epiphenomenalisms, Ancient and ModernPhilosophical Review 106 (3): 309-363. 1997.This debate, I shall argue, has everything to do with Aristotle. Aristotle raises the charge of epiphenomenalism himself against a theory that seems to have close affinities to his own, and he offers what has the makings of an emergentist response. This leads to controversy within his own school. We find opponents ranged on both sides, starting with his own pupils, several of whom are stout defenders of epiphenomenalism, and culminating in the developed emergentism of later commentators. Aristot…Read more
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32Aristotle and the Problem of IntentionalityPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2): 249-298. 1998.Aristotle not only fonnulates the problem of intentionality explicitly, he makes a solution to it a requirement for any adequate theory of mind. His own solution, however, is not to be found in his theory of sensation, as Brentano and others have thought. In fact, it is precisely because Aristotle regards this theory as inadequate that he goes on to argue for a distinct new ability he calls “phantasia.” The theory of content he develops on this basis (unlike Brentano’s) is profoundly naturalisti…Read more
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26Commentary on Kurt Pritzl: Aristotle on the conditions of thoughtProceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 14 (1): 202-212. 1998.
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23Ancient and Medieval Theories of IntentionalityBrill. 2001.This volume, including sixteen contributions, analyses ancient and medieval theories of intentionality in various contexts: perception, imagination, and intellectual thinking. It sheds new light on classical theories and examines neglected sources, both Greek and Latin
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20Commentary on MillerProceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 15 (1): 214-230. 1999.
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17Theophrastus on PerceivingRhizomata 7 (2): 188-225. 2020.Many fragments from Theophrastus on perception are preserved by the late Neoplatonist, Priscian of Lydia. After preliminary source criticism concerning how to identify the fragments, I turn to Theophrastus’ discussion of perceiving and perceptual awareness. While he clearly rejects literalism, he also does not embrace “spiritualism”: he argues instead that we receive the defining proportions of perceptible qualities in the sense organ, though in different contraries than in the perceptible (ther…Read more
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15Colloquium 6Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 9 (1): 213-245. 1993.
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15Phantasia and ThoughtIn Georgios Anagnostopoulos (ed.), A Companion to Aristotle, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 322-34. 2009.This chapter contains sections titled: Phantasia Thought Notes Bibliography.
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9Aristotle's PsychologyIn Sean D. Kirkland & Eric Sanday (eds.), A Companion to Ancient Philosophy, Northwestern University Press. 2018.This chapter contains sections titled: The Soul–Body Relation Perception Phantasia Thought Bibliography.
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